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Financial resilience and managing financial risks are key factors of a successful
financial inclusion. The personal factors that shape financial management are,
yet, not well understood. This dissertation studies how non-standard economic
preferences and beliefs might help explain different financial management prac-
tices of households. The focus is on countries that are on the verge of becoming
high income economies and where financial products and inclusion are steadily ex-
panding. Four domains of financial risk management are considered. Chapter two
analyzes the relationship between inequality aversion and insurance take-up. To
this end, a novel measure for inequality aversion is constructed and employed in a
household panel survey in Thailand. In chapter three, the effect of social compar-
ison on debt taking is investigated in a lab experiment in Germany to disentangle
two kinds of peer effects: social image concerns and peer information. Chapter
four explores potential differences in uncertainty preferences and in beliefs be-
tween supposedly high-risk managers: necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs
as well as return migrants in Albania and Kosovo. In chapter five, beliefs and
their potential effect on over-indebtedness are studied using the same panel sam-
ple in Thailand as in chapter two. All chapters follow a common methodological
approach by using lab(-in-the-field) experiments. In three chapters, lab evidence
is set in relation to real life outcomes elicited with self-reported survey data.
v
Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Finanzielle Resilienz und der Umgang mit finanziellen Risiken sind wesentliche
Bestandteile einer erfolgreichen finanziellen Inklusion. Die persönlichen Faktoren,
die finanzielles Management formen, sind allerdings nicht umfassend bekannt.
Diese Dissertation untersucht wie nicht-standard-ökonomische Präferenzen und
Vorstellungen („Beliefs“) dazu beitragen können verschiedene Vorgehensweisen
im finanziellen Risikomanagement von Haushalten zu verstehen. Der Fokus liegt
dabei auf Ländern, die kurz davor stehen einkommensstarke Ökonomien zu wer-
den und in denen die Auswahl an finanziellen Produkten und die finanzielle Inklu-
sion stetig wachsen. Vier Bereiche des finanziellen Risikomanagements werden be-
trachtet. Kapitel zwei analysiert den Zusammenhang zwischen Ungleichheitsaver-
sion und der Aufnahme von Versicherungen. Dazu wird ein neuartiges Maß für
Ungleichheitsaversion konstruiert und in einer Haushalts-Panelumfrage in Thai-
land verwendet. In Kapitel drei wird der Effekt von sozialen Vergleichen auf
die Schuldenaufnahme in einem Laborexperiment in Deutschland untersucht um
zwei Arten von Peer Effekten zu entflechten: Sorge um das soziale Ansehen und
Peer Information. Kapitel vier erforscht potenzielle Unterschiede in Unsicher-
heitspräferenzen und in Beliefs zwischen Individuen, die vermeintlich ein hohes
Risiko managen: Selbständige aus der Notwendigkeit und Selbstständige aus der
Möglichkeit heraus als auch Menschen mit Migrationsgeschichte in Albanien und
im Kosovo. In Kapitel fünf werden Beliefs und deren potenzieller Effekt auf Über-
schuldung innerhalb der gleichen Panel-Stichprobe in Thailand wie in Kapitel zwei
studiert. Alle Kapitel folgen einem gemeinsamen methodologischen Ansatz indem
Labor- oder sogenannte lab-in-the-field-Experimente verwendet werden. In drei
Kapiteln wird die Evidenz aus dem Labor in Relation zu Resultaten aus dem
wahren Leben gesetzt, die mit selbstberichteten Umfragedaten erfasst werden.
vi
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Lesson no. 1: Making comparisons can spoil your happiness. [...]
Lesson no. 3: Many people see happiness only in their future. [...]
Lesson no. 5: Sometimes happiness is not knowing the whole story.
Hector and the Search for Happiness
François Lelord (2010)
Managing financial risks and being financially resilient are key elements of
successful financial inclusion (Karlan and Morduch, 2010). Not just unexpected
shocks can have severe consequences for individuals, but also expected expenses,
if they do not have the means to cover these. Thus, deciding which risks to in-
sure and which risks to take in the first place are crucial components of household
financial management. For example, borrowing enables individuals to invest in
assets they could otherwise not afford but bears the risk of defaulting if they are
not resilient to financial shocks or if they mismanage their finances. In addition,
especially in settings where risk is frequently beyond one’s control, building re-
silience is an important policy goal of development banks around the world (Asian
Development Bank, 2019; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018).
Financial risk management can build on insurances and safety nets, on savings
or assets, on borrowing, even on changing occupations, or on changing liability
structures. Risk management not only means being prepared for shocks but
also making it possible to take risks that potentially entail larger benefits. As
positive correlations between risk and expected gains can be found in various
domains, having no insurance and being fully liable, just like lacking savings and
opportunities to borrow, can prevent people from more profitable investments.
For example, having no insurance might hamper investment in more risky but, in
return, more profitable crops (e.g. Cole et al., 2017; Karlan et al., 2014). Similarly,
2 Chapter 1
being self-employed might lead to higher income or independence but due to high
individual liability, some are deterred from entering the market (e.g. Hvide and
Moen, 2010; Paulson and Townsend, 2004).
A central question that emerges is what eventually determines how people
manage financial risks and how they decide which risks to take. Naturally, there
are binding factors that are not in the hand of the individual, e.g. access to finance
and insurance, as well as legal liability structures, that limit or change financial
risk management (e.g. Beck et al., 2008; Bruhn and Love, 2014; Burgess et al.,
2005). Beyond this, household characteristics are still an important determinant
of financial management, as even at high levels of financial inclusion there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity across household management practices. There are “hard,”
socio-economic factors, like initial wealth, income, age, and sex of the household
head, that partially explain the prevalence of borrowing, entrepreneurship, insur-
ance, and savings (see Beshears et al., 2018). Yet, there are still many unresolved
questions, especially with regard to household debt management (Zinman, 2015),
insurance take-up (Baicker et al., 2012; Cole et al., 2013), and decisions to become
entrepreneurs (Astebro et al., 2014).
Standard theoretical models fail to explain the high prevalence of household
debt and entrepreneurial activity as well as the lack of insurance. Non-standard
preferences and beliefs, not captured in these models, seem to be a fruitful av-
enue in trying to better understand household risk management. Non-standard
uncertainty preferences, like loss aversion or ambiguity aversion, are the most
obvious starting point. There is an increasing, albeit small, body of literature
on the relation of these to real-life risk management. Other non-standard, for
instance social, preferences seem to play an important role in managing financial
risk as well (see Beshears et al., 2018, for an overview). Furthermore, individ-
ual beliefs are crucial when outcomes are risky or uncertain (Fox and Tversky,
1998). However, the impact of these on real-life financial decisions is still not well
researched.
These considerations are also true for emerging markets and middle income
countries, where a tremendous increase in financial inclusion and opportunities
and, at the same time, still fragile political and economic systems, ask for explicit
research on households’ financial risk management (IMF, 2017). For example, in
countries like Albania or Thailand, which are both upper-middle-income coun-
tries, most people still report relying on money from family and friends if an
emergency occurs, which is an incomplete form of insurance (Karlan and Mor-
duch, 2010). In other aspects, the two countries are completely different: in
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Thailand the share of households with savings is extremely high in comparison to
Albania; while, simultaneously, the household debt to GDP ratio is eight times
larger in Thailand (IMF, 2017; World Bank, 2017). More research is needed on
how preferences and beliefs potentially shape these outcomes.
This dissertation concentrates on the role of non-standard preferences and be-
liefs in managing financial risks. Thereby, a special focus is set on upper-middle-
income countries. The dissertation contributes to understanding how behavioral
factors, in comparison to socio-demographic factors, affect financial decisions and
risk management. The four chapters address four areas of financial risk manage-
ment: insurance take-up, borrowing, entrepreneurship, and migration. Chapters
two and three concentrate on non-standard preferences, chapter five rather fo-
cusses on beliefs, while chapter four explores both.
Chapter two analyzes the relationship between inequality aversion and insur-
ance take-up. To this end, a novel measure for inequality aversion is constructed
and employed in a household panel survey in Thailand. In chapter three, the
effect of social comparison on debt taking is investigated in a lab experiment
in Germany to disentangle two kinds of peer effects: social image concerns and
peer information. Chapter four explores differences in uncertainty preferences
and beliefs between supposedly high-risk managers: necessity and opportunity
entrepreneurs as well as return migrants in Albania and Kosovo. In chapter
five, beliefs and their potential effect on over-indebtedness are studied using the
same panel sample in Thailand as in chapter two. All chapters follow a common
methodological approach by using lab(-in-the-field) experiments. In three chap-
ters, lab evidence is set in relation to real life outcomes elicited with self-reported
survey data.
Summary of the Dissertation
In chapter two, which is joint work with Lukas Menkhoff and Ulrich Schmidt, a
new measure for inequality aversion is developed. The measure is called coupled
lotteries because two persons face identical binary lotteries and the only decision
they have to take is if they want to play the lotteries coupled or separated.
Coupled means the lotteries are perfectly positively correlated and separated
means the lotteries are drawn independently from each other. If lotteries are
coupled, there is no outcome inequality. Hence, we obtain an easy, cheap, fast,
and ready-to-use measure for inequality aversion, which is an advancement in the
literature. Previous measures are either not able to clearly disentangle inequality
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aversion and other social preferences or are more complicated to assess, requiring
various structural assumptions.
Our method is tested in a panel survey in rural Thailand and supplementally
in a lab in Germany. First, we confirm the existing literature by finding that
our measure for inequality aversion is related to other individual preferences,
namely risk aversion and social status concerns. Second, as most of the rural,
agricultural households in Thailand are still not sufficiently insured, we analyze if
those household heads who are inequality averse are more likely to have some kind
of formal or informal insurance for their households. Theoretical considerations
hypothesize a positive relationship between inequality aversion and insurance,
which is confirmed by our analysis. Finally, we do not find that coupling is
correlated with giving in the dictator game, which is one of the commonly used,
albeit flawed, measures for inequality aversion.
Thus, we contribute to the literature by constructing a more rigorous measure
for inequality aversion and by providing empirical evidence for a link between in-
equality aversion and the inclination to insure. So far, there is only little evidence
on how inequality aversion might be related to managing financial risk. Our study
helps shed light on one particular aspect.
Chapter three, co-authored with Antonia Grohmann, contributes to the rela-
tively small literature on determinants of household debt. Using a lab experiment
in Germany, we try to disentangle two channels through which social comparison
-comparing with others- might influence consumption and subsequently debt tak-
ing: we isolate social image concerns and peer information effects. Additionally,
we study if certain character types are more prone to social comparison effects.
There are still not many studies investigating if people are willing to finance
consumption out of social comparison motives with taking a credit. However,
borrowing to finance conspicuous consumption could contribute to the steep in-
crease in household debt seen around the world. Furthermore, in comparison to
social image concerns, peer information effects are even less frequently analyzed
in the nexus of consumption and borrowing (see Bursztyn and Jensen, 2017).
We find that in our setting, social image concerns do not lead to more debt
taking but peer information does. Social image concerns actually lead to less
debt taking as participants have social image concerns of a different kind than we
expected. Surprisingly, we find a rather large effect of peer information that is
likely to be driven by a preference for conformity. Participants moderately con-
verge to the choices of others, which results in less or more debt taking depending
on where they are placed in the distribution of incomes.
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We lack power to precisely measures effects for most of the character traits
but we believe this is a promising direction for future research as we find some
evidence for heterogenous effects. Most of all, social comparison effects in financial
decision making seem to be important determinants that are understudied so far.
Chapter four, co-authored with J. Michelle Brock, analyzes potential differ-
ences in ambiguity aversion attitudes and uncertainty preferences between en-
trepreneurs out of necessity and those out of opportunity as well as compares
both to another group of occupational risk-takers, return migrants. Furthermore,
before eliciting preferences for strategic and non-strategic uncertainty, we apply
a treatment. The treatment is supposed to exogenously vary the perceived level
of competence with respect to judging other people’s market entry decision.
The difference in willingness to enter the market and the frequently ob-
served difference in profitibality between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs’
businesses is still not well understood. Our study concentrates on uncertainty
preferences and beliefs, which are understudied in the general literature on en-
trepreneurship. The literature on whether entrepreneurs are more risk taking
than others is inconclusive, which could be (i) because entrepreneurs do not dif-
fer in their willingness to take risks but in their willingness to take uncertainty and
their perception of uncertainty; and (ii) because another group of occupational
risk-takers in the comparison group confounds the results: migrants. Therefore,
we concentrate on non-standard uncertainty preferences and isolate return mi-
grants to compare them separately to entrepreneurs.
Although we do not find very pronounced differences in ambiguity aversion
across the groups, opportunity entrepreneurs and returnees are significantly more
a-insensitive than necessity entrepreneurs, which means they more often treat
uncertain gambles like 50-50 chances. Furthermore, necessity entrepreneurs are
less willing to take non-strategic uncertain gambles than the other two groups
in our control treatment. However, they react strongest to our treatment and
experience a large boost for tolerating uncertainty. Return migrants are, in turn,
almost immune to the treatment. In general, it seems that the treatment does
not increase perceived capability but rather the level of general optimism. Those
who have the feeling they have no other choice than starting a business profit the
most from this treatment, which is informative for business trainings and other
policy interventions that seek to spur entrepreneurship and business survival.
In chapter five, after looking at how non-standard preferences affect debt
taking, the dissertation turns to beliefs as another potential determinant in a
setting where expectation formation is crucial. Observing the same households in
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rural Thailand as in chapter two, Theres Klühs, Wiebke Stein, and I investigate if
positive expectations about future household income increases the likelihood and
severity of over-indebtedness. As previously noted, household debt in Thailand is
extremely high and simultaneously, there is large income uncertainty, especially
in rural areas where households mostly engage in agriculture. A downside of high
financial inclusion in some emerging markets could be that insufficient screening
actually harms households in the long-run as they borrow excessively.
We construct a survey specifically to collect extensive data on objective and
subjective over-indebtedness indicators as well as to elicit quantitative income
expectations. We use these measures for our estimations, where, importantly, we
control for household characteristics and other factors like unexpected shocks that
potentially confound the relationship between expectations and over-indebtedness.
To identify one possible channel how expectations can lead to more debt taking,
we also conduct a lab-in-the field experiment with the same households. In the
experiment, we investigate the causal effect of over-confidence on borrowing.
Our results suggest a robust and strong link between positive income expec-
tations and over-indebtedness. Results are slightly different for objective and
subjective over-indebtedness indicators, but all point in the direction that pos-
itive expectations contribute to being over-indebted. This is supported by the
additional result that households that are more certain about their expected in-
come development are also more likely to be over-indebted. Although it might
be rational to borrow more today if income expectations are justifiably higher,
expecting too much and being too certain in an uncertain situation, such as the
situation that rural, agricultural households in Thailand live in, seem to lead to
serious financial distress. The survey results are supported by the lab results,
which find overconfidence to be related to overspending in the game. Addition-
ally, those households spending too much in the lab are also more likely to be
over-indebted in real life. Still, mostly because of sticky and over-confident beliefs
at baseline, we are not able to detect a causal link between overconfidence and
overspending in the lab.
Chapter five is one of only a few studies empirically exploring the relationship
between income expectations and household debt. Globally, there is still not
much evidence and we are the first to quantify real-life income expectations and
their potential effect on over-indebtedness.
Overall, this dissertation helps deepen the understanding of how non-standard
preferences and beliefs shape financial risk management of households in diverse
Chapter 1 7
settings. Since household debt is rising worldwide and over-indebtedness can put
households in extreme distress and misery, it is crucial to understand the drivers
of over-indebtedness and if there is potential to change them. Two chapters fo-
cus on sub-optimal borrowing from a policy perspective. There might be scope
to refine household expectations and perceptions by providing sufficient infor-
mation and training on information processing. In many cases, however, this is
not feasible and equipping households with insurance and adequate safety nets
still seems to be more appropriate. As seen in chapter two, the willingness to
insure inherently depends itself on social preferences. Thus, it might be helpful
to discuss new insurance products e.g. at village meetings. However, for other
financial decisions, like borrowing itself, the influence of others might have ad-
verse effects. A preference for conformity can lead to excessive debt taking and,
possibly, the same may hold for insurance take-up. More research is needed to
understand under which conditions social preferences lead to “better or worse”
financial decisions. The same is true for beliefs. As shown in chapter five, being
too optimistic potentially leads to financial distress, whereas in chapter four opti-
mism is beneficial for those who are the most afraid of uncertainty. In that sense,
the lessons described in the beginning seem not only to be lessons on happiness
but also lessons on finances.
Chapter 2
Coupled Lotteries -
A New Method to Analyze
Inequality Aversion
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2.1 Introduction
The pure self-interest hypothesis of standard economic theory is refuted by an
overwhelming body of evidence from economics and psychology. The respective
literature documents that people typically also have other-regarding preferences
that include concerns for the resources of others as well as for reciprocity and
fairness. One of the most prominent concepts in the literature on other-regarding
preferences is inequality aversion. According to the seminal models of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), the utility of an inequality
averse agent is increasing in both the own payoff and the equality of the distri-
bution. The prominence of inequality aversion lies in the fact that it can explain
observed behavior, which deviates from the self-interest hypothesis in many ex-
perimental settings. Examples include giving in dictator games, the rejection
of low offers in ultimatum games, as well as the conditional cooperation and
punishment of free riders in public good games. Outside the lab, the degree of
inequality aversion might influence individual preferences over tax deductions,
insurance take-up and many more aspects of redistribution.
Despite its prominence, the measurement of inequality aversion is still de-
bated. While inequality aversion is intuitively appealing and successful in ratio-
nalizing observed behavior in the aforementioned games, it is unclear whether it
is indeed inequality aversion or other considerations that are measured in these
settings. For instance, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) show that a combination of
selfishness, efficiency concerns, and maximin preferences are sufficient to explain
behavior in simple distribution experiments. Inequality aversion is not needed to
rationalize behavior and, moreover, is at odds with several patterns in their data.
In a related paper, Fershtman et al. (2012) conclude that social norms are more
successful than inequality aversion in explaining behavior in dictator and trust
games. Thus, decisions in games that appear to be based on inequality aversion
may actually originate from other preferences. Still, Tricomi et al. (2010) find
neural evidence for the existence of inequality aversion in humans using functional
magnetic resonance imaging.
Motivated by this literature, the present paper develops and implements a
new method to measure inequality aversion, which we term “coupled lotteries.”
In this method, two players are endowed with two identical binary lotteries (of-
fering amount x with probability p > 0 and nothing otherwise) and the only
choice they make is whether they want to play out the lotteries independently
(“separated”) or with perfect positive correlation (“coupled”). This choice only
affects ex post inequality in outcomes, i.e., there is no outcome inequality if lot-
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teries are coupled and a 2p(1 − p) chance of inequality if lotteries are separated.
When only monetary payoff over both peers is maximized, not coupling the lot-
teries is the social planner’s optimal choice, because risk could be shared ex post
by reallocating payoffs if one party wins and the other loses. Since coupling the
lotteries decreases the chance of inequality for sure and changes nothing except
the possibility for ex post risk sharing, inequality aversion seems to be the only
way to rationalize this choice.
We implement an incentivized version of our coupled lotteries game in a repre-
sentative survey of about 850 rural households in Ubon Ratchathani, a province in
northeastern Thailand. The advantage of using this survey is, first, that we have
a more heterogeneous sample than lab experiments with students, second, that
we can employ rather high monetary incentives comprising more than a half day’s
wage and, third, that we can use extensive socioeconomic data for each respon-
dent. Thus, we are able to analyze the share of respondents displaying inequality
aversion as well as which personal and socioeconomic characteristics are associ-
ated with inequality aversion. We test six hypotheses derived from the literature
(mainly based on the structural estimation of Bellemare et al. (2008)): inequality
aversion is related to being male, older, less educated, poorer, showing higher risk
aversion, and having social status concerns. Additionally, we can directly use our
measure to explain real-life behavior: following the theoretical considerations of
Friedl et al. (2014), we test the empirical relation between inequality aversion
and insurance take-up. Moreover, we investigate whether inequality aversion is
related to less risky farming decisions.
We find that almost 40 percent of respondents choose to couple the lotteries
versus more than 60 percent who prefer to separate. Regarding the six hypotheses
stated above, our evidence supports three of them (while evidence on the three
others is not robust): choosing coupled lotteries is significantly related to being
male, being more risk averse, and having social status concerns, which is in line
with theoretical predictions. Potential ex post risk sharing (which might motivate
to separate) is not supported by our data, as risk sharing would be related to, for
example, trust in the village. This is not compatible with our results, which show
that subjects who trust more prefer to couple. Finally, we find that households
with inequality averse household heads are more likely to have some kind of formal
insurance and are also more likely to diversify crops (if they are farmers), which
is a way to diversify risk of crop loss. This is in line with theoretical predictions
on insurance take-up.
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We opt for a lab-in-the-field experiment as we want to take advantage of the
unique setting: interviews are conducted in each respondent’s house and we let
them each play coupled lotteries against one of their neighbors, who is not part
of the sample. Analyzing inequality aversion within such a close reference group
is rare in the economic literature and gives insights into social preferences when
social distance is small. It might, however, present an upper bound of inequality
aversion (e.g. Bandiera et al., 2005; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; Kranton and
Sanders, 2017). Furthermore, there might be culturally determined differences
in the degree of inequality aversion between our relatively poor Thai sample
and samples in industrialized countries (see Alesina et al., 2011, for a general
discussion on preferences for redistribution). Croson and Gneezy (2009), for
example, analyzing various ultimatum and dictator games, conclude that, in gen-
eral, women seem to be more inequality averse, which contrasts with our finding.
However, as highlighted before, these games might not be suited for identifying
inequality aversion because they exhibit a trade-off between maximizing efficiency
and inequality aversion. In general, we do not have reason to believe that the
cultural background affects the external validity of our method itself.
To eventually rule out risk sharing motives completely, we additionally imple-
ment our measure in a “more controlled” setting, namely, a lab with students in
Germany. The anonymity and structure of a lab experiment inhibits ex post risk
sharing. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between coupled lotteries
and a still common measure for inequality aversion, the dictator game. We find
that the degree of inequality aversion in the German student sample is larger
than in the Thai rural sample. This is a bit surprising given the high social
distance between lab participants in comparison to neighbors, however, the two
samples differ in many respects. Thus, it is comforting that we also find similar
results in both samples, such as coupling being related to risk aversion and that
we can confirm that women are not more inequality averse than men. However,
we do not find any correlation between decisions in the coupled lotteries and the
dictator game within this student population. This is in line with our claim that
dictator giving is driven by different other-regarding preferences. It also speaks to
previous literature that refutes the correlation of inequality aversion parameters
derived from the dictator game and other simple distribution games (see Blanco
et al., 2011).
Our paper is closely related to the work of Bellemare et al. (2008) who analyze
inequality aversion in a representative sample of the Dutch population. Based on
observed decisions in the ultimatum game and proposers’ elicited expectations of
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rejection rates, they estimate a structural model of decision making under un-
certainty from which they derive the degree of inequality aversion. Compared to
our method, they obtain a metric measure about the degree of inequality aversion
and are able to distinguish between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality
aversion, while we only obtain a binary measure, i.e., we can detect whether a
person is inequality averse or not. However, our method has the potential advan-
tage that we do not need to control for expectations and risk attitudes but can
observe inequality aversion directly from choices. It is much easier to implement
this method in large scale surveys and to obtain a relatively simple, fast, and still
valid measure for the presence of inequality aversion. Furthermore, the game is
easy to understand and decreases the concern of confounding preferences with
decision errors.
The reason why Bellemare et al. (2008) use structural modeling lies in the
aforementioned difficulty of distinguishing inequality aversion from other motives
in standard distribution games. So far, probably the most common ways to mea-
sure inequality aversion are observing choices in dictator and ultimatum games
(see Levitt and List, 2007). However, the literature shows that these choices can
also be explained by other considerations. In the case of the ultimatum game,
first, it is the fact that giving might depend on the belief a proposer has about the
acceptance threshold of the responder. Already Forsythe et al. (1994) concludes
that strategic considerations partly drive ultimatum giving as people give more
in the ultimatum than in the dictator game. This is confirmed by Bellemare et
al. (2008) as their model controlling for individual beliefs fits observations better
than a model assuming rational expectations. On the responder side, rejecting
an offer can be caused by inequality aversion but also by negative reciprocity
(Brandts and Solà, 2001; Falk et al., 2003; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) or other
punishment motives. The active role of the responder and, thereby, the strategic
interaction is eliminated in the dictator game. Here, there is especially one motive
that competes with inequality aversion in explaining observed choices: (impure)
altruism. Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that simple altruistic preferences ex-
plain dictator giving extremely well. This work is extended by, among others,
Chowdhury and Jeon (2014) and Korenok et al. (2013), who find more support
for impure altruism as there is imperfect crowding-out if recipients have own in-
come (Bolton and Katok, 1998). In any case, it is not clear whether dictators
derive a higher utility from equalizing payoffs, from the warm glow of giving, or,
most likely, from both kinds of motives. This is emphasized by the finding of
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) that a combination of preferences explains behav-
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ior in standard distribution games better than a single social preference. Given
the previous literature, we approach inequality aversion more directly: we are
not investigating whether inequality aversion can explain behavior in an already
existing game but we are looking for a game that can give us a consistent measure
of inequality aversion.
The design of our game itself is related to a different kind of distribution games
that address different correlation structures between the own and the other’s risky
payoffs, which, however, do not directly address inequality aversion as such. Ro-
hde and Rohde (2011) concentrate on how correlated payoffs affect risk taking
and give participants choices between problems with varying risk and correla-
tion structures. However, neither do these choices resemble our coupled lotteries
measures nor are they suited to test explicitly for inequality aversion. Bolton
and Ockenfels (2010) and Adam et al. (2014) use binary decision problems with
(perfect) negative correlation between payoffs to investigate the effect of social
comparison on risk taking. Trautmann (2010), relying on binary distribution
choices from Broome (1991), discusses how to include fairness into utilitarian
welfare models.
Several paper address the empirical relevance of ex ante and ex post inequality
aversion and how inequality aversion translates to risky environments in general
(e.g. Brock et al., 2013; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010;
Saito, 2013). We deliberately only concentrate on ex post inequality and ignore
ex ante inequality by ruling it out with our design. However, we do not neglect
the existence or the possibly greater empirical relevance of ex ante inequality.
Actually, our results support the notion that exact equality in outcomes does
not seem to be important for many individuals. Given that equalizing payoffs
in our game does not mean foregoing own payoff, it would not even be costly to
establish equal outcomes and, still, many persons do not seem to care in both our
samples. This is in line with the aforementioned literature, arguing and showing
that inequality aversion in outcomes is not the main driver for the observed
behavior in standard distribution games. Nevertheless, for some persons exactly
equalizing payoffs does matter and we can show this is informative about real-life
behavior.
Hence, we not only contribute to the literature by deriving a method to mea-
sure inequality aversion in outcomes but also by analyzing who is actually in-
equality averse and how inequality aversion is related to economic behavior, like
insurance take-up or crop portfolio choices. The literature on the relation between
inequality aversion and real-life decision making is especially scarce. However,
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knowing about areas of life that might be affected by inequality aversion and
knowing about who is affected is necessary for deriving an empirically validated
microfoundation of inequality aversion. It could inform policy makers thinking
about implementing inequality-reducing policies like progressive taxes or social
benefits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent Section
2.2 introduces the theoretical background and derives hypotheses. Methods and
data are presented in Section 2.3, while Section 2.4 provides results. Section 2.5
illustrates the relation between our coupled lotteries measure and insurance take-
up. Section 2.6 discusses the supplemental lab experiment and the additional
insight into the relation between our measure and dictator giving. Robustness
checks are shown in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 Coupled Lotteries
Suppose there are two players, i and j, who are both endowed with a lottery L
each. With a probability of p > 0, this lottery yields x and with a probability
of 1 − p nothing. The only decision players have to make is whether they want
to keep their lotteries separate, where it is independently drawn for each player
if she loses or wins, or whether they want their lotteries coupled, in which case
a single draw determines if both lose or both win. For simplicity, let us assume


























Figure 2.1: Coupled Lotteries: Decision Matrix and Connected Outcomes
In standard decision theory, subjects care only about their own payoffs. There-
fore, they should be indifferent between coupling and separating their lotteries,
as in both cases the chance of winning is 50%. One alternative to this pure self-
interest hypothesis is inequality aversion. Like Bellemare et al. (2008), we employ
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the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to model inequality aversion. Suppose that
the payoffs of i and j are given by xi and xj respectively. Then, the utility of i,
Vi , is given by
Vi = xi − αimax{xj − xi, 0} − βimax{xi − xj, 0} (2.1)
where 0 ≤ βi < 1 and αi ≥ βi. Inequality aversion implies 0 < βi < 1 and
αi ≥ βi.
For coupling the lotteries, we always have xi = xj. In contrast, when separat-
ing, there is a 2p(1 − p) chance of unequal outcomes.1 Given our parametrization
this means, that coupling yields an expected payoff of
E(Vi(coupling)) = 50. (2.2)
Separating entails a 1/4 chance of being better off than the peer as well as
another 1/4 chance of being worse off than her. Consequently, we obtain
E(Vi(separating)) = 50 − 0.25αi100 − 0.25βi100, (2.3)
This means that inequality averse subjects, whose β and α are strictly greater
than 0, should prefer coupling. Note that this conclusion also holds in the case
of risk aversion or any non-linearities in the perception of inequality, i.e. we can
replace Vi in equation (1) also by the more general form:
Vi = ui(xi) − αivi(max{xj − xi, 0}) − βivi(max{xi − xj, 0}), (2.4)
where ui reflects the risk attitude and the strictly increasing vi with vi(0) = 0
reflects the perception of inequality. Moreover, βi could be even negative, i.e. the
subject actually likes advantageous inequality, as long as its absolute value is less
than α (the parameter for disadvantageous inequality). However, in contrast to
Bellemare et al. (2008), our method does not separate disadvantageous inequality
aversion from an advantageous one.
1 Note, that, independent of coupling or separating, it is always the case that E(xi) = E(xj).
That means there is no inequality in opportunity or ex ante inequality. Subjects who only care
about expected outcomes are hence indifferent between coupling and separating. However,
subjects who care about outcome inequality consider the expected difference in outcomes.
Therefore, we apply the expected utility function on Fehr-Schmidt preferences and not Fehr-
Schmidt preferences on expected outcomes. In general, Fehr-Schmidt preferences are not well




Despite the differences between our method and that of Bellemare et al. (2008), we
believe that both methods measure the same preference. Our initial hypothesis
is that the correlation structure between sociodemographic characteristics and
inequality aversion in our Thai subject pool is similar to that of the Dutch subject
pool. Thus, according to the results of Bellemare et al. (2008), we obtain the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Male subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are
more likely to couple.
In contrast to the previous literature, as for example discussed in Croson and
Gneezy (2009), Bellemare et al. (2008) find no significant sex difference in dis-
advantageous inequality (α), but they find that being male is related to a larger
β.
Hypothesis 2: Older subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are
more likely to couple.
Hypothesis 3: Less educated subjects are more inequality averse and, thus,
they are more likely to couple.
Hypothesis 4: Poorer subjects are more inequality averse and, thus, they are
more likely to couple.
In addition to those sociodemographic variables analyzed by Bellemare et
al. (2008), there is evidence that inequality averse subjects are also risk averse
(Carlsson et al., 2005). Thus, we include the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: More risk averse subjects are more inequality averse and, thus,
they are more likely to couple.
Furthermore, since social status concerns can be a driver of inequality aversion
(Shaw and Olson, 2012), a measure for social status concerns is included in the
survey. Our last hypothesis reads as follows:
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Hypothesis 6: Subjects with social status concerns are more inequality averse
and, thus, they are more likely to couple.
2.2.3 Alternative Explanations
Ex Post Risk Sharing. For inequality neutral individuals, there is no payoff
gain in coupling the lotteries. However, in our household-survey-setting there
might be an individual gain in choosing to separate the lotteries due to the pos-
sibility of ex post risk sharing. In fact, separating the lotteries is the optimal
choice from a social planner perspective as payoffs can be redistributed if one
party loses and the other wins. Since our survey participants live next to each
other, it is hard to control whether they might share the money afterwards as
well. We think that it is a strength of our main analysis that subjects know each
other well, implying that the social comparison should have a much stronger im-
pact than in an anonymous laboratory setting. Still, we make sure that after
introducing the game, subjects had no opportunity to interact before making
their decisions, i.e., they were not able to agree ex ante on ex post risk sharing.
Nevertheless, the possibility of ex post risk sharing is a potential confound when
analyzing inequality aversion with our survey data. We subsequently address this
potential confounding factor by adding variables to the analysis that help us to
detect the possible presence of ex post risk sharing. Greater trust and social con-
nection between the respondent and her neighbor should increase the incentive
for ex post risk sharing, thereby increasing the probability of separating. This
is because greater trust decreases the level of betrayal aversion (Bohnet et al.,
2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010). Bohnet et al. (2008, p. 294) describe be-
trayal aversion as being, “less willing to take a risk when the source of the risk
is another person rather than nature.” In our setting nature decides the outcome
of the lottery, but the neighbor decides to share the money afterwards or not.
Thus, she is a source of risk that induces betrayal aversion. In our additional
laboratory experiment (like in any other lab setting), the possibility to share risk
ex post can be ruled out as participants usually do not know each other, cannot
communicate during the session, and leave the laboratory directly after the pri-
vate payout. This means that inequality neutral subjects should be indifferent
between coupling and separating in the lab.
Reciprocity and Altruism. Even if behavior in experimental games cannot
fully be rationalized by efficiency or maximin preferences, there might be other
social preferences that confound the measurement of inequality aversion, e.g.
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reciprocity and altruism. Reciprocity is the preference to reward kind and punish
unkind actions (Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). In our setting there is no possibility
to behave reciprocally, since respondents neither can influence their own or the
probability of their neighbors winning nor can they see the choice their neighbors
make (and vice versa). Fehr and Fischbacher (2003, p. 785) define altruism in the
behavioral economics sense “as being costly acts that confer economic benefits on
other individuals.” Except for ex post risk sharing, which we discuss extensively
in this paper, there is no scope for altruism in our game.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Survey Design
The survey including the coupled lotteries game was conducted in rural Thailand
in 2014. It is part of an add-on project to a panel survey in rural Thailand and
Vietnam starting from 2007 that is now known as the Thailand Vietnam Socio
Economic Panel (TVSEP). At the time our game was played, 4 full waves had
been completed (2007, 2008, 2010, and 2013).
Each survey wave consists of a household and a village questionnaire. The
household questionnaire is tailored to the lives of families in rural areas, largely
engaged in agricultural business. It includes comprehensive sections on crop
farming, livestock rearing, borrowing/lending as well as saving decisions, health,
various socio-economic items for every household member, and, in particular,
questions on exposure to shocks and anticipated risks. In some waves, personal
opinions on topics such as inequality and trust are sought. The full sample con-
sists of about 4400 rural households in 440 villages over six provinces in Thailand
and Vietnam. It is representative for the rural populations in these two coun-
tries and deliberately excludes households living in urban areas. The three-stage
sampling procedure is described in Hardeweg et al. (2013).
The add-on aims at analyzing individual risk preferences in rural populations
in more detail, especially how these preferences vary in different situations and
how they interact with skills like numeracy and financial literacy. The corre-
sponding questionnaire is substantially shorter than a full TVSEP survey. Fur-
thermore, it is conducted in only one of the survey provinces in Thailand, Ubon
Ratchathani, which borders Cambodia and Laos (see Figure 2.2). The province is
located in the northeastern part of Thailand (“Isan”), which is the poorest region
in the country and where most households engage in agricultural activities. The
full sample comprises about 850 individuals/households.
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Figure 2.2: Study Site, Ubon Ratchathani and Sampled Subdistricts
For most specifications, we combine 2014 and 2013 data, as it results in a richer
dataset and gives us the variables we are mainly interested in. The 2013 data
include measures on trust and social comparison as well as the socio-economic
variables we seek to analyze. We do not exploit the panel structure but include
variables that we assume to be stable over the two points in time. Thus, we spec-
ify our regressions as a one-period model. If we want to exploit information on
social comparison and trust, we can only do so if an individual answered the ques-
tionnaires in 2014 and in 2013, because this is personal information that cannot
be extrapolated from the answers of another household member. Unfortunately,
some respondents only answered the 2014 survey. This results in a smaller sam-
ple size for some of the regressions; this subsample consists of 521 individuals.
Other variables from 2013, like sex and education, are available as long as the
2014 respondent was already part of the household in 2013, which is always the
case.2
2.3.2 Coupled Lotteries in the Field
Coupled lotteries is one of four short “games” played toward the end of the
survey. The preceding section asks respondents to answer a battery of items that
2 In most cases the respondent in both years is the household head or their spouse.
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measure their financial literacy. The following and final part of the survey is a
quiz to measure numeracy. Thus, the games are surrounded by two tasks that
ask for similar cognitive and computational skills. However, the financial literacy
and numeracy sections are not designed to assess any sort of preference but are
knowledge-based.
Respondents are explicitly asked for consent to participate in the games, which
are not part of the general survey (see Appendix Material A.2.1). Since none of
the respondents declines to play, no concern for sample selection into the games
is given. In the questionnaire, coupled lotteries is titled “social game” and is
played after the three other games.3 The whole task is incentivized by randomly
choosing one game to be implemented for payoff. On average, respondents earn
165 THB (ca. 3.70e) including a participation fee of 30 THB (ca. 0.68e), which
is more than a half day’s wage.
Coupled lotteries is played out by gaining either 100 THB or 0 THB, each with
50% probability determined by a coin flip (see Appendix Material A.2.2). The
survey respondents are assigned the role of player i, which is a trivial assignment
as roles are symmetric. We ask a neighbor of each respondent to join the game as
player j. Since the survey is conducted in small villages with mostly about 100
inhabitants, players know each other quite well. However, the neighbors are not
part of the survey sample and, therefore, we do not have further data on them.4
The crucial decision that both players then make is deciding whether their lotter-
ies are played out by one coin flip for each of them or by one coin flip together.
Thus, they have to decide whether they want their risk to be perfectly positively
correlated to or to be independent of their peer’s risk. As explained before, the
expected total payoff is equal in both cases, but the correlation structure changes
the relative payoff. Both participants, although sitting next to each other, have
to indicate their choice secretly on a piece of paper that is collected by the in-
terviewer who then flips the coin(s) and announces the outcome (see Appendix
Material A.2.3).5 If both players decide to couple, so that only one coin is flipped,
both either receive 100 THB or nothing. If both decide to separate, one coin is
flipped for each of them and both receive their respective payoff, independently
3 The first is a multiple price list to elicit risk preferences following Holt and Laury (2002), the
second consists of four multiple price lists to elicit time preferences, and the third one is the
“cheating game” by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). We have no reason to believe that
these games themselves prime behavior in our game in any specific way. Importantly, the
first two games are only played out after the coupled lotteries game and reported numbers
in the cheating game are uncorrelated to decisions in the coupled lotteries game.
4 Except for four observations, we could always find a neighbor who agreed to participate.
5 As mentioned before the respondent is paid for only one of the games, but the neighbor is
paid directly after the social game has been played.
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from each other. If they have conflicting preferences meaning one decides to
couple and the other to separate, an additional coin is flipped to determine how
the lottery is played out (see again Figure 2.1). To avoid experimenter demand
effects, we neither encourage nor discourage participants with respect to ex post
risk sharing.
2.3.3 Empirical Approach
Decisions about coupled lotteries are binary and since every participant makes a
valid choice, we use a simple logit model to estimate our regressions. Let Yi denote
the decision a participant takes, where yi = 0 means separating the lotteries
and yi = 1 means coupling the lotteries. The first regression specification only
contains information available for the full sample and reads as follows:
Yi = α + X ′itβ1 + uit (2.5)
Errors are clustered on the district level and the regressor matrix X ′it contains
sex, age, education, annual per capita log consumption, district fixed effects, and
a measure for risk preference. We use consumption instead of income because,
in general, it is believed to be a more reliable measure in this kind of setting.
However, our results are also robust to using annual per capita income (see Section
2.7). As the survey was designed to analyze risk preferences, various measures
of risk taking are available. These are correlated with each other but seek to
measure risk taking behavior in different situations. We include risk preference
measured through the multiple price list method (inspired by Holt and Laury,
2002), which is the only incentivized elicitation method we employed. Education
is measured by years of schooling. In one of the regressions we include a first
measure to test for ex post risk sharing. To do so a proxy for trust or closeness
to people in the village is used. We employ a variable that indicates whether
respondents receive agricultural advice from their neighbors or relatives.
The second regression specification applies to the subsample of respondents
who played the game in 2014 and answered the survey in 2013:
Yi = α + X ′itβ1 + S ′itβ2 + uit (2.6)
Besides the same regressor matrix X ′it as in 2.5, matrix S ′it is added. S ′it contains
our measures for social status concerns and a more accurate measure of trust.
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Respondents are asked whether they compare their standard of living to other
persons and to whom. They can choose between 11 different reference groups,
where one option is “Neighbors” and another one is “I don’t compare myself
to anyone.” We construct two dummies that equal 1 when respondents choose
the respective option and 0 otherwise. Thus, we have a dichotomous measure
whether respondents “keep up with the Joneses” (choose their neighbors as main
reference group for social comparison) and whether respondents care about social
status at all. As indicated, respondents can only choose one reference group.
Hence, a 0 in the “neighbor dummy” does not mean that respondents do not
regard their neighbors for social comparison, but that neighbors are not their
primary group for social comparison. In that sense our other measure for general
social status concerns is cleaner, which is why we primarily focus on whether
respondents compare their standard of living at all in the later analysis. A 4-
point Likert scale measures how much respondents trust other people living in
their village, such that we have a more reliable measure for the possibility of ex
post risk sharing.
2.3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the two regression
models. We include respondents between the age of 16 and 85 for the analysis.
The descriptives are split by whether the respondent is the same in both waves,
2013 and 2014, or not. There are two significant differences between the two sub-
samples, i.e. age and education. As these two variables are highly correlated in
our sample, it is not surprising that there is a significant difference in education
given that there is one in age. The difference in age can be explained by the fact
that the add-on project in 2014 put less priority on interviewing the household
head than did the main project and that other household members are, on aver-
age, younger than their head. Nevertheless, the fraction choosing to separate is
not significantly different between those respondents who only answer the 2014
questionnaire and those who participate in both 2013 and 2014 (see Appendix
Figure A.1.1). Overall, these statistics indicate that we can concentrate on the
latter subsample and still receive valid results for the whole sample.
Section 2.4 23
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Full Sample 2013 and 2014 Only 2014 Difference
Coupling 0.37 0.36 0.39 0.03
Male 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.05
Age 52.97 55.24 49.40 −5.84∗∗∗
Years of Schooling 5.94 5.48 6.66 1.18∗∗∗
Ann. Consumption per Cap. 716.57 724.36 703.43 −20.92
Risk Taking, MPL 11.03 10.98 11.11 0.13
Advice from Neighbor 0.14 0.14 0.13 −0.02
Trust in Village 3.12
Comparing with Neighbors 0.48
Not Comparing 0.16
Observations 851 521 330 851
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
From the table, it can be seen that the majority prefers to separate. Given
the structure of our sample (more women and small degree of risk aversion), this
is not surprising based on our hypotheses. Around 60% of the respondents are
female and the fraction of women who choose to separate is significantly higher
(two-sided t-test, p < 0.05) than the fraction of men who decide to do so (see
Appendix Figure A.1.2). Furthermore, the rural Thai population seems, on av-
erage, to be more risk seeking than the Western populations previously studied.
Dohmen et al. (2011), for example, use the same multiple price list in a represen-
tative German sample. Not only is the mean for risk taking higher in the Thai
sample, but the whole distribution is skewed to the right with a much higher pro-
portion never switching from the lottery to the safe option (see Appendix Figure
A.1.3). This result is in line with the conclusion of l’Haridon and Vieider (2019)
that, on average, persons in poorer countries are substantially more risk toler-
ant than persons in rich countries. Years of schooling and annual consumption
per capita in the Thai rural population are substantially lower than in samples
from industrialized countries. Turning to the social comparison variables, almost
half of the sample states that the main group they are comparing with are their
neighbors. Besides this group, there are around 16% of respondents who do not
compare themselves to anyone. Thus, social comparison motives between players
have an important role in our setting.
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2.4 Results
For each regression, we report average marginal effects (AME). Hence, for each
observation all variables, except the one for which the effect is estimated, are held
at their realized level. The AME is obtained by taking the mean over all individual
marginal effects. Given the many dummy variables, estimating marginal effects
at the means (MEM) would be less meaningful as a dummy value between 0 and
1 cannot be interpreted economically (such as being 80 percent female). Table
2.2 shows regression results using model specification 1, i.e. analyzing the full
sample based on equation 2.5. First, the variables for testing hypothesis 1-5 are
included in two steps and then, in the third regression we add our proxy variable
for trust between neighbors to test for the relevance of ex post risk sharing.
Table 2.2: Logistic Regressions, Full Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.101∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.034)
Age −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) −0.015 −0.013
(0.026) (0.025)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Advice from Neighbor 0.075∗
(0.039)
Observations 849 829 829
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.369 0.367 0.367
McFaddens R-squared 0.046 0.046 0.048
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
SE clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The highly significant positive effect on being male is in line with hypothesis 1;
on average men are 10 percentage points more likely to couple the lotteries than
women. This effect is in line with Bellemare et al. (2008) but stronger than their
coefficient for the Dutch population. Consequently, we cannot confirm previous
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studies that find women to be more inequality averse than men. One explanation
could be cultural differences; Croson and Gneezy (2009) mention that cultural
biases could cause sex differences in preferences. Still, from this perspective, it
may be surprising that the results in Bellemare et al. (2008) point in the same
direction as ours. Another explanation could be that, in our game, there is no
trade-off between inequality and efficiency, as in some previous studies. If men
prefer efficiency over inequality, this does not automatically mean that they are
less inequality averse than women. In general, there might be several confounds in
previous studies as to why women appear to be more inequality averse than men.
We do not confirm hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. Age is only significant in regression
(1) and the effect goes in the opposite direction as hypothesized. Education
and consumption are never significant. These insignificances are not related to
a possible multicollinearity problem. Preference for risk taking is significant in
the expected direction. The effect size is not as small as it seems at first glance
given that the risk taking variable takes values between 1 and 21. Going from
1 to 21 decreases the probability of coupling the lotteries by over 17 percentage
points. Thus, we confirm hypothesis 5, that risk aversion and inequality aversion
are positively related to each other. Another possibility would be that risk taking
is not related to less inequality aversion in general, but to favoring advantageous
inequality. In our setting, only choosing to separate can lead to advantageous
inequality and more risk prone individuals might want to get ahead of the Joneses
and are less afraid of falling behind. However, this argument is not supported by
our results for social status concerns (see the following paragraphs). Furthermore,
there is no significant interaction effect between risk and social comparing.
Regarding ex post risk sharing, we clearly find evidence against this alternative
explanation. Respondents who are closer to their neighbors are more likely to
couple lotteries instead of separating and potentially sharing afterwards. This
effect is significant and large.
We now turn to the subsample of 521 individuals for whom we have infor-
mation about the importance of social status concerns as well as the improved
measure of trust. In Table 2.3, we report results using model specification (2),
i.e. equation 2.6. Regression (1) contains the same variables as regression (2) of
Table 2.2 to check how consistent the model is estimated with the smaller sample.
In regressions (2), (3), and (4) social status and trust variables are added. The
effect sizes for sex are smaller in all presented regressions but are still large and
significant. Age and consumption are insignificant as before, which is intuitive,
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because possible effects should have already been significant in the larger sample.
For education, however, we find significant effects. Due to the significant differ-
ences in age and education between the two samples and the small sample size
here, we do not want to interpret this as evidence for a sizable effect of education
as stated by hypothesis 3. If there is any effect, more educated individuals seem
to be more inequality averse, not the other way around.
Table 2.3: Logistic Regressions, Subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.067∗ 0.068∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.068∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035)
Age −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.013∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) −0.031 −0.033 −0.035 −0.032
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Comparing with Neighbors 0.060∗
(0.036)
Not Comparing −0.127∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.045)
Advice from Neighbor 0.086∗
(0.048)
Trust in Village 0.059∗∗
(0.025)
Observations 521 521 521 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.359 0.359 0.359 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.044 0.047 0.052 0.061
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
SE clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Unfortunately, the smaller sample size turns the coefficients on risk taking
insignificant. Still, they do not differ in direction and size from the full sample
specification. Looking at the measures for social status concerns, we cannot
reject hypothesis six. Having the neighbors as main reference group for social
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comparison increases the probability of coupling while having no social status
concerns decreases the probability of coupling. The coefficient for having no
social status concerns is large and significant at the 5% level. Moreover, our
finding indicates that inequality aversion seems to be stronger if the other person
is part of the individual’s main reference group for social comparison. We cannot
use both variables in the same regression because a substantial part of the sample
compares themselves to neighbors, which makes the dummies per definition highly
correlated. Therefore, they are included separately in regressions (2) and (3).
Eventually, we again test for ex post risk sharing, this time using the proxy
from the 2014 survey and adding a more reliable measure on trust from 2013.
Both coefficients depict a sizable effect and are clearly not in favor of ex post risk
sharing. Respondents trusting other people in the village a lot are 16 percentage
points more likely to couple the lotteries than respondents who do not trust other
villagers at all. This is in line with inequality aversion increasing in reduced social
distance and that the “comparing with neighbors” dummy turns insignificant if
the two variables for trust are added.
2.5 Inequality Aversion and Field Behavior
In order to test the “predictive power” of our measure for inequality aversion, we
estimate the correlation between the measure and actual behavior that theoreti-
cally should be related to inequality aversion. More precisely, we run regressions
to analyze whether our measure is related to formal insurance take-up as well as
means taken to reduce the risk of grown crop portfolios, which could be regarded
as some kind of informal insurance take-up. Friedl et al. (2014) show theoreti-
cally that insurance take-up reduces inequality among peers facing similar risks
as long as risks are not perfectly positively correlated between them. Therefore,
inequality averse subjects should be more prone to insurance take-up, which we
want to test in our field setting.
Table 2.4 reports the regression results for different kinds of insurance take-up.
Using the TVSEP 2013 survey data, we construct a dummy indicating whether
the household has any kind of voluntary, formal insurance.
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Inequality Aversion 0.066∗∗ 0.102∗ −0.078 0.086∗∗
(0.027) (0.060) (0.054) (0.046)
Male −0.038 −0.002 0.022 0.000
(0.032) (0.084) (0.053) (0.048)
Age 0.003 0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.013 −0.001 −0.008 −0.001
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007)
Ann. Cons. per Cap. (log) 0.079∗∗∗ −0.047 0.043 −0.056
(0.028) (0.056) (0.033) (0.043)
Household nucleus size 0.048∗∗∗ −0.013 0.017 −0.016
(0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Numeracy −0.002 0.017 0.007 −0.017
(0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Financial Literacy 0.009 −0.005 −0.012 0.000
(0.022) (0.028) (0.025) (0.017)
Self-Employed 0.070
(0.075)
HH better off in 5 years −0.038∗
(0.021)
Number Anticipated Risks −0.007
(0.009)
Number Weather Risks 0.018 0.026 0.018
(0.036) (0.022) (0.019)
Land Size 0.005 0.007∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Number of Tractors 0.091∗ 0.092∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.048) (0.032) (0.045)
Number of Waterpumps −0.021 −0.017 −0.070∗∗
(0.048) (0.025) (0.027)
Observations 418 319 296 288
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.767 0.537 0.774 0.217
McFaddens R-squared 0.123 0.080 0.193 0.334
Dependent Var.: Having insurance, Simpson index of crop-land share diversification above
mean and growing glutinous rice and cassava. Average marginal effects reported. District
dummies not reported. SE clustered at district level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Furthermore, we run a regression using the Simpson Index of (crop) Diversi-
fication as used in Nguyen et al. (2017) for the same households; however, only
for those households engaged in own agricultural activities. Crop diversification
is interpreted as informal insurance (see Skoufias, 2003), because it diversifies the
risk of crop loss, especially if the additionally planted crops are less sensitive to
weather shocks or pest infestation. Farmers in Northeastern Thailand tradition-
ally grow glutinous rice, which is also their main staple. Cassava is a crop that
yields similar profit and fulfills the conditions to diversify crop loss. Therefore,
we estimate separate regressions for growing glutinous rice and cassava to see
whether the motives to grow these two differ from each other. Since the decision
what risk to insure and which plants to grow are decisions that are usually made
at the household level, and not the individual level, in our setting, we only include
subjects who are supposed to be the main decision maker in their household, the
household heads.
Our exogenous variable of interest is the decision subjects make in our cou-
pled lotteries game. Additionally, we include controls that are hypothesized to
be decisive for each specific take-up (see for example Nguyen et al., 2017), in
particular our incentivized measure of risk aversion. As can be seen, respondents
who are inequality averse, i.e. those who couple the lotteries, are significantly
more likely to have formal insurance in their households and to have an above-
average crop diversification index. The above-average diversification seems to be
driven by growing cassava which, in contrast to glutinous rice, is significantly
correlated with being inequality averse. Thus, we can show that our measure
captures real-life decisions that are likely driven by inequality aversion.
2.6 Supplemental Lab Evidence
To gain further insights, we also ran a lab experiment in Germany including
the coupled lotteries game. Our motivation for this experiment is twofold. First,
besides substantially increasing social distance, because lab participants typically
do not know each other, unlike neighbors in a small Thai village, and because
participants in fact do not know who their counterpart for playing the game will
be, taking the game to the lab inhibits ex post risk sharing for the very same
reasons. Hence, in comparison to the field study, our lab experiment is more
controlled as we can fully rule out risk sharing motives. Second, we aim to analyze
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how decisions in the coupled lotteries game relate to a common (but flawed)
measure for inequality aversion by additionally playing the dictator game.6
The sessions were conducted at the University of Kiel in March 2019. In total,
76 students participated in 2 sessions. On average the sessions lasted about 35
minutes and participants earned 13e. Besides a questionnaire, the experiment
includes four games in fixed order, a dictator game, the coupled lotteries game,
and two multiple choice lists eliciting the certainty equivalents of a lottery where
you win(lose) 10e or nothing with equal probabilities. Instructions for the ex-
periment were given on the screen and in written form (see Appendix Material
A.2.5). Participants were invited via hroot (Bock et al., 2014) and the experiment
was programmed in oTree (Chen et al., 2016).
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.5. Somewhat surprisingly, we find
that in contrast to our rural Thai sample, the majority of our German student
sample couples the lotteries. About 60% decide to couple the lottery and again
the share is statistically significantly different from being random.
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Lab-Sample
Full Lab-Sample Separators Couplers Difference
Male 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.05
Age 24.61 25.68 23.87 1.81∗
Risk Taking, MPL 10.46 11.16 9.98 1.18
Advice from Classmate 0.51 0.45 0.56 −0.10
Dictator Keeping 6.41 6.39 6.43 −0.05
Donation Dummy 0.64 0.68 0.62 0.06
Donation Amount 45.11 38.90 49.38 −10.47
Observations 76 31 45 76
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Furthermore, we find no difference for female and male participants, which
might be due to the rather homogeneous student sample in general (see Table 2.6
(1)). Still, we again cannot confirm previous findings, which are also mostly based
on student samples, that women are more inequality averse than men. We find
6 In our version of the dictator game, both parties decide how much to give to the other party
and a random draw decides whose decision is going to be implemented.
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a significant negative relationship between age and coupling the lotteries, which
is similar to the Thai sample. However, given the small age range and the rather
small sample size, insight into this relationship is limited. Our elicitation of risk
preferences, using a multiple price list similar to the one in Thailand, shows a
significant positive relation between risk aversion and coupling. In comparison to
Thailand, the relation in Germany is stronger and more robust.
Table 2.6: Regressions, Lab Sample
Coupling Donating Donating
Male −0.042 0.075 0.051
(0.072) (0.119) (0.144)
Age −0.022∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.003)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.013∗∗
(0.005)
Advice from Classmates 0.081∗∗∗
(0.002)




Relative Income −0.084 −0.082
(0.060) (0.071)




Observations 76 76 76
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.592 0.645 0.645
McFaddens R-squared 0.050 0.098 0.084
Dependent Var.: Coupling - Decision to separate (=0) or to couple (=1); Donating - Dummy
for making donations to any charity; Average marginal effects reported. SE bootstrapped and
clustered at session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Moreover, we asks students whether they regularly receive advice concerning
their studies from classmates. This question is chosen to mimic the agricultural-
advice question in our Thai sample. In line with our previous results, students
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who regularly receive advice are more likely to couple. Thus, even though social
distance in the lab is ex ante assumed to be higher, this finding supports the
notion that less social distance is related to greater inequality aversion.
Importantly, we do not find a correlation between decisions in the dictator
game and coupled lotteries. Both separators and couplers keep on average about
6.40e in the dictator game. For us, this is not worrisome, as the main motiva-
tion for this paper is that the dictator game is a flawed measure for inequality
aversion. Dictator giving is driven by various motives that blur the elicitation of
inequality aversion in outcomes, as the literature shows. Blanco et al. (2011), for
example, find no correlation between inequality aversion parameters derived from
the dictator game and other distribution games. Along the same lines, one motive
for donating to charities might be inequality aversion; however, it is probably not
the most crucial motive. Similar to charitable (dictator) giving in the lab, the
same various motives might drive charitable giving in real life. We elicit donation
behavior in our questionnaire and, in fact, we find no evidence for our coupled
lotteries measure to be predictive for whether people donate money to charities
or not. Dictator giving, however, is significantly positively related to donating at
the extensive margin (see Table 2.6 (2-3)).
2.7 Robustness Checks
In order to challenge our main results as shown in Section 2.4, we perform four
kinds of robustness tests. (i) In a first step, we run regressions focusing on the
socio-demographic variables sex and age. (ii) Then, we use different measures for
risk preference and income. (iii) Subsequently, we change the level for clustering
the error terms from district level to sub-district and village level to see how a less
conservative clustering affects the results. (iv) Finally, we control for additional
skills that could promote ex post risk sharing, numeracy and financial literacy.
Socio-demographics. We run regressions separated by sex to check for inter-
action effects between sex and other independent variables (see Table 2.7). In the
same table, we narrow the age group we look at. Beside the estimates in Section
2.4 for respondents between 16 and 85 years, we run a regression for respondents
aged 18 to 65 separated by using the two measures for social comparison. Look-
ing at the regressions separated by sex, we do not find new significant results.
Risk taking loses its significance in the small subsamples as before. However, the
different size of the coefficients indicates that the relation between risk aversion
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and inequality aversion is mainly driven by the male respondents. Comparing
oneself with neighbors is significant for the female sample, however, having no
social status concerns is not. For the male sample it is the other way around, sug-
gesting different channels between social status concerns and inequality aversion
for women and men in our sample.7 The narrowed age group increases the effect
of risk taking on the decision: although sample size is small, it turns significant.
All other results are unchanged except for receiving advice from neighbors, which
turns insignificant.
Table 2.7: Logistic Regressions, Split by Sex and Narrower Age Group
Female Male Age 18-65 Age 18-65
Male 0.085∗∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.038) (0.038)
Age −0.000 −0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.015 0.018 0.017∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) −0.027 −0.056 −0.027 −0.029
(0.034) (0.056) (0.033) (0.034)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.001 −0.007 −0.006∗∗ −0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Comparing with Neighbors 0.080∗ 0.014
(0.048) (0.040)
Not Comparing −0.261∗∗ −0.104∗∗
(0.078) (0.046)
Advice from Neighbor −0.017 −0.016
(0.032) (0.034)
Trust in Village 0.067∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.031) (0.029)
Observations 341 178 414 414
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.343 0.382 0.353 0.353
McFaddens R-squared 0.064 0.095 0.067 0.072
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
SE clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
7 Furthermore, there is another difference between female and male respondents. Whereas trust
is positively significant for coupling the lotteries for females, receiving advice from neighbors
is no longer significant; with it the other way around for males.
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Different measures. In this paragraph, we only report regressions using
the full sample as all findings can be transferred to the sub-sample. Replacing
annual consumption per capita with annual income per capita (see Table 2.8 (1))
does not change any of the other coefficients. Like consumption, income is not
significant. The same holds true if consumption is replaced by the total value of
durable assets the household of the respondents owns. Thus, we gain no further
insights by using different measures for income or wealth.
Table 2.8: Logistic Regressions, Different Measures for Risk and Income
Ann. Inc. Dur. Assets Risk Invest
Male 0.097∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Ann. Cons. per Cap. (log) −0.016 −0.016
(0.026) (0.026)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)








Observations 829 829 828 828
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.367 0.367 0.367
McFaddens R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.043
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
SE clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The alternative risk measures we employ are self-reported, general risk taking
on a scale from 0-10 (Dohmen et al., 2011) and a question in which respondents
have to decide how much to invest in a business from a hypothetical lottery prize
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of 100,000 THB, where the chance is 50% that the investment is doubled and
50% that it is halved. Both measures do not have a significant effect on coupling.
Regardless, the multiple price list measure seems to be the more reliable measure
given its more detailed scale8 and that it resembles our game the most.
Clustering. We cluster at the district level following Cameron and Miller
(2015) to cluster at least at the primary sampling unit. They emphasize that
clustering on an even higher aggregated level may frequently more suitable. How-
ever, in our sample, there is no straightforward level above district. In that sense,
our method is the most conservative way to cluster our sample. Nevertheless, we
also run regressions clustered at subdistrict and village levels (see Table 2.9).
Table 2.9: Logistic Regressions, Different Levels for Clustering
Subdistr. Subdistr. Village Village
Male 0.098∗∗∗ 0.067 0.098∗∗∗ 0.067
(0.034) (0.045) (0.035) (0.045)
Age −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.005 0.013∗ 0.005 0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) −0.013 −0.032 −0.013 −0.032
(0.022) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.004∗ −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Advice from Neighbor 0.075∗ 0.086 0.075∗ 0.086
(0.046) (0.055) (0.044) (0.057)
Not Comparing −0.129∗∗ −0.129∗∗
(0.048) (0.053)
Trust in Village 0.059∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.025) (0.029)
Observations 829 521 829 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.359 0.367 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.048 0.061 0.048 0.061
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
8 In principle, the investment question allows for a more precise measurement. Nevertheless,
respondents only made 22 unique choices, with more than 50% of the sample choosing 50,000.
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Effects remain unchanged except for sex and receiving advice from neighbors,
which lose their significance in the subsample. This is due to the fact that clus-
tering at a too low level cannot account for correlated error terms within each
district. Another point worth mentioning is that the number of district clusters
is small and that large-sample assumptions might not hold. However, our main
results are robust to re-estimating our regressions using wild cluster bootstrap
(results available upon request).
Skills. As final check, we add indices potentially indicating the comprehension
of the concept of ex post risk sharing; these indices represent the skills of numer-
acy and financial literacy (see Table 2.10). Numeracy is measured by letting
respondents answer 6 standard math equations, which gives us an index taking
values between 0 and 6. A higher value of numeracy is related to an increased
probability of coupling the lotteries and, thus, seems to have a similar effect as
education (although education is only significant in the small sample). This re-
sult is not driven by a potential multicollinearity problem between education and
numeracy.
For financial literacy, two standard questions from the literature (Lusardi and
Mitchell, 2008) and two additionally for this survey designed questions are used.
We find a positive effect on separating, which would be in favor of ex post risk
sharing. However, the coefficient is only significant in the small sample. In order
to better understand potential drivers, we analyze the four items defining the
financial literacy index separately. We see that the effect is purely driven by an-
swering the question on inflation correctly, the other questions are not significant.
Thus, this might be an artifact of the small sample.
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Table 2.10: Logistic Regressions, Numeracy and Financial Literacy
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.095∗∗∗ 0.065∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.030)
Age −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.003 0.012∗ 0.013∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Ann. Consumption per Cap. (log) −0.014 −0.032 −0.029
(0.025) (0.032) (0.031)
Risk Taking, MPL −0.004∗ −0.004 −0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Advice from Neighbor 0.081∗∗ 0.084∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.041) (0.048) (0.047)
Not Comparing −0.127∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046)
Trust in Village 0.057∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.025) (0.027)
Numeracy 0.030∗∗∗ 0.013 0.016
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016)










Observations 829 521 521
Baseline Predicted Probability 0.367 0.359 0.359
McFaddens R-squared 0.052 0.064 0.074
Dependent Var.: Decision to separate (=0) or couple (=1). Average marginal effects reported.
SE clustered at district level. District dummies not reported.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.8 Conclusion
Inequality aversion is a well-established concept in the behavioral economics liter-
ature, which is also gaining policy relevance due to increasing income inequality
in most industrialized countries (Alvaredo et al., 2017). Thus, for sound and
evidence-based policy making, it is important to have a better, empirically sub-
stantiated, understanding of individual inequality aversion. This is currently
hampered by the lack of a simple measure for inequality aversion that can be
integrated into large household surveys. Here we propose such a new and simple
measure. Due to its simplicity, it is less informative than a measure specified by
theoretical models, but has the advantages that (i) it requires no further assump-
tions on expectations and preferences and (ii) can be implemented at relatively
little cost in empirical studies.
We term this new measure “coupled lotteries.” It is built on a single deci-
sion of individuals; whether they want to separate or couple a predefined lottery
with their peers. Here, coupling means that the lotteries of two individuals are
perfectly positively correlated, i.e. both receive the same outcome. As expected
payoffs are the same for both choices, the decision for coupled lotteries reveals
inequality aversion.
We find, in our sample of 850 poor households from rural Thailand, that
about 60% of respondents prefer to separate, whereas 40% prefer to couple. As
theoretically expected, the latter choice is related to being more risk averse and
having social status concerns. In contrast to previous studies, but in line with
Bellemare et al. (2008), our results suggest that men are more inequality averse
than women and that previous studies might include confounding factors. As a
competing explanation of the findings, one may argue that those individuals who
prefer to separate are aware of the possibility of ex post risk sharing. However,
we examine several variables underlying such awareness and expectation, with
none supporting this explanation. In addition to these results, we find that our
measure is related to real-life choices. Household heads who are inequality averse
are more likely to have formal insurance for their household and more likely to
diversify the crops they cultivate, which can be interpreted as a kind of informal
insurance.
Our supplemental lab evidence from Germany shows that coupled lotteries
and dictator game decisions are not correlated, providing further evidence that
dictator and charitable giving are not reliable measures for inequality aversion.
Otherwise, we find similar correlations in our German student sample to those
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we find in our rural Thai sample. Social connectivity seems to be an especially
important correlate of inequality aversion in both samples.
Thus, we conclude that our method gives us a robust measure of inequal-
ity aversion within our two diverse samples. Future research is needed to show
whether this finding has further external validity and holds with various param-
eterizations.
Chapter 3
The Effect of Social Comparison
on Debt Taking:
Experimental Evidence
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3.1 Introduction
The number of over-indebted households is increasing worldwide (IMF, 2017).
In Germany, for example, 6.9 million households were regarded as over-indebted
(Creditreform Wirtschaftsforschung, 2017) and 7.5% of German households had
negative assets in 2017 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019). These high levels of debt
cannot be rationalized by conventional economic theory and, in this regard, house-
holds’ borrowing behavior is vastly understudied. There are many open questions
about the determinants of debt taking (Zinman, 2015). Despite this, household
debt is a wide ranging problem, as over-indebtedness can pose a serious risk to
household well-being and the economy as a whole (IMF, 2017).
One promising, but still very small, line of research studies the effects of social
comparison and peer effects on debt levels. Georgarakos et al. (2014) find that
individuals who believe their social circle to have higher income than themselves
are more likely to hold debt. Agarwal et al. (2019) show, using lottery winners in
Canada as exogenous variation, that unequal incomes in neighborhoods can lead
to financial distress. These studies find evidence for the effect of social comparison
on debt. However, what remains unclear are the mechanisms behind these effects.
In this paper, we aim to shed light onto these mechanisms by performing a lab
experiment in which we are able to disentangle two different channels.
We use three different treatments to disentangle the following two possible
drivers: social image concerns, concerns about private information about oneself
that is revealed to others, and peer information, the information about others that
is revealed to oneself. Bursztyn and Jensen (2017) clearly distinguish between
these two kinds of peer effects. By separating these two mechanisms, we also
contribute to literature on peer effects in general.
The three treatments vary the way participants make and communicate a
consumption decision: participants are supposed to buy one pen out of a set of
different quality pens with money they have previously earned in an IQ-quiz. The
amount earned depends on how participants perform in comparison to the others
in the session. All the money not spent is lost. Thus, assuming cognitive ability to
be a socially desirable trait, the consumption decision can be indicative of being a
“lower” or a “higher” type. In the control treatment, the decision which pen the
individual participant buys is kept private. In contrast, in the public treatment,
each participant must announce their decision publicly. The decision of which
pen to buy is made in private before the public announcement, but participants
know about the announcement before they decide. In the information treatment,
the consumption decisions of participants who made their decision previously is
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shown to the participants on screen before they make their own decision. This
way, participants are informed about the decision of others without identities
being revealed. In all treatments, participants have the possibility to take out
a loan to buy a higher quality pen. They can later repay this loan by exerting
sufficient effort in a real-effort task (the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012)) or
by using their participation fee. To estimate not only between treatment effects
but also the possible shift in preferences within participants, we elicit a non-
manipulated consumption preference prior to the experiment by conducting an
online survey and compare it to the decision in the experiment. Furthermore, we
elicit a comprehensive list of character traits and interact these traits with our
treatments to investigate who is susceptible to social comparison.
We have two main expectations regarding the outcome of our experiment.
First, loan take-up in the public treatment is higher than in the control treat-
ment, since “lower” types try to hide their type by buying a more expensive pen
as a way to signal high IQ. Second, take-up is also expected to be higher in the
information treatment than in the control, because of a preference for confor-
mity or because new information is received by learning about other participants
choices. However, we expect this effect to be smaller than the social image effect
in the public treatment, because it could potentially also move in the opposite
direction. Related to these hypotheses, we generally expect persons who take a
loan to work harder in the slider task.
Our results are very surprising. Participants in the public treatment do not
take more loans than those in the control treatment, but are more likely to buy a
pen of lower quality than they could actually afford. Two likely explanations for
this finding are that (i) they do not want to be perceived as smarter than their
peers, as it might not be socially desirable; and/or (ii) they do not want to be
publicly blamed for making other participants worse off as their “success” in the
experiment is directly linked to the “failure” of others. Thus, they still exhibit
social image concerns but of a different kind than we hypothesized. We expected
social image concerns to coincide with social status concerns in our experiment
but clearly have to refute this expectation. In the information treatment, we find
strong evidence for a taste for conformity. Lower performing participants do take
out slightly more loans while higher performing participants buy a lower quality
pen than participants in the control group. This means that participants in the
information treatment converge to some average quality pen although adjustment
from above is much larger than from below.
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These results are supported when comparing pre-experiment preference to
actual choice in the experiment: looking at the effects of our treatments within
subjects, we can see that participants in the public treatment buy more lower
quality pens, whilst participants in the information treatment adjust their choices
to match those who have chosen before them, which is not the case for participants
in the control treatment. Surprisingly, the amount of loan taken is negatively
related to performance in the slider task for all treatments, even when controlling
for general ability and motivation. This means participants do not want to make
up for the lost earnings with extra work.
Beyond helping to broaden out knowledge about why private debt might have
increased sharply worldwide, our study is linked to at least two other strands of
the literature. First, to the literature on peer effects on consumption decisions
in general and through which channels these effects actually might be induced.
Second, on the discussion started by Veblen (1899) over 100 years ago on who is
actually engaging in conspicuous consumption and is even willing to take out a
loan to finance it.
Several studies find that social comparison at least influences consumption
decisions. In the field, Kuhn et al. (2011) find that the likelihood of buying a
new car increases if someone in the neighborhood has recently bought a new car
(see also Grinblatt et al., 2008). Rural villagers make consumption decisions that
are more in line with the decisions of those that they observe (Grohmann and
Sakha, 2019). In the lab, people are less likely to take up additional assistance
when this has to be done publicly to compensate for a smaller payout due to low
cognitive ability (Friedrichsen et al., 2018). Methodologically, the experiment by
Clingingsmith and Sheremeta (2017) is closely related to ours. They show in
the lab that participants increase consumption of a “luxurious” good if income
is linked to a desirable trait and the decision has to be made publicly. Our
experimental design resembles theirs. However, we explicitly look at taking out a
debt to consume and we have an additional treatment to test for peer information
effects.
As previously noted, concerning debt taking and peer effects, we find only a
few studies looking explicitly at this relationship. Bertrand and Morse (2016)
describe, in their appendix, how the presence of higher top-income households is
probably causally related to higher credit and bankruptcy in low-income house-
holds. As mentioned before, Georgarakos et al. (2014) find a link between beliefs
on the affluence of the own social circle and debt taking. Agarwal et al. (2019)
show that having a lottery winner in the neighborhood leads to increased rates of
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bankruptcy for others in the area. While the former studies depict correlations,
the latter does not discusses through which personal channels peer effects work
and who is more responsive to social comparison.
Many of the aforementioned field studies implicitly explain higher “visible”
consumption merely as a result of conspicuous consumption. In reality it is
hard to disentangle whether persons want to convey status with their visible
consumption or they just “learned” from the visible consumption of others and
want to conform. There is a substantial literature on how social -peer- information
affects pro-social behavior and charitable giving (e.g Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang
and Croson, 2009; Smith et al., 2015) but less so on (debt-financed) consumption.
We see two major contributions of this lab experiment. First, we are able to
study the mechanisms behind an effect that is found in a number of studies based
on field experiments. Second, we test if effects, such as the social comparison
effect that holds in studies on consumption, also hold once consumption can be
financed through debt.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 explains the experimental design
and the data we collect. Section 3.3 reports our main results and Section 3.4
presents robustness checks. Section 3.5 discusses our findings in more detail
while Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment is designed to mimic consumption decisions in social situations
when credit is available. The treatments vary in how the consumption decisions
are made. There are three main stages to our experiment. A schematic descrip-










Figure 3.1: Experimental Flow
Once in the lab, participants first read the instructions and enter an individu-
ally constructed ID on the computer. Instructions are given in written form and
on screen (see Appendix B.3.1). Then, the participants have to answer compre-
hension questions on the screen regarding the procedure of the experiment and
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payoff possibilities (see Appendix B.3.2). If there are participants who have made
mistakes in this part, the experiment only continues after one of the experimenters
explains the right answer to these persons.
3.2.1 Intelligence Test
Following the instructions and comprehension questions, participants take an IQ-
style test, for which they are paid according to their performance in relation to
others in the session. All questions are taken off a website endorsed by Mensa and
designed by a member of Mensa. Participants are made aware that these type of
questions are used to measure intelligence. The questions are not designed to give
a reliable IQ measure but present small intelligence riddles with varying levels
of difficulty. We include questions for several levels of difficulty as defined by
the website. Our test consists of twelve questions: four questions on completing
number sequences and eight questions on completing sequences of pictures with
geometric forms (see Appendix B.3.3). Participants have seven minutes to answer
as many questions as possible. An intelligence test is chosen by us because we
believe it is intrinsically desirable for our student sample to perform well on it.
The top performing quartile in each session is paid 3e, the third is paid 2e, the
second is paid 1e and the bottom quartile is paid 50 Cents.
The test has an adequate level of difficulty. Out of the twelve questions
the best candidates answered nine questions correctly and the worst none. The
average candidate gave 4.43 correct answers and, with a standard deviation of
2.14, there is a good spread in the number of questions answered correctly.
3.2.2 Consumption Choice
The quiz is followed by a “shopping round,” in which participants can buy a pen
with the money they just earned. The pen is available in 5 different qualities and
we use a star rating to convey the difference in quality: the five-star pen costs
4e, the four-star 3e, the three-star 2e, the two-star 1e, and the one-star pen
costs 50 Cents. Thus, there is a pen quality for each earnings level and one pen
whose price exceeds maximum quiz earnings. A picture of the pens and their
labels is placed by each computer at the beginning of the session (see Appendix
B.3.4). The lab prices present the actual list prices of the pens that are all from
the same brand. The labeling makes it clear that the more expensive pens are
supposed to be more desirable than the cheaper ones. To buy a pen that costs
more than what participants earned during the IQ-test, participants can take a
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loan of up to 3.50e. All the earnings from the quiz that are not spent on a pen
are lost. The way the choice of a pen is communicated and what the participants
know about the choice of others varies between treatments. For more details, see
Subsection 3.2.3.
One of the reasons why we choose pens is that we assume that preferences
are rather unidimensional in the sense that the price is the most decisive factor
in the preference relation for the five pens, at baseline. This might be not the
case for products like chocolate (see the Descriptives in Subsection 3.3.3). Simply
speaking, for pens the price is more important than personal taste for color or
material. Hence, there should be no other reason to buy a lower quality pen
except for that it is cheaper. However, this means even in a standard economic
framework without peer effects, incentives to buy a lower quality pen than one
can afford are relatively small or non-existent in our experiment. This is the case
because all the earnings from the IQ-quiz that are not spent on a pen are lost.
Hence, participants would leave money on the table. However, as outlined before,
in the absence of peer effects, there is also no particular incentive to buy a more
expensive pen. Thus, pens are less likely to confound our treatment than other
products, as the preference is more easily malleable.
3.2.3 Treatments
We assume that the most revealing signal for being in a particular earnings/perfor-
mance group is to buy the pen whose price exactly corresponds to this group.
That is because both pen prices and the earnings structure for the intelligence
test are common knowledge:1
Pr−i(σi = T |ai = T ) > Pr−i(σi = T |ai ̸= T ), (3.1)
where σi is the type of individual i, T ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is the type space, which in our
case are the four possible performance groups and ai ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the action
space, thus the 5 possible pens an individual can buy. Pr−i(σi|ai) represents the
probability that the other participants think individual i belongs to a certain
group given a certain action. Furthermore, we assume that buying the most
expensive pen makes it most likely for the other participants that i belongs to
the highest (the fourth) performance group:
Pr−i(σi = 4|ai = 5) > Pr−i(σi ̸= 4|ai = 5) (3.2)
1 Our notation is largely taken from Bursztyn and Jensen (2017).
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With these assumptions in mind, we explain the treatments and their conse-
quences in the following.
Private Treatment: Control
The private treatment is the control treatment. In the shopping round partici-
pants simultaneously decide on their individual computer screens which pen they
want to buy. The decision is kept private and they continue to the slider task
without any further intervention. In this treatment, social image concerns and
peer information do not occur as there is no possibility for participants to infer
which pen the others buy (which means Pr−i(σi|ai) is not defined). The pens are
handed over individually in another room next to the lab and participants leave
after payout.
Public Treatment: Social Image Concerns
In the public treatment, participants again first make the decision simultaneously.
However, after everyone made their decision they have to stand up one after
another and have to publicly announce which pen they have chosen. The order
in which participants stand up is random. They are informed beforehand that
announcing the consumption decision is part of the procedure and are shown
by the experimenter how they have to do it. Given our previous assumptions,
buying a low quality pen is a strong signal for low performance in the IQ-quiz.
Hence, further assuming that being seen as intelligent is a desirable trait, social
image concerns can potentially occur, as Pr−i(σi|ai) is well-defined. This is true
especially for those individuals who end up in the lower performance groups.
Thus, we assume that low performers in the public treatment are more likely to
take a loan to buy a higher quality pen in order to signal higher intelligence.
Information Treatment: Peer Information
The third treatment is an information treatment, where each respective partici-
pant makes their decision sequentially, in random order, instead of simultaneously.
Therefore, we can show participants in a small table on their screen how many
pens of each kind have been bought previously (see Appendix B.3.6). Everyone is
sitting in a cubicle with high walls and instructions are solely given on the com-
puter without any interruptions from the experimenters. In this way, participants
are informed about what their peers decided while no identities are revealed. This
means that Pr−i(σi|ai) is not defined because i cannot be identified, but that i
has several a−i that she can consider when making her own decision. Therefore,
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peer information can occur but social image concerns are very unlikely to play a
role. We expect to find that participants in this treatment will follow the decision
of those who have already made their decision.
3.2.4 Slider Task
After the consumption choice, participants perform the slider task developed by
Gill and Prowse (2012). The slider task is a computerized real-effort task where
participants have to move a predefined number of “sliders” to a predefined posi-
tion with their cursors (see Appendix B.3.5). In our experiment, they have four
minutes to move up to 48 sliders to the value “50.” Effort is measured by counting
the number of correctly adjusted sliders. Moving the sliders is rather cumbersome
and non-entertaining. Furthermore, we implement a sharply decreasing marginal
return to effort: the first eight correctly adjusted sliders pay 25 cents each, the
next eight earn 15 cents each, the following eight get 10 cents each, the next
eight earn 5 cents each, the following eight 3 cents, and the final eight 2 cents.
The slider task gives participants who previously took a loan the chance to earn
additional money to repay that loan. After the slider task, final earnings from
the experiment are calculated. If participants decide to take up a loan and do
not exert enough effort in the slider task to repay it, the money is taken off the
participation fee.
The average number of sliders set correctly is 23.83 and the maximum is 48
out of 48. This is in line with performances in other experiments that involve
slider tasks such as Gill and Prowse (2019).
3.2.5 Pre-Experiment Survey
In their invitation email to the experiment, participants are asked to complete an
online survey that was created with Google Forms. Invitation emails are send out
one week before the sessions take place and participants are reminded to fill out
the survey 1-2 days beforehand. In the survey, they have to provide an individual
ID so that we can later link these data to the data collected in the experiment.2
In the online survey, participants are asked for their preferred product out
of a group of five homogeneous goods. They have to indicate their favorite type
of chocolate, cola, folder, lip balm, and pen. We show them a picture and the
2 The ID is composed of the third letter of the first name + the last two numbers of the zip code
+ the last letter of the last name in capitals + the birthday for each individual participant.
In this way, we can merge the online survey with the experimental data whilst participants
remain anonymous and no sensitive data is collected by the researcher.
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list price of each product (see Appendix B.3.7). The five pens are the same pens
that they later can buy in the experiment. Thus, a pre-treatment preference
for pens is elicited that we use for a within-subject analysis. By asking for a
variety of homogeneous goods, we can reduce priming as participants are less
likely to remember their choice. We further get an indication on whether the
price is a decisive factor when choosing a pen and whether this is different for the
other products. Additionally, we include questions on the importance of price,
brands/image, and the opinion of others when buying small, everyday products
like the products in the survey. These questions are measured on a Likert-scale
from one to seven.
3.2.6 Individual Characteristics
We not only want to analyze the possible channels through which peer effects
might increase debt taking but also who responds to which channel. Various
studies look at differences in socially contingent consumption rather along socio-
economic lines (like income, region, “race” etc.). We want to complement the
literature by investigating what kind of personal attitudes and characteristics
make persons more or less susceptible to social image concerns and responsive to
peer information. We concentrate on five distinct personality concepts, namely
cognitive reflection, locus of control, global self-esteem, self-monitoring, and the
Big Five personality traits. Each of these are measured with well-established
methods from the literature. Cognitive Reflection measures a specific type of
intelligence: the tendency to reflect on problems rather than following a wrong
intuition when looking for an answer. We use the three questions originally intro-
duced by Frederick (2005). Locus of Control presents the perceived control over
the own life. Here, we use the scale used in the German Socio-Economic Panel
(Wagner et al., 2007), which itself is based on Rotter (1966). The “Rosenberg
Self-esteem Scale” (see Rosenberg, 1979; Ferring and Filipp, 1996; von Collani and
Herzberg, 2003) is employed to assess Global Self-Esteem (GSE). In contrast to
specific self-esteem, GSE is an overall feeling of self-worth that is not attached to
a particular situation. Self-Monitoring describes the willingness and/or ability of
individuals to adapt their behavior to different social situations and is measured
with the revised self-monitoring scale by Snyder (1974) (see Snyder and Ganges-
tad, 1986; Graf, 2004). The Big Five are measured using the short version of
the big five inventory “BFI-S” (John and Srivastava, 1999; Gerlitz and Schupp,
2005). For detailed hypotheses, as well as results on the relationship between
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these personality traits and susceptibility to social comparison, see Appendix
B.1.
Additionally, we collect socio-economic variables like sex and age as well as
data on lab experience, financial literacy, and risk preference. The financial lit-
eracy scale is based on Lusardi and Mitchell (2008) and complemented by own
designed questions. Risk preference is measured with the question on general risk
taking by Dohmen et al. (2011).
3.2.7 Procedure and Participants
Our experiment took place at Technical University Berlin in November 2018. In-
cluding three pilot sessions, 27 experimental sessions were run. Treatments were
randomized at the session level and each session lasted between 42 and 58 min-
utes.3 On average, participants earned 14.33e, including a show-up fee of 5e
and a participation fee of 3.50e. In total, 305 students from various disciplines
participated. All sessions had at least nine participants and most consisted of
twelve participants. The experiment is programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and participants are recruited from the subject pool of the Technical Uni-
versity laboratory via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). The experiment is registered in
the AEA RCT Registry, RCT ID: AEARCTR-0003597.4
In Table 3.1, we present the descriptive statistics for the whole sample and
the control group as well as the differences between control group and the two
treatments, respectively. For the main analysis, we exclude the 35 observations
from our three pilot sessions, as we changed the experimental procedure sub-
stantially after the pilot. As can be seen, our treatments are gender-balanced,
with the average participant around 23 years old, having studied for 3 semesters,
a monthly income of ca. 690e, and already participated in at least one other
experiment in the lab. There is also no difference in intelligence as proxied by
absolute performance in the IQ-quiz and cognitive reflection between treatments.
At a first glance, the number of imbalances seem to be particularly high in our
experiment in comparison to other studies. However, given the sample size and
the large number of variables we are looking at, this is actually not surprising.
Furthermore, an F-test on joint orthogonality of all variables on the treatment
cannot be rejected (p-value=0.14). We still control for the imbalanced variables
in most of our specifications.
3 There is a significant correlation between duration and treatments with mean duration of




Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Full Sample Control Control-Public Control-Info
Male 0.48 0.48 −0.00 0.01
Age 22.86 22.57 −0.58 −0.29
Education 3.36 3.27 −0.20∗∗ −0.06
Students 0.97 0.99 0.05∗ 0.02
Semester 3.68 3.50 −0.62 0.09
Student Job 0.28 0.27 −0.03 0.01
Mthl. Income 688.36 713.84 18.35 60.98
Risk Preference 5.34 5.81 0.85∗∗ 0.64∗
Lab Experience 1.89 1.95 0.07 0.12
Know Someone 0.31 0.18 −0.22∗∗ −0.17∗
Persons in Session 11.33 11.67 0.46∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
Correct Control Questions 4.74 4.76 −0.01 0.08
Correct Quiz Questions 4.43 4.55 −0.00 0.37
Financial Literacy 4.59 4.70 0.27 0.07
Cognitive Reflection 1.91 2.01 0.19 0.12
Conscientiousness −0.01 −0.12 −0.14 −0.20
Neuroticism 0.03 −0.06 −0.22 −0.07
Extraversion −0.02 0.08 0.28∗ 0.04
Openess −0.02 0.08 0.18 0.13
Agreeableness −0.01 −0.13 −0.26∗ −0.10
Self-Esteem −0.01 0.19 0.37∗∗ 0.23∗
Locus of Control 0.00 0.13 0.29∗ 0.10
Self-Monitoring −0.02 −0.02 0.02 −0.03
Observations 270 93 182 181
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Participants in the public treatment have a higher level of education but are
slightly less likely to study than participants in the control treatment. They
are less risk-seeking and less extraverted but more agreeable and have a larger
internal locus of control. We find differences between the control and information
treatments for risk-seeking and self-esteem but not in the education domain.
Finally, although there were significantly less participants per session in the public
and information treatment (which is, however, exogenous to the participants),
participants in these treatment are more likely to know another person in their
session. Since this study analyses peer effects, endogeneity in the peer group size
could seriously jeopardize identification. However, given that participants are not
aware beforehand in which treatment they will end up and that we randomized
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the order of treatments between daytime and weekdays, we do not have reason to
believe that real-life peers were more likely to sort into one or another treatment.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptives
Overall, around 20% of the participants actually take a loan and the average loan
amount conditional on take-up is about 1.30e. This means that, on average,
participants take up a loan to buy a pen that is one quality level higher than the
one they can afford with quiz earnings. However, as can be seen in Table 3.2,
these numbers differ across treatments.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics Outcome Variables
Observations Mean Stand. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Control Treatment
Loan Amount 93 0.22 0.62 0.00 3.50
Loan Dummy 93 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 16 1.28 0.95 0.50 3.50
Public Treatment
Loan Amount 89 0.23 0.53 0.00 2.50
Loan Dummy 89 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 19 1.08 0.63 0.50 2.50
Info Treatment
Loan Amount 88 0.31 0.73 0.00 3.50
Loan Dummy 88 0.20 0.41 0.00 1.00
Cond. Loan Amount 18 1.50 0.92 0.50 3.50
Summary statistics are given in Euro for Loan Amount and Cond. Loan Amount.
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Similarly, in Figure 3.2, we see that participants borrow, with a considerable
number buying the five-star pen, for which there is no corresponding earnings
level. The two-star pen is the most frequently bought pen, whilst the three-star
pen is the least popular. Most importantly, we can see from the graphic that
people buy pens that do not correspond to their earnings level, as not all bars
are of the same height.
3.3.2 Loan Take-Up
In Table 3.3, the effects of the socially contingent treatments on loan take-up
are estimated.5 For both treatments, there are no significant effects on whether
participants took a loan nor on the amount, as seen in Columns (1) and (2). When
controlling for imbalances, as seen in Column (3), effect sizes are much smaller
for the loan amount in the public treatment, even negative, which suggests that
participants in the public treatment actually take a smaller loan than those in
the control group. Column (4) shows that there is absolutely no effect on the
loan dummy when we control for imbalances.
Table 3.3: Effects of Treatments on Loan Take-Up
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment 0.010 0.041 −0.017 0.006
(0.118) (0.088) (0.137) (0.095)
Info Treatment 0.086 0.033 0.073 0.003
(0.126) (0.078) (0.114) (0.073)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Given the results on loan amounts for the control group and our sample size,
we would be able to detect moderate effect sizes (Cohen’s d = 0.37, assuming a
power=80% and α=5%). This is almost exactly the same minimum detectable
5 In all our regressions, we estimate standard errors that are bootstrapped and clustered at
session level. However, given the subsequent small number of clusters, we also calculate p-
values using wild cluster bootstrap following the advice of Cameron et al. (2008). All our
results of interest are robust to this specification.
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effect size we calculated in our pre-analysis plan and slightly larger than the ef-
fect found in comparable studies (for example Friedrichsen and Engelmann, 2018,
find an effect of 0.3). However, the actual effect size of the public treatment is
extremely small (Cohen’s d = -0.017), the confidence intervals lie almost sym-
metrically around the null and never reach 0.3 in the positive direction. Hence,
we are relatively confident that participants, in general, do not take a larger loan
due to social image concerns.6
Effect sizes for the loan amount are larger in the information treatment, but
standard errors are considerably high. However, observations in the information
treatment might be path-dependent within each session and, in Table 3.3, we do
not account for this. Table 3.4, tries to take this into account.
Table 3.4: Effects of Treatments on Loan Take-Up, Info Treatment Correction
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment −0.108 −0.173 −0.016 0.070
(0.210) (0.118) (0.466) (0.368)
Order −0.017 −0.010*
(0.014) (0.006)
Interaction Order*Info 0.028 0.028**
(0.025) (0.014)
Mean Prev. Pens 0.023 0.051
(0.114) (0.116)
Interaction Mean*Info 0.034 −0.015
(0.169) (0.138)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Correction Order Order Mean Pen Mean Pen
Observations 248 248 226 226
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered
on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In Columns (1) and (2), we control for the place in the order in which par-
ticipants decide in the information treatment. Those who have to decide later
6 There is the possibility that participants hide their low performance, but we still do not
find an effect: they simply lie when announcing the decision publicly. Controlling for this
possibility by cross-checking each announcement with the data, we do not find a single person
who lied in the public treatment.
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are more likely to adjust their behavior as they receive more information.7 We
find a significant order effect on the probability to take a loan at all, however, no
significant effect on the amount taken. The effect size is small, which might be
the case because early decision makers can either set a high or a low benchmark.
If early decision makers choose low quality pens, there might be no reason for
followers to take a loan. Therefore, in Columns (3) and (4), we control for the
average of pens bought up to the point when the respective participant has to
decide. Here, we find an insignificant, albeit positive, effect on loan take up and
a negative effect on the likelihood. Eventually, there is some adjustment in the
information treatment. Thus, in general, there seems to be an effect of the info
treatment if controlling for path dependency but effects seem to be too small to
reach significance.8
Summarized, when looking at between-subject effects, results are rather sur-
prising. The public treatment has no effect on loan take up, if anything it seems
that people are borrowing less in the public treatment. The information treatment
seems to have larger effects. In the next subsection, we examine within-subject
results to gain further insights. Results on how different personal characteristics
interact with peer effects are in Appendix Tables B.1.1 and B.1.2.
3.3.3 Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice
In this subsection, we compare pen choices in the pre-experiment survey to pen
choices during the experiment. Hence, we can examine whether our treatments
let participants choose to buy a different pen from the one they claimed to use
in everyday life. Therefore, we compare the pen that participants actually buy
in the experiment to the pen they buy and use most in everyday life as stated
in the online survey. This is not a test between stated and revealed preference,
as in the online survey we already ask explicitly for usage and not preference.
More importantly, we expect a difference between the two pen choices, even for
the control treatment because of the experimental design in general. In this
sense, we are interested in whether the treatments changed the choice of the
pen above and beyond the change already induced by the experimental setting.
As argued in Subsection 3.2.3, participants have a large incentive to buy the
pen that corresponds to their earnings level, especially if the price is the most
important criterion for the choice of pens. The latter assumption seems to be
7 Since in the other two treatments there is no order that matters for the decision, we use the
subject number to order these observations in the various specifications.
8 Both corrections have advantages and disadvantages. We prefer the order approach as it
allows us to keep all observations, which is not the case if using the mean approach.
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valid, especially compared to other goods, as seen in Appendix Figure B.2.1.
In total, we collected 323 answers in our online survey and approximately 50%
choose the cheapest pen. For all the other goods, no more than 24% ever choose
the cheapest option. For example for folders, which belong to the same group of
goods as pens (stationery), only 16% choose the cheapest.
Unfortunately, despite having more survey responses than participants, not
all our participants answered the online survey or used different IDs such that
we cannot merge their responses with the experimental data. We are able to
match 219 cases that are evenly distributed between treatment groups (for each
treatment we have about 80% who answered the online survey). Furthermore,
there are no significant personal differences between those for whom we have valid
answers and for those we do not (see Appendix Table B.2.1).
In Table 3.5, we regress the different pen choices on treatments. As expected,
there are no significant effects on pre-experiment choices (Column (1)). However,
there are also no significant effects on choices in the experiment (Column (2)).
Interestingly, there is a change in signs, which means that there is a considerable
difference between the two coefficients. This difference is marginally significant in
the public treatment but only if we do not control for imbalances. Nevertheless,
it seems that participants in the public treatment not only take a smaller loan
but choose a cheaper pen in general.
Table 3.5: Pre-Experiment Choice and Adjustment
Pen Before Pen After Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Public Treatment 0.098 −0.061 −0.237
(0.226) (0.231) (0.246)
Info Treatment −0.227 0.022 0.262
(0.254) (0.179) (0.289)
Mean Control Group 2.00 2.69 0.71
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Similar to Table 3.4, Table 3.6 shows the results for the info treatment, but
controlling for order effects. Here, we find highly significant effects. Participants
in the information treatment who decide later in the order buy a more expensive
pen and, thereby, a pen that is further away from their pre-experimental choice.
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Table 3.6: Pre-Experiment Choice and Adjustment, Info Treatment Correction
Before After Difference
(1) (2) (3)
Info Treatment −0.101 −0.550* −0.567
(0.473) (0.326) (0.520)
Order 0.035 −0.064*** −0.102***
(0.045) (0.023) (0.036)
Interaction Order*Info −0.022 0.092*** 0.134**
(0.055) (0.035) (0.054)
Mean Control Group 2.00 2.69 0.71
Correction Order Order Order
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered
on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
3.3.4 Leaving Money on the Table
So far, we have seen that participants in the information treatment are more
likely to take a loan and, hence, more likely to buy a more expensive pen, if they
have to make their choice later in the order. At the same time, we have seen
that, in the public treatment, there is neither a significant effect on loan take up
nor on the choice of pens compared to the choice in the pre-experiment survey.
The surprising non-results in the latter treatment seem to not only be driven
by small effect sizes in combination with a small sample, but effects seem to be
non-existent or actually go in the opposite direction.
We here examine this further by looking at whether participants leave money
on the table by buying a cheaper pen than the one they could afford according to
their earnings. In Table 3.7, we determine if people leave money on the table and
how much they leave. Results are striking, as participants in the public treatment
buy significantly more lower quality pens and are more likely to do this than those
in the control treatment. As expected, this effect is driven by high performers,
which means we have an asymmetry: high performers are adjusting downwards
but low performers do not adjust upwards.
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Table 3.7: Buying a Lower Quality than Affordable
Lost Amount Lost Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment 0.115*** 0.076** −0.066 −0.033
(0.043) (0.030) (0.073) (0.044)
Info Treatment 0.068 0.067 −0.018 0.005
(0.056) (0.053) (0.044) (0.051)
Performance 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Interaction Rank*Public 0.026* 0.016**
(0.015) (0.007)
Interaction Rank*Info 0.013 0.009
(0.009) (0.008)
Mean Control Group 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.043
Observations 248 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
As in the previous subsections, we repeat these calculation for the info treat-
ment by controlling for order effects. Results are shown in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Buying a Lower Quality than Affordable, Info Treatment Correction
Lost Amount Lost Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment 0.187** 0.183** 0.203** 0.233**
(0.078) (0.085) (0.091) (0.107)
Order 0.012* 0.012* 0.014* 0.013*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Interaction Order*Info −0.020** −0.020* −0.021* −0.026**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Mean Control Group 0.038 0.043 0.038 0.043
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 270 270 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered
on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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We can see here that people in the information treatment are also more likely
to leave money on the table than people in the control group. However, in line
with previous results, this effect is counteracted if participants make their choices
later in the order. Thus, in contrast to the public treatment, there seems to be a
rather symmetric adjustment in the information treatment.
3.3.5 Results on Effort Provision
As described above, the choice of pen is followed by the slider task. It is our
expectation that participants who took a loan in the consumption stage will try
to make up for their loss in income by exerting additional effort in the slider task.
In Table 3.9, however, we find exactly the opposite: the amount of loan taken
is significantly negatively related to effort. The treatments themselves seem to
have no additional effect on the effect exerted in the slider task.
Table 3.9: Effort and Loan Take-Up
Effort Slider Task Effort Slider Task Effort Slider Task
(1) (2) (3)
Public Treatment 1.064 0.952 1.931
(1.386) (1.416) (1.551)
Info Treatment 2.131 2.053 2.145
(1.547) (1.555) (1.647)








Mean Control Group 22.61 22.61 22.61
Observations 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In Column (2), we can see that there is a positive relationship between per-
forming well in the IQ-quiz and performing well in the slider task. One can only
speculate about the reasons behind this. It is possible that some people have a
high general ability. Alternatively, low performers may have been demotivated
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by their low performance and, as such, put little effort into the slider task. In
Column (3), we see that the effect of having taken a loan on putting no effort into
the slider task is largest in the public treatment. All the results combined indi-
cate that having taken a loan in the consumption round may have demotivating
effects later in the experiment.
Given the low loan take-up, the payoff from the slider task is too generous.
Only two persons did not manage to work enough to repay their loans, all the
others mostly obtained a surplus from the slider task. This makes it hard to draw
meaningful conclusions, since participants did not have to work more to repay
their debts.
3.4 Robustness
Controlling for the Pre-Experiment Choice There are slight, albeit not sig-
nificant, imbalances across treatments in the pen participants have chosen in the
online survey. Therefore, we control for this pre-experimental choice in Appendix
Tables B.2.2 and B.2.3 and test if our main results are robust to this inclusion.
Although our sample size is smaller, as not all participants answered the online
survey, results regarding loan take-up in the two treatments stay the same. There
is no significant positive effect of the public treatment on taking a loan. In this
specification, coefficients are larger in size but all of them are negative. For the
information treatment, we again find a significant and positive interaction be-
tween treatment and order of deciding. The effect is furthermore of a similar size
than before. Interestingly, the more expensive the chosen pen in the online survey
is, the larger is the loan amount in the lab. This indicates that participants did
not give fun answers in the online survey, which is not incentivized, but reported
truthfully.
Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice - Dummy Given that participants
deviate in both directions from their pre-experimental choice, we test if, in total,
the treatments make it less or more likely to buy the pen that one actually prefers.
In Appendix Table B.2.4, we find a small negative effect on the likelihood to buy
the preferred pen, which is, however, not significant. If we control for order effects,
the treatments seem to increase the likelihood to buy the preferred pen for first
movers, but this effects fades out with the place in the order. Again, these effects
are not significant as standard errors are extremely large. In general, the table
supports our previous results as found in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.
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Using a Different Order in Control and Public Treatment To correct for
path dependency in the information treatment, we control for the order in which
participants decide. However, since participants decide simultaneously in the
control and public treatment, we have to use an artificial order for their choices.
For our main results, we use the most straightforward order our data provide,
which are the individual subject numbers that z-Tree is assigning to participants
within each session. As a robustness check, we use a different ordering that is
based on actual orders in the information treatment. For each potential number
of total participants in the session, which are 9, 10, 11, or 12, we randomly draw
one information treatment session and implement its ordering in the other two
treatments. Results are presented in Appendix Table B.2.5. The interaction term
between loan take-up and information treatment is almost the same in size and
significance as the term in Table 3.4. The coefficients for leaving money on the
table are smaller and not significant anymore. However, they still point in the
same direction as before in Table 3.8 and their size is still large.
3.5 Discussion
We find some results in this paper that we did not hypothesize. Our two main
findings regarding the debt taking and consumption choices are, first that par-
ticipants buy worse quality pens than they can afford. This effect is weaker for
participants in the info treatment who make their choice later in the order of
participants. Secondly, and most strikingly, participants do not want to signal
intelligence to other participants. Here, we discuss four potential reasons for
the observed findings. These are “standing-out-aversion,” “smarty-pants-effect,”
“blame aversion,” and conformity.
“Standing-Out-Aversion" Jones and Linardi (2014) formulate a simple model
and find evidence for what they call wallflowers: Some people are averse to being
seen as too selfish or as too generous, they do not want to stand out with their level
of generosity. Therefore, they adjust their action to what they believe the average
is doing. If we directly translate this model from reputational to social image
concerns and apply it to our experimental design, we should see that loan take-up
is the highest in the public treatment. Given that the payout and performance
structure is common knowledge, we assume that participants expect that the
average person buys a two-star or three-star pen. Thus, low performing persons
would have to take a loan to match the mean decision. This is not what we
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find. We do find that high performing persons leave money on the table to
buy a cheaper pen in the public treatment. However, this asymmetry does not
support “standing out aversion” as an explanation. Further evidence against
this explanation is that we find no differential effects for females and males (see
Appendix Table B.2.6). Jones and Linardi (2014) find females are especially likely
to be wallflowers and, if anything, our coefficients point in the exact opposite
direction.9
“Smarty-Pants-Effect” Our participants avoid signaling higher intelligence
by not taking a loan and buying a cheaper pen than they can afford. McManus
and Rao (2015) find similar results to ours in a very different experiment. They
present three explanations for this avoidance, of which two might be present
in our setting. The first might be what they call “smarty-pants-effect,” which
means that participants neither want to appear smarter than their peers nor to
be perceived as arrogant. This same effect is more prominently known as the
“acting white” effect (e.g. Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Bursztyn et al., 2019).
“Blame Aversion” An alternative explanation is what we call “blame aver-
sion,” which relates to social preferences. There is evidence that persons care
about negative externalities of their own performance on others in cases where
relative performance determines payout (e.g Bandiera et al., 2005). In our ex-
periment, high performing participants are the reason why low performing par-
ticipants can only afford a low quality pen. Thus, inequality is inevitable and
self-esteem damage is done. However, it might be the case that high performers do
not want to publicly take the blame for others being worse off and, therefore, pre-
tend to be a low performer. Eventually, with both kinds of explanations, smarty-
pants-effect and blame aversion, participants in the public treatment might have
social image concerns, just not the ones we anticipated.
Conformity Looking at the coefficients for the information treatment and
controlling for order effects, we find a significantly high and positive effect of
buying a too cheap pen. This slowly goes down with the order of deciding. Addi-
tionally, the number of different modes in bought pens is smaller in the informa-
9 Another consideration is that participants in our design are not exactly standing out when
buying a low or high-quality pen as a quarter of participants is expected to do so given the
payoff categories. Still, since we did not elicit beliefs about what participants think others
will do, we do not know whether some persons might think that they would be the only
one making extreme choices. However, in this case, even more participants in the public
treatment should be willing to take a loan.
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tion treatment than in the control treatment, albeit not significantly. Standard
errors are large but the effect size is relatively large as well (see Appendix Ta-
ble B.2.7). Since we also find some significant, though much smaller, effects for
loan take-up, it seems that decisions in the information treatment are mildly con-
verging to some lower midpoint. In contrast to the public treatment, however,
participants cannot observe the individual behavior of others in this treatment.
Hence, the last two paragraphs presented explanations for the observed behavior
in the public treatment, however, not for the information treatment. A pref-
erence for conformity seems to explain the observed pattern in the information
treatment fairly well. As conformity, we define the intrinsic preference to align
consumption decisions to those of others without others even learning about this
(see Goeree and Yariv, 2015). Alternative motives, like self-image concerns and
pure information gathering, are unlikely in our setting as participants especially
adjust from above and pens are everyday products. Overall, some participants
are actually willing to incur cutbacks as either they have to take on debt or end
up with a lower quality pen to conform.
3.6 Conclusion
The number of over-indebted households is increasing worldwide (IMF, 2017).
Hence, it is increasingly important to understand the drivers behind this process.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on household borrowing behav-
ior. It analyzes the effects of social comparison on debt taking, examining two
potential channels. Here, we argue that social comparison is one of the reasons
leading to increased debt taking, which in turn leads to overindebtedness.
It is our aim to disentangle two channels that underlie social comparison.
Therefore, we take our research question to the lab, as it is difficult to do this
outside the lab. We design two treatments through which we want to separately
examine social image concerns and peer information. While the former relates to
how an individual wants to be perceived by others, the latter relates to how an
individual themselves perceives the decision of others. Few studies disentangle
these two effects.
The possible biggest caveat of our study is that borrowing in the lab is highly
artificial, since participants cannot leave the lab indebted. Still, we believe that
our experimental design is different from standard spending decisions and that
participants thought of the possible loan they could take as creating a temporary
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debt. The fact that participants who took a loan did not work more means that
they actually left the lab with less money than the others.
Our results on how social comparison might affect borrowing are quite sur-
prising. Social image concerns lead to underspending in our setup, hence, the
exact opposite of what we expected. Potential reasons are that participants do
not want to be perceived as more intelligent, which is contrary to our expectation,
or that the more successful do not want to be blamed for the failures of others.
We acknowledge that these reasons are peculiar for our setting and might differ in
other environments where, for example, status is not only defined by intelligence
and no perfect correlation between success of one group and failure of another
group exists. We find striking results on peer information. There is convincing
evidence for an intrinsic inclination to conform, which leads less to more debt
taking by individuals in the lower tail but more to underspending by those in the
upper tail of the performance distribution.
Our findings highlight that not only is borrowing underresearched but also in-
trinsic motivations like conformity and their effects on consumption and borrow-
ing. Conformity leads to “sub-optimal” decisions on both sides of the distribution
in our experiment as participants deviate from their intrinsic preference elicited
before the experiment took place. In real life, conformity might disadvantageously
hurt the low income households. Especially in countries with high income inequal-
ity, like emerging markets, conforming to an average level of consumption might
lead to severe financial distress. Research looking at how inequality in neigh-
borhoods affects financial distress seem to confirm this concern. Furthermore,
that the upper end of the distribution is adjusting more in our setting might be
purely driven by the fact the decision only involves simple pens. It cannot be
expected that the rich downward adjust their consumption when it comes to prod-
ucts where quality differences matter much more. Given the extensive research
on status consumption in the last 120 years, future research should concentrate
more on peer information effects on debt-financed consumption, similar to what
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4.1 Introduction
In weak labor markets, entrepreneurship may be perceived as a necessity rather
than as an attractive outside option chosen by motivated individuals. Theoreti-
cally, one becomes an entrepreneur if the expected returns are greater than what
can be earned from a wage job. Expected returns to entrepreneurship will, in turn,
depend both on actual profitability as well as perception-based factors, such as
competence and tolerance of uncertain outcomes (van Praag and Cramer, 2001).
From an individual, financial (management) perspective, entrepreneurship often
seems to not be an optimal decision (see Hall and Woodward, 2010). However,
if jobs are scarce relative to labor supply, necessity will push more people into
entrepreneurship, even those with relatively low levels of perceived competence,
low tolerance for uncertain gambles, or both. Hence, there are entrepreneurs of
opportunity, i.e. those who prefer to take the chance to open a business, and
entrepreneurs of necessity, i.e. those who feel to have no other choice than be-
coming business owners.1 Understanding how these different motivations shape
entrepreneurial choices is crucial for identifying the potential scope for policy
interventions to avoid business failure and support prosperity.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between uncertainty tolerance and
perceived competence to manage strategic uncertainty among entrepreneurs of
necessity compared to entrepreneurs of opportunity. Additionally, we compare
their decisions to those from another “risk-taking” group: return migrants (re-
turnees). We carry out our study with real entrepreneurs from two middle-income
countries with historically weak labor markets, Albania and Kosovo.
Our contribution is fourfold. First, we study two under-explored factors that
could explain the different willingness to enter the market between the two kind
of entrepreneurs: attitudes towards uncertainty and feelings of competence to
manage strategic uncertainty. As many decisions surrounding entrepreneurship
involve uncertainty, ambiguity aversion might be an important determinant of
opening a business (see Gutierrez et al., 2020). Meanwhile, beliefs about the own
competence to manage uncertainty could also explain different entry motives.
Perceived competence can change individuals’ perception of uncertain events, thus
changing the trade-off potential entrants face. Moreover, as Wu and Knott (2006)
suggests, entrepreneurship may be more driven by willingness to accept uncer-
tainty regarding one’s own entrepreneurial ability than general tolerance towards
uncertainty. Furthermore, there is evidence that opportunity entrepreneurs’ busi-
1 The distinction between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs is drawn in several studies
on entrepreneurship, for example, Koellinger and Thurik (2012) and Calderon et al. (2017).
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nesses are more profitable than those of necessity entrepreneurs. Calderon et al.
(2017) find that this gap cannot be explained by different levels of education
and only partially by better management practices. Fossen and Büttner (2013)
estimate that the returns to education are lower for necessity than for opportu-
nity entrepreneurs. Differences in the willingness to take uncertain gambles could
explain these gaps as well.
Second, we also concentrate on non-standard uncertainty preferences, e.g.
ambiguity aversion, a-insensitivity, and source preference, as standard expected
utility models fail to explain the general prevalence of entrepreneurship and ev-
idence on whether entrepreneurs are more risk seeking than non-entrepreneurs
is mixed (for an overview see Astebro et al., 2014). Third, one reason for this
mixed evidence might be that there are other occupational risk takers in the com-
parison group that are not accounted for. Therefore, we isolate return migrants
from the rest of the population and use them as an alternative comparison group.
Lastly, not only is this research question new to the literature on entrepreneurship
but our sample also is novel in the literature on ambiguity attitudes. Thus, we
contribute to understanding the generalizability of findings on attitudes toward
uncertainty from conventional samples.
For our study, we design a laboratory experiment that measures ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity in a comprehensive way, as well as willingness to
take different kinds of uncertain gambles. Both ambiguity parameters are mea-
sured with the “matching probabilities” approach by Dimmock et al. (2016). We
measure a-insensitivity, which is a form of probability weighting induced by am-
biguity, because it is found to be correlated to real life choices like stock market
participation, whereas ambiguity aversion is not (Dimmock et al., 2016). The
overweighting of rare events and the underweighting of frequent events, i.e. the
perceived likelihood of an uncertain event, could similarly explain why some peo-
ple see an opportunity in opening a business and others not.
Willingness to take uncertain gambles is simulated with a modified version of
the market entry game of Camerer and Lovallo (1999). In our modified game,
participants are presented with choice sets where they have to choose between
a lottery, where probabilities are unknown, and an outside option. In half of
our choice sets, participants face a kind of uncertainty where the outcome of the
lottery is determined by an uncertain number of competitors. This is referred to
as strategic uncertainty, as uncertainty is neither given by nature nor an unknown
source, but is explicitly given by the actions of other individuals.
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To study the importance of feelings of competence to manage strategic un-
certainty, we randomize a message that either conveys a rather neutral (control)
signal regarding the ability to judge the actions of other participants or conveys an
affirmative signal that certifies the participant to have correctly judged the choices
of other participants. Participants receive this message before the market entry
game. For all subsequent choices, we hypothesize that necessity entrepreneurs
are more responsive to treatment because opportunity entrepreneurs’ level of per-
ceived competence might be already high and, thus, less mutable. The treatment
is based on two ideas: the first is the idea that familiarity decreases ambiguity
aversion (e.g Heath and Tversky, 1991; Kilka and Weber, 2001; de Lara Resende
and Wu, 2010) and the second is the possibility that entrepreneurship might be
driven by a greater willingness to accept uncertainty regarding one’s own en-
trepreneurial ability. Both ideas predict that boosting feelings of competence
about the decisions of competitors should result in more willingness to tolerate
strategic uncertainty. Additionally, inspired by a finding of Holm et al. (2013)
that entrepreneurs are more tolerant of social risk (trusting other people), we an-
alyze if the treatment makes them more willing to pass a risky decision to another
person instead of deciding on their own.
Our results show that there are not strong differences in ambiguity aversion
between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs but that the latter are signifi-
cantly more a-insensitive. This hints at the fact that opportunity entrepreneurs
do not have a different ambiguity attitude per se but perceive non-strategic am-
biguity differently than necessity entrepreneurs. Moreover, return migrants seem
to be slightly more ambiguity seeking than entrepreneurs for small and moder-
ate probabilities and are also significantly more a-insensitive than necessity en-
trepreneurs. Looking directly at the uncertain gambles in the market entry game,
necessity entrepreneurs are the least willing to take non-strategic uncertain gam-
bles at baseline. Surprisingly, we find no strong baseline differences for strate-
gic uncertainty. As expected, necessity entrepreneurs are the most responsive
group for the treatment. They experience the largest boost for taking uncertain
gambles. However, the positive experience significantly increases the tolerance
towards non-strategic but not towards strategic uncertainty, which is not what
we have expected. In contrast, returnees seem to be the least responsive, which
might be because the competence message is more salient to persons who in real
life engage in risky decisions with competitors. The results provide evidence that
training for entrepreneurs, where entrepreneurial skills are strengthened, might
be especially useful for those who have the feeling they have started a business
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because there was no other choice. Our results are robust to order effects and
how sure participants are about their judgement pre-treatment.
Literature. As aforementioned, results on whether entrepreneurs are rel-
atively risk loving are mixed and only a very few studies look at uncertainty
attitudes. Additionally, most studies on entrepreneurial attitudes use student
samples (e.g. Gutierrez et al., 2020). There are some exceptions using subjects
with real entrepreneurial experience. Djankov et al. (2006), using survey data,
find that entrepreneurs are more willing to accept a (well defined) risk-neutral
gamble. Macko and Tyszka (2009) do an experiment with students, where some
have entrepreneurial experience. They do not find any strong difference between
entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial students with respect to general risk pref-
erences, but they do find that entrepreneurial students are more risk seeking in
a task that is framed as a business decision. Caliendo et al. (2009) conclude that
only opportunity entrepreneurs are more risk seeking than the general popula-
tion but not necessity entrepreneurs. Similar to us, Gutierrez et al. (2020) study
whether overconfidence and ambiguity aversion explain market entry among stu-
dents. They find that entry is caused by overconfidence but only if outcomes
depend on ability and not on luck. Entering ability-based markets is also influ-
enced by ambiguity seeking if the uncertainty is caused by the own ability rather
than by nature, independent of the level of confidence. The closest study to ours
is Holm et al. (2013). They run a large scale experiment on entrepreneurs’ tol-
erance for strategic uncertainty, using a random sample of CEOs and a control
group of non-CEOs in China. They find that entrepreneurs are more willing
to enter multilateral competition, hence strategic uncertainty, and are more tol-
erant to uncertainty originating from trusting others. They do not differ from
non-entrepreneurs with respect to their tolerance of non-strategic uncertainty.
Our study is different from the latter two in so far that (i) we test if there are
systematic differences between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs; (ii) we
analyze if inducing competence to manage strategic uncertainty has an effect;
and (iii) we use a clearer elicitation method for ambiguity aversion and look at
a-insensitivity.
In general, potential to grow but also income uncertainty is high in Albania
and Kosovo, which makes them relevant study subjects. Entrepreneurship is vital
for economic development because not only does it create value with new ideas
and products, it also contributes to competitive dynamism. In the model of Iyigun
and Owen (1998), a sufficient initial stock of both entrepreneurial and professional
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human capital are important to avoid a development trap. As Cusolito et al.
(2020, p.7) note, “Increasing innovation is a key regional priority in the Balkans
region[...].” Working in the two countries makes the comparison between return
migrants and entrepreneurs particularly salient. Both countries have experienced
a large outflow of people in the last decades and intentions to migrate remain high
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2018). While international
migration is a source of remittances, it also deprives the local economy of risk-
takers, who might otherwise fuel economic development at home. Jaeger et al.
(2010) find that people who had migrated between regions in Germany have
higher self-reported willingness to take risks. Similarly, Gibson and McKenzie
(2011) find that even among high-skilled individuals from three Pacific countries,
risk preference is still an important determinant of migration.2 Understanding
uncertainty preferences of different kinds of occupational risk-takers can support
policies targeted at providing opportunities for these people to stay in the region.
Thus, our study also contributes to this understanding and finds that returnees’
uncertainty preferences are mostly unchanged by the treatment in comparison to
entrepreneurs.
We are not aware of another study that looks at differences between necessity
and opportunity entrepreneurs with respect to uncertainty tolerance and feelings
of competence. Furthermore, by isolating return migrants and using them as a
comparison group, we shed light on how entrepreneurs might be different from
other risk-tolerant people in the population. It also allows us to test whether
entrepreneurs have disproportionate tolerance for uncertainty due to competition,
compared to general income uncertainty, and if their response to our treatment
is, thus, also different from those of returnees.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 describes the experimental pro-
cedures, design, our hypotheses, and the sample. Section 4.3 shows the main
results followed by Section 4.4 providing robustness checks. Finally, Section 4.5
concludes.
2 Using a sub-sample of this study, Gibson et al. (2019) show that risk preferences of Tongan
migrants do not change due to migration but remain stable.
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4.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
4.2.1 Procedures
We conducted experimental sessions in six municipalities across Albania and four
municipalities across Kosovo between April and May 2019. These are shown in
Figure 4.1.3
Figure 4.1: Cities in Albania (left) and Kosovo (right) where experiments were
conducted
We ran a total of 21 sessions, with one, two, or three sessions per municipal-
ity.4 The sessions took place in conference rooms in the center of the respective
municipalities. In total, 224 persons participated, 121 in Albania and 103 in
Kosovo. On average, they earned 19.30e in Albania and 29.60e in Kosovo for a
session that typically lasted between 90 and 120 minutes.5 Session were run in
Albanian and all tasks were executed on tablets using oTree (Chen et al., 2016).
Our between subject experiment consists of five parts. Parts I-III occur before
and parts IV-V after the treatment. In parts I and II, risk and ambiguity aversion
parameters are measured. Part III looks at risk and uncertainty preferences with
strategic uncertainty, pre-treatment. The treatment is administered between part
3 The municipalities are Durrës, Elbasan, Fier, Korçë, Skhodër, and Tirana in Albania and
Gjilan, Peja, Pristhina, and Prizren in Kosovo.
4 Two municipalities had only one session each. Others included either two or three, depending
on our success recruiting participants.
5 Since average incomes and living standards differ across the two countries, we adjusted exper-
imental earnings accordingly. Average earnings roughly equal a day’s average wage in each
respective country.
72 Chapter 4
III and IV. Part IV assesses how different kinds of uncertain gambles are affected
by the treatment. Part V includes a dictator, a trust game, and a short survey
to collect demographic data. In parts I-IV, tasks are structured as choice sets,
mostly with a varying number of multiple price lists. In many parts, price lists are
not directly given but determined with a bisection method (see 4.2.2 for example).
All subjects were supposed to complete all parts of the experiment in the same
order. This is because the experiment and associated tasks were novel to all the
subjects, so all instructions had to be read out loud by a moderator and examples
had to be demonstrated.6 Subjects were paid in cash and for a randomly selected
decision they made in each choice set. This was to eliminate confusion and ensure
salience of each decision. The currency in the experiment were points that were
later translated to money. In addition to experimental earnings, all participants
received a participation fee of 1000 Lek (ca. 8e) in Albania and 15e in Kosovo.
The moderator handed out the payments at the end of the session in private.
Participants remained seated until their name was called. The moderator showed
them the amount they earned and the participant signed a receipt that they had
received the money. Each participant left the room immediately after receiving
their payment.
4.2.2 Measuring Ambiguity Aversion and A-Insensitivity
We elicit ambiguity preferences using an extension of the original Ellsberg exper-
iment that allows us to calculate a more granular measure of ambiguity aversion
and a measure for a-insensitivity. The measures are described below.
The Ellsberg Experiment
To cross-check the consistency of the extended method, we first replicate the
original two-color Ellsberg problem. Participants are asked to choose between a
risky bucket, which comprises 50 blue and 50 orange balls, and an ambiguous
bucket, which also contains blue and orange balls but in unknown composition
(see Figure 4.2).7 A ball is randomly drawn from the chosen bucket to determine
participants’ payout from that choice.
6 In pilot sessions, we read only general instructions out loud and randomized the order of
decision tasks. This requires subjects to read some instructions independently. We discovered
that there was a substantial risk that subjects would not fully understand all the tasks if left
to read the instructions on their own. This was driven by subjects who were older, had less
computer literacy, or had lower levels of education.
7 For the same reason as Dimmock et al. (2016), we do not use black and red, the original
colors, to avoid confusion for color-blind people.
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Figure 4.2: Ambiguous and Risky Bucket with Two Colors
Each subject makes two such choices, with the values of orange and blue balls
being different in each choice. For the first choice, the subject earns 100 points if a
blue ball is drawn and nothing if an orange ball is drawn. For the second decision,
orange is the “winning color” worth 100 points and blue is worth 0 points.
First described by Ellsberg (1961) and confirmed by many studies afterwards,
a substantial share of individuals chooses the ball to be drawn from the risky
bucket in both choices, irrespective of the winning color. This preference violates
not just expected utility theory as formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern,
but also classical models of subjective probabilities à la Savage (1954). Based on
this, participants can be grouped in three categories: those who always choose
the risky bucket are defined as ambiguity averse, those who always choose the am-
biguous bucket are ambiguity seeking, and those who change buckets for different
winning colors are considered to be ambiguity neutral.
Matching Probabilities
For our analysis, we concentrate on an elicitation method for ambiguity aversion
that is an extension of the original Ellsberg problem. The method was introduced
by Dimmock et al. (2016) and is called “matching probabilities.” It allows us to
generate more granular measures of ambiguity aversion. A matching probability
is interpreted as the subjective probability of winning that is attached to the
ambiguous bucket.
For the matching probability elicitation tasks, subjects make nine choices, split
into three sets of three. In each set, subjects first chose between a risky bucket,
with an objective chance of winning, and an ambiguous bucket, with an unknown
chance of winning. In the subsequent two decisions in each set, we change the
composition of balls in the risky bucket so that the risky bucket becomes less and
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less attractive the more often it is chosen and vice versa. We fix the contents of
the ambiguous bucket across the choices.
Using a bisection method, we identify the probability that makes the partici-
pant indifferent between betting on the risky bucket and betting on the ambiguous
bucket. For example, assume that blue is the winning color and the chance of
winning in the risky bucket is 50-50 in the beginning. If the participant chooses
the risky bucket in the first round, she is presented with the choice between a
risky bucket that now contains 25 blue balls and 75 orange balls and the ambigu-
ous bucket in the second round. Hence, the objective probability of winning in
the risky bucket decreased. If she had chosen the ambiguous bucket in round one,
she would be presented the same ambiguous bucket but a risky bucket containing
75 blue balls and 25 orange balls. This bisecting continues for two further rounds.
For simplicity, we fix the winning color for all participants to be blue.8
In the first choice set, each risky bucket has orange and blue balls like in the
example above. The exercise is repeated for a second choice set, but instead of
orange and blue balls in the risky bucket, the non-blue balls are of many colors.
The risky bucket comprises balls of ten different colors with ten balls per color
at the beginning (see Figure 4.3).
Figure 4.3: Ambiguous and Risky Bucket with Ten Colors
The participant wins 100 points if the drawn ball is blue and nothing other-
wise, which means the objective probability of winning is 10% at the beginning.
As before, the subject makes three decisions and we are bisecting depending on
the previous choice. In a third set of choices, the same risky bucket as in set two
is used. However, this time participants win 100 points if the drawn ball is NOT
8 Furthermore, we do not include an “indifferent” button like Dimmock et al. (2016) did.
Given the setting of the experimental session, we were afraid that the indifference button
would invite participants to not consider their choices carefully, instead simply hitting the
indifference button all the time.
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blue, hence, the initial winning probability is 90%. Instructions and pictures
accompanying the tasks are found in the Appendix C.4.2.
A matching probability is calculated for each choice set. We define the match-
ing probability as the number of winning balls that would make the participant
indifferent between betting on the risky and betting on the ambiguous bucket.
We approximate this with the average number of winning balls in the risky bucket
in the last choice and the number of winning balls if we had to bisect again in
an additional fourth choice. This means that there are eight possible values the
matching probability can take, ranging between 6% and 94% for the 50-50 bucket
for example. We calculate three different matching probabilities for the objective
winning probabilities of 10%, 50%, and 90%. Thus, we repeat the aforementioned
exercise three times. Using the three matching probabilities, we are able to calcu-
late local ambiguity aversion parameters by comparing the matching probabilities
to their objective, ambiguity-neutral probability p. Dimmock et al. (2016) call
these local ambiguity attitudes “event-specific indexes”,
AA0.1 = 0.1 − m(0.1) (4.1)
AA0.5 = 0.5 − m(0.5) (4.2)
AA0.9 = 0.9 − m(0.9) (4.3)
where m(0.1), m(0.5), and m(0.9) are the respective matching probabilities. For
all indices, a positive value means ambiguity aversion whereas a negative value
means ambiguity-seeking. Furthermore, by fitting a linear function between the
three p’s and m(p)’s,
m(p) = c + sp (4.4)
where c is the intercept and s the slope, we can generate an index for global
ambiguity aversion, which is defined as:
b = 1 − s − 2c (4.5)
Index b is the difference between the distance of the linear approximation from
the value 1 at p = 1 and the intercept. If it is larger (smaller) than zero, the
individual is considered to be ambiguity-averse (-seeking).
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A-Insensitivity
Another kind of ambiguity-induced preference is a(mbiguity-generated likelihood)-
insensitivity. A-insensitivity describes the feature that some individuals tend to
anchor small and high probabilities to the mid-point, which means they cannot
sufficiently discriminate between intermediate probabilities. It can be considered
as a special form of probability weighting induced by ambiguity. With our ap-
proach, a-insensitivity can be calculated using two different procedures. First,
simply by the difference between AA0.9 and AA0.1. An individual is a-insensitive,
if AA0.9 is positive (thus, the matching probability for 0.9 is smaller than 0.9)
and if AA0.1 is negative at the same time (thus, the matching probability for 0.1
is larger than 0.1). This means that a positive difference implies a-insensitivity
and a negative difference a-oversensitivity. Second, we can generate the so-called
index a from the linear approximation as:
a = 1 − s (4.6)
In comparison to index b, index a solely relates to the steepness of the curve
and captures the insensitivity to the likelihood of events that are not 50-50. In
our experiment, both methods to derive a-insensitivity lead virtually to the same
results. However, we will use the second derivation throughout our analysis, as
this approach has a clearer decision-theoretic foundation. For a general, decision-
theoretic foundation of matching probabilities, we refer to Dimmock et al. (2016).
Essentially, matching probabilities are founded in the source method of Abdel-
laoui et al. (2011) and the axioms of Chew and Sagi (2008), which both follow
the idea that subjective probabilities depend on the source of uncertainty.
Thus, we use the three matching probabilities, their values for local ambiguity
aversion as well as indices b and a to assess ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity
in our analysis.
4.2.3 Competence Treatment and Choices under Uncer-
tainty
The Treatment
After part two, where ambiguity aversion parameters are measured, participants
face several choice problems in part three, in which they have to choose between
two options. These options either entail a certain payout, a risky payout, or
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a payout with strategic uncertainty. Recall that strategic uncertainty refers to
uncertainty that is generated due to the actions of other individuals. To mimic
strategic uncertainty, we use a “market entry” game (e.g. Camerer and Lovallo,
1999), in which the final payout depends on how many people choose to enter the
market. The option is not referred to as market but as “competition” to make the
competitive aspect of this game more salient. Entering the competition entitles
participants to a share of a limited amount of profits. Furthermore, in our case,
participants do not decide simultaneously to enter or not, but every participant is
quasi-randomly matched to a group of four other persons who have done similar
choice tasks in our pilot sessions before. These other persons are always either
“competitors” or non-competitors, depending on how often they have chosen to
enter competition. Competitors always enter the competition if the participant
chooses this option, non-competitors never. This means that the number of other
entrants is unknown but fixed. There is also no excess entry; the total number
of winning points is divided by the number of all entrants, which means that
participants gain a strictly positive amount. For example, if a participant has
three other competitors in her group and she decides to compete over 300 points,
she gets 75 points. The number of competitors is only important for payoff if the
participant chooses the competition option. Participants are not informed about
the number of competitors in their groups beforehand. Thus, the competition
option entails strategic uncertainty.
Before participants start the tasks in part three, they have to guess the number
of their competitors and how certain they are about their guess (see Appendix
C.4.3). The only information they have is that given the their group size they
can have at most four competitors. After they finish part three’s choice sets, it
is revealed how many competitors the participants actually have faced. Along
with this revelation, we implement a “competence treatment” by matching the
exact number of competitors guessed to half of the participants and a different
number to the other half in each session. The following messages are shown to
the participants:
Message Competence:
“Now that Part III is complete, you can learn how many competitors you faced.
You guessed that you would have # competitors. You had #. Only half of the
people in the room today had the same number of competitors as their estimate.
Well done! You got mastery in the estimation task.”
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Message Neutral:
“Now that Part III is complete, you can learn how many competitors you faced.
You guessed that you would have # competitors. You had ##. Half of the people
in the room today had guesses that matched reality.”
Where # is a number between 0 and 4 that equals the guess of the participant and
## is a different number between 0 and 4. Those individuals who are randomized
in the neutral message make up the control group.
The “competence” message is supposed to exogenously strengthen the per-
ceived confidence of our participants with regard to estimating the actions of
other persons. Specifically, with this message two different kinds of confidence
might increase: confidence related to estimating the absolute value of competi-
tors correctly or confidence related to having better judgement than half of the
other participants. Since participants have guessed their competitors correctly
this time, they might feel confident in guessing it correctly again in other choices
that entail strategic uncertainty. The reasoning behind this conjecture is that
there is evidence that at least ambiguity aversion in the gain domain decreases
with familiarity and knowledge about the source of uncertainty (see Heath and
Tversky, 1991; Kilka and Weber, 2001; de Lara Resende and Wu, 2010). This
might also be true for the tolerance of uncertainty in general. We analyze what
kind of choices might alter with an increase in this kind of competence. Specifi-
cally, we are interested whether necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs are not
only potentially different with respect to ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity
but whether they also respond differently to the treatment (and if both respond
differently than other parts of the population). Wu and Knott (2006) conclude
that entrepreneurs are not less uncertainty averse than the general population
per se but the difference depends on the domain. Entrepreneurs seem to be more
willing to accept uncertainty in personal ability, both in absolute terms and in
relation to others. Entrepreneurs who have the feeling they have no other choice
but to become self-employed might feel different than opportunity entrepreneurs
in this respect and respond differently to the treatment.
Uncertainty Choices
After the treatment, four different choice sets are played in part four of the
experiment. The first three sets make use of non-strategic uncertainty in form
of the ambiguous bucket, introduced in part two of the experiment, strategic
uncertainty as introduced in part three and a certain payment. One choice set
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elicits the certainty equivalent (CE) for an ambiguous bucket that pays out 300
points if a blue ball is drawn by varying the certain payoff. Another set elicits
the certainty equivalent for strategic uncertainty, where participants are again
matched with four other persons in a market entry game. It is clearly explained
that these four persons are not the same people as in part three. Hence, it is
not clear to the participants how many competitors are in their group. The
total profit to be shared among all competitors is 300 points, which means that
participants get at least 60 points and at most 300. In this choice set, the certain
payoff is again varied. In the last of the three sets, strategic uncertainty is held
against non-strategic uncertainty. However, the total profit to be shared with
competitors starts with 750 points and will change while the ambiguous bucket
is fixed again.9 For each choice set in this part of the experiment, there are four
choices, where the values of the varying choice is again determined via bisection.
The order in which the three sets are considered is randomly assigned to each
participant. Instructions are found in Appendix C.4.4.
The fourth choice is slightly detached from the other sets since it measures
a completely different aspect of decision making under uncertainty. It relates to
taking or passing the responsibility for a risky choice to another person. Partici-
pants face a lottery where there is a 50% chance of winning 150 points and 50%
chance of getting nothing. The lottery is determined by a bucket that contains
10 balls, which are numbered from 1-10. It can be decided if the 150 points are
won if a ball with the number between 1-5 is drawn (which means that the par-
ticipant receives nothing if the ball drawn has a number between 6-10), or if the
150 points are won if the drawn ball has a number between 6-10 (see Figure 4.4).
Thus, participants cannot change the risk of losing but can decide the winning
numbers. This is made clear to all participants upfront.
Figure 4.4: Lottery for Choice 4
For this choice, participants are matched with another, unknown, participant
in the room. They receive the option not to choose the winning numbers them-
9 The profit is chosen so high in this choice set to accommodate the most pessimistic belief
that everyone enters the competition. In this case, to receive 300 points, which is the highest
possible gain for the ambiguous bucket, the total profit has to be 1500 points.
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selves but to hand over this task to their matched partner. The partner faces
the exact same decision. Both are informed about the chosen winning numbers
for both of them after they decide (see Appendix C.4.5). Although the partner
cannot change the risk, participants might still feel unconformable to lay their
fate in other peoples’ hands. Bohnet et al. (2008) coin this feeling “betrayal aver-
sion,” which describes the greater unease of taking risks if the source is not nature
but another person. At the same time, some persons might not want to take re-
sponsibility for their outcomes and, therefore, prefer to let the partner decide. In
their study, Holm et al. (2013) find that entrepreneurs are more willing to take
social risk, meaning more willing to trust other persons, than non-entrepreneurs.
In the following Section 4.2.3, we discuss how our treatment potentially changes
this preference.
Hypotheses
At outlined in Section 4.2.3, our treatment is supposed to increase the perceived
competence, the ability to estimate the “competitiveness” of other persons. For
each of the four choices above, we first formulate a hypothesis about if and how
they are affected by the treatment. Then, we discuss how the two groups of
entrepreneurs might differ from each other and other population groups in their
response.
Feeling competent is domain dependent and the treatment should affect the con-
fidence to judge other persons more than it affects confidence in judging nature.
Since the composition of the ambiguous bucket is not related to the choices of
other participants, we do not expect to find an effect on the certainty equivalent
for non-strategic uncertainty.
Hypothesis 1: The treatment does not affect the certainty equivalent for non-
strategic uncertainty.
In contrast to the ambiguous bucket’s CE, the certainty equivalent for strategic
uncertainty should be affected by the treatment. This CE is dependent on the
belief of the participant about the number of competitors and how certain she is
about her belief. Participants in the control group should perceive the prospect
as less certain than those in the competence treatment and, therefore, rather bet
on the certain amount. Their level of aversion to strategic uncertainty should be
Section 4.2 81
higher independent of whether they expect to have a small or a high number of
competitors, which means their CE is lower.
Hypothesis 2: The treatment has a positive effect on the amount of the certainty
equivalent for strategic uncertainty.
As described in 4.2.3, ambiguity aversion reduces with experience, which might
translate to the willingness to take uncertain gambles in general. Combined
with the reasoning for hypothesis two, the treatment should increase participants
preference for strategic over non-strategic uncertainty.
Hypothesis 3: The treatment has a negative effect on the potential total profit
to be shared with other competitors, which makes participants indifferent between
strategic and non-strategic uncertainty.
Judging other persons’ market entry decision correctly might induce a feeling of
“being an able entrepreneur” in the whole sample. Since entrepreneurs seem to
trust other people more, larger perceived competence might increase the willing-
ness to pass the responsibility to others.
Hypothesis 4: The treatment increases the probability that participants let
others choose the winning numbers instead of deciding on their own.
Entrepreneurs out of necessity are expected to feel less competent than opportu-
nity entrepreneurs at baseline because opportunity entrepreneurs would not have
opened a business if they did not believe themselves to have some form of general
ability with regard to entrepreneurial skills. Their level of perceived competence
might already be high and, therefore, less immutable. Hence, we hypothesize
that necessity entrepreneurs are more responsive to the treatment.
Hypothesis 5: Necessity entrepreneurs respond more strongly to the treatment
than opportunity entrepreneurs.
Finally, we also formulate a hypothesis regarding how entrepreneurs and return
migrants differ. As outlined before, both groups face considerable uncertainty in
their “occupational choice.” However, it should be expected that entrepreneurs
are much more affected by the treatment as for them assessing the actions of other
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persons is much more salient. The outcome of a business is directly dependent
on the actions of other businesses in the market and potential entrants.
Hypothesis 6: In general, entrepreneurs respond more strongly to the treatment
than do return migrants.
4.2.4 The Sample
Participants were recruited in two different ways: Initially, we asked respondents
of a survey implemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (EBRD) in 2018 if they are interested in participating in an interactive
session that would be carried out approximately one year after the survey and
for which they will be compensated. The survey was set up to explore “recent
trends in economic migration from the Western Balkans to Western Europe” and
to analyze the link between migration and entrepreneurship. The survey respon-
dents were drawn from screener samples that are representative for Albania and
Kosovo. However, for the survey, potential migrants and those with a recent mi-
gration history were deliberately over-sampled. Nevertheless, respondents were
still randomly drawn from the respective strata. In total, 2,301 persons in Al-
bania and 2,323 persons in Kosovo participated in the survey. Out of these, 70
persons in Albania and 44 persons in Kosovo attended our experimental sessions.
Additionally, we asked each survey participant to refer a friend or another family
member who they thought would be willing to participate in an interactive ses-
sion. Thus, the remaining experimental sample consists of these family members
and friends.
For the analysis, we mostly concentrate on participants who either have en-
trepreneurial spirit or who have a migration history. Initially, we define en-
trepreneurs and returnees by the following means: entrepreneurs are all partici-
pants who set up a business successfully at least once but who do not have any
migration history. We distinguish between entrepreneurs out of necessity and
those out of opportunity by asking for the most important reason they opened
their last business.10 Returnees are defined as persons who have lived at least
three consecutive months abroad in the last six years for non-recreational pur-
poses but who do not have any entrepreneurial history. Naturally, there are
10 The reasons provided for necessity are: 1. could not find (a suitable) job; 2. afraid of losing
job at that time; 3. needed to earn more money; and 4. other. For opportunity: 1. ideal form
of work; 2. opportunity to be in charge; 3. opportunity to earn more money; and 4. other.
Our classification approach is similar to the one of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (see
Reynolds et al., 2005).
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persons in the sample who have both an entrepreneurial and migration history.
Our analysis shows that these persons are much more like entrepreneurs and,
therefore, they are included in the entrepreneurial group.11 We group all other
persons in a final group, which we call the remaining sample throughout the
analysis. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for entrepreneurs (necessity and
opportunity), returnees, and the remaining sample.12 A detailed explanation of
the variables is in Appendix C.3.
Table 4.1: Descriptives of the Sample and Groups of Interest
Entrepreneurs Return Remain
All Nec. Opp.
Male 0.55 0.68 0.44 0.68 0.43
Age 35.97 36.82 35.23 35.33 32.18
Education 6.07 5.53 6.54 4.47 5.57
Dummy Working 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.40 0.44
Work Status 2.62 2.43 2.78 2.50 2.00
Agreeableness 2.78 2.88 2.69 2.48 3.17
Extraversion −0.14 −0.38 0.08 −0.85 −0.89
Conscientiousness 3.70 3.56 3.82 2.78 3.96
Neuroticism −1.71 −1.24 −2.13 −0.83 −1.52
Openness 1.85 2.00 1.72 1.52 1.55
Observations 73 34 39 60 89
Groups: All are all entrepreneurs, Nec. and Opp. only include entrepreneurs out of necessity
and opportunity, respectively, Return represents the group of return migrants and Remain
all persons who are neither entrepreneurs nor returnees. Variables: Male is an indicator for
being male or female; Age is the age of the participant in years; Education is a categorical
variable from 1-9, where 1 is “no degree/no education” and 9 is “doctoral degree or equivalent;”
Dummy Working is an indicator for having worked in the previous week; Work Status is the
kind of work with seven different categories; Agreeableness, Extraversion, Conscientiousness,
Neuroticism, and Openness form the BIG Five personality traits.
Entrepreneurs out of opportunity have a significantly higher level of education
than entrepreneurs of necessity and all the other groups. Furthermore, they are
more likely to be female and tend to be less neurotic than necessity entrepreneurs.
There are no other significant differences between the two groups. In compar-
ison to return migrants, entrepreneurs are generally less likely to be male, but
11 Our results are qualitatively robust to excluding those persons. However, sample size issues
render some effects insignificant and less precise. Results are available upon request.
12 Two observations are excluded from the analysis because these participants did not complete
the whole experimental session.
84 Chapter 4
better educated and more likely to have worked in the previous week. Strikingly,
entrepreneurs also exhibit a significantly higher level of extraversion and consci-
entiousness as well as a lower level of neuroticism. These differences are especially
driven by entrepreneurs out of opportunity. Entrepreneurs also have a higher level
of education and are more likely to work than the remaining sample. Addition-
ally, they are slightly older and more male and have a higher level of extraversion;
these differences are again mostly driven by opportunity entrepreneurs. In gen-
eral, opportunity entrepreneurs show the lowest levels of neuroticism. In Table
4.2, descriptive statistics across treatment and control group are compared.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Full Sample Control Treatment Difference
Male 0.54 0.45 0.62 −0.16∗∗
Age 34.28 33.89 34.66 −0.77
Education 5.44 5.26 5.61 −0.34
Dummy Working 0.51 0.45 0.56 −0.11
Work Status 2.38 2.58 2.22 0.36
Index b 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
Index a 0.69 0.71 0.67 0.04
Sigma 1.02 1.06 0.98 0.08
Alpha 0.70 0.67 0.72 −0.05
Remain 0.40 0.40 0.40 −0.00
Ent. 0.33 0.32 0.34 −0.02
Nec. 0.15 0.13 0.18 −0.05
Opp. 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.03
Return 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.02
Observations 222 110 112 222
Variables: Male is an indicator for being male or female; Age is the age of the participant
in years; Education is a categorical variable from 1-9, where 1 is “no degree/no education”
and 9 is “doctoral degree or equivalent;” Dummy Working is an indicator for having worked
in the previous week; Work Status is the employment status with seven different categories;
Index b and Index a are ambiguity attitudes derived in Section 4.2.2; Sigma and Alpha are risk
attitudes; Ent. are all entrepreneurs; Nec. and Opp. only include entrepreneurs out of necessity
and opportunity respectively; Return represents the group of returnees and Remain includes
all persons who are neither entrepreneurs nor returnees.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
There is an imbalance in the sex composition as the share of males in the
treatment group is significantly higher. However, all other variables, especially
ambiguity attitudes and our groups of interest, are well balanced. An f-test on
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the joint significance of all variables reveals that the controls are not related to
treatment assignment (p-value: 0.762).
4.3 Results
We first discuss the prevalence of ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity in the
whole sample and in our groups of interest. Subsequently, we discuss whether
there are significant differences between these groups. In the second part, we
analyze the treatment and its effects on choices under uncertainty, as formulated
in hypotheses 1-6.
4.3.1 Ambiguity Aversion and A-Insensitivity
Table 4.3 summarizes the ambiguity aversion measures. Correlations between
our parameters, estimated with the methods introduced in Section 4.2.2, are
in Appendix Table C.1.1.13 Naturally, index a, which measures a-insensitivity,
is correlated to the local ambiguity parameters for low and high probabilities
because they are used to construct the index. However, there is only a weak
correlation between ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity. This is consistent
with previous studies (see Dimmock et al., 2016) and the notion that ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity are two distinct preferences induced by ambiguity.
Table 4.3: Summary Ambiguity Parameter
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Matching Prob. m(0.1) 0.36 0.21 0.31 0.01 0.89
Matching Prob. m(0.5) 0.50 0.44 0.30 0.06 0.94
Matching Prob. m(0.9) 0.60 0.56 0.33 0.11 0.99
AA0.1 -0.26 -0.11 0.31 -0.79 0.09
AA0.5 0.00 0.06 0.30 -0.44 0.44
AA0.9 0.30 0.34 0.33 -0.09 0.79
Index b 0.03 0.04 0.51 -0.88 0.88
Index a 0.69 0.84 0.41 -0.23 1.98
m(0.1), m(0.5), and m(0.9) are the matching probabilities derived from the three ambigu-
ity choice sets. AA0.1, AA0.5, and AA0.9 are the differences between objective and matching
probabilities-the local ambiguity attitudes. Index b and a are global indices for ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity derived via linear approximation.
13 In this Table, it is also seen that the matching probabilities approach is highly correlated
to measuring ambiguity aversion with the Ellsberg problem, which supports the validity of
matching probabilities.
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Our sample is, on average, ambiguity neutral. This is indicated by index b
being, on average, almost equal to zero and is in contrast to similar studies done
in other countries, where the average study participant is ambiguity averse (for
an overview see Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2015). Ambiguity aversion seems
to be less prevalent in our sample than in previous studies, which are mostly
conducted in industrialized countries or in developing economies with small-scale
farmers.
This lower rate of ambiguity aversion is not exclusively driven by our sample
composition. We explicitly focus on groups of the population that we hypothe-
size to be more ambiguity tolerant, namely entrepreneurs and return migrants.
The share of ambiguity averse persons is lower within the groups of necessity
entrepreneurs and returnees; however, this is not significantly different from the
remaining sample. Furthermore, even for the remaining sample the share of am-
biguity averse subjects is still below 50%. Given the results from the previous
literature, this is already an interesting finding in itself.
In Table 4.4, we do not find much differences between necessity and oppor-
tunity entrepreneurs with regard to ambiguity aversion. If anything, necessity
entrepreneurs are less ambiguity averse for moderate probabilities (onesided t-
test, p=0.087). They also seem to be slightly more ambiguity seeking for small
probabilities in comparison to the remaining sample, whereas opportunity en-
trepreneurs have the tendency to actually be more ambiguity averse for large
probabilities.











AA0.1 −0.06 0.07 0.01 0.11∗ 0.05
AA0.5 0.09∗ −0.03 0.05 0.02 0.11∗∗
AA0.9 0.04 0.02 0.06 −0.02 0.02
Index b 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.12
Index a 0.12∗ −0.06 0.06 −0.16∗∗ −0.03
Observations 73 123 128 94 99
Groups: Diff. Nec.-Opp., Diff. Rem.-Nec., Diff. Rem.-Opp., Diff. Ret.-Nec. and Diff.
Ret.-Opp. are various differences between necessity entrepreneurs, opportunity entrepreneurs,
returnees, and the remaining sample. Variables: AA0.1, AA0.5 and AA0.9 are the local ambiguity
attitudes. Index b and a are global indices for ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity derived
via linear approximation. Positive differences indicate that value of the parameter is larger for
the second group in each pair.
Onesided t-tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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However, none of these differences are significant at conventional levels. Yet,
we do find significant differences between entrepreneurs and return migrants. Re-
turnees are more ambiguity seeking than necessity entrepreneurs for small proba-
bilities and more ambiguity seeking for moderate probabilities than opportunity
entrepreneurs. Returnees and entrepreneurs seem to differ from the general pop-
ulation in opposing directions. Thus, studies that try to test for differences in risk
attitudes between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs should take the share of
migrants in their sample into account depending on their research question.
For a-insensitivity, we find necessity entrepreneurs to be significantly less a-
insensitive than opportunity entrepreneurs and return migrants. The highest
risk-takers (as they have other outside options in contrast to the perception
of necessity entrepreneurs) are those who discriminate the least between differ-
ent probabilities and tend to treat every level of uncertainty as a 50-50 chance.
There is, however, no significant difference between the remaining sample and
entrepreneurs of all kinds.14
Overall, we do not find very pronounced differences between the two kinds
of entrepreneurs and the other groups. This also does not change if we control
for further potential covariates. In Appendix 5.5, we provide regression results
including covariates and discuss if the significant covariates in our sample differ
from those in former studies. For ambiguity aversion, our results are in line
with studies concluding that, although theoretically appealing, there might be no
relationship between greater risk tolerance and entrepreneurship (see for example
Astebro et al., 2014, for an overview).
Our Albanian and Kosovar participants are, in general, slightly less ambiguity
averse but more a-insensitive than already studied populations. The overweight-
ing of small probabilities might imply, in general, a greater willingness to migrate
and open a business already. Still, we find that necessity entrepreneurs are less
a-insensitive than entrepreneurs out of opportunity and other risks groups. It
seems that the perception of the size of uncertainty is the basis on which both
kinds of entrepreneurs differ rather than the level of ambiguity aversion, if un-
certainty is given by nature. Some studies find that the perception of and the
tolerance toward strategic uncertainty (Holm et al., 2013) are stronger predictors
of entrepreneurship. We look closer at strategic uncertainty and the effect of
perceived uncertainty with our results for the treatment in the following section.
14 In general, contrary to the case of ambiguity aversion, the average person in our sample is
more a-insensitive than other populations (e.g the Dutch in Dimmock et al., 2016). This is
driven by both components almost equally, the stronger overweighting of small probabilities
and the stronger underweighting of high probabilities.
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4.3.2 Competence Treatment and Choices under Uncer-
tainty
At first, we concentrate on hypotheses one to four and look at the uncontrolled
differences between control and treatment groups for the different choice sets.
A onesided t-test reveals that the difference between control and treatment in
the certainty equivalent for non-strategic uncertainty is significant at the 10%
level (p=0.068). However, we do not find a statistically significant effect for the
certainty equivalent for strategic uncertainty (onesided p=0.29). Fisher’s exact
tests for the share of CE’s above 150 (which would be the “ambiguity-neutral,”
expected value of a 50-50 bucket) show the same pattern (onesided p-values:
0.047 and 0.347). This is surprising and a sign that respondents are more open to
uncertainty because of a positive experience with uncertainty but not specifically
in the domain of strategic uncertainty. The conjecture is further supported by
the significant, positive difference in the direct choice between strategic and non-
strategic uncertainty (p=0.064). Participants in the treatment group become
more tolerant toward non-strategic uncertainty instead of preferring strategic































Figure 4.5: CE’s for Non-Strategic (left) and Strategic (right) Uncertainty by
Treatment
The same pattern also holds for the fourth choice (see right picture of Fig-
ure 4.6). Participants in the treatment group are more willing to “trust” other
persons and let them make decisions (onesided t-test, p=0.053). Consequently,
we reject hypotheses one and three because the significant differences are not in
the direction we expected. We cannot reject hypothesis two and four although,
15 We are generally slightly under-powered for these comparisons as our effect sizes are fairly
small. We are able to detect moderate effect sizes (0.33) with our sample size (means test,
alpha of 0.05, onesided and a power of 0.8). However, the effect size of our null-result (0.07)
is also economically not meaningful.
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unexpectedly, the effect on the non-strategic CE is larger than the one on the
strategic CE. Combining these initial results, it seems that the treatment in-
creases the tolerance to the more ambiguous option in each choice set only if






































Figure 4.6: Strategic vs. Non-Strategic Uncertainty (left) and Taking
Responsibility (right) by Treatment
Looking at hypothesis 5 and 6, we first test whether there are already signif-
icant differences between entrepreneurs and returnees at baseline by comparing
results across groups for those in the control treatment. Results are shown in
Appendix Table C.1.2.16
Necessity entrepreneurs seem to dislike non-strategic uncertainty more than
opportunity entrepreneurs, however not strategic uncertainty. The certainty
equivalent for non-strategic uncertainty and the willingness to accept non-strategic
uncertainty in comparison to strategic uncertainty are much larger for opportu-
nity entrepreneurs, although not significantly larger.
This result is not driven by outliers and supports the notion that necessity
entrepreneurs are as willing as opportunity entrepreneurs to accept strategic un-
certainty but not non-strategic uncertainty. There is no difference in letting
others decide between the two kinds of entrepreneurs; however, they are both
much less likely to lay their fate in others’ hand than return migrants at baseline.
Out of all groups, entrepreneurs out of necessity are the ones who are the least
willing to tolerate non-strategic uncertainty, indicated by the several large differ-
ences between them and the other groups. In general, returnees seem to tolerate
non-strategic uncertainty in isolation more than both kinds of entrepreneurs.
Table 4.5 presents the differences (and onesided significance) between treat-
ment and control for each group of interest separately. For the whole group of
16 The sample sizes for this exercise are small, so these tests are under-powered but we still find
it worthwhile to look at initial differences to identify small effect sizes.
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entrepreneurs, we find large effects for all choices except the CE for strategic
uncertainty. The treatment significantly increases their certainty equivalent for
non-strategic uncertainty by 33.95 points, which are about 0.5 standard devia-
tions, and their willingness to let others decide by 15 percentage points, which is
a tremendous increase since the baseline probability is 5.5%.
Table 4.5: Individual t-tests for Groups of Interest
Entrepreneurs Return Remain
All Nec. Opp.
CE Ambiguity 33.95∗∗ 53.26∗∗∗ 20.89 −6.23 19.93
CE Competition 11.90 22.78 −1.33 3.58 3.12
Competition vs. Ambiguity 734.09 1684.67∗∗ 98.43 968.74 712.28
Others Decide 0.15∗∗ 0.08 0.23∗∗ 0.02 0.09
Observations 73 34 39 60 89
Groups: All are all entrepreneurs; Nec., and Opp. include entrepreneurs out of necessity and
opportunity respectively; Return represents the group of returnees and Remain includes all
persons who are neither entrepreneurs nor returnees. Variables: CE Ambiguity is the outcome
for the certainty equivalent of non-strategic uncertainty; CE Competition is the outcome for the
certainty equivalent of strategic uncertainty; Competition vs. Ambiguity is the outcome for the
total profit in the strategic uncertainty option against non-strategic uncertainty; and Others
Decide is the outcome for the probability of letting other decide the winning numbers instead
of oneself. Positive differences indicate that value of the parameter is larger for the first group
in each pair of groups.
Onesided t-tests. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Strikingly, the increase in tolerance for non-strategic uncertainty is mostly
driven by entrepreneurs out of necessity. The treatment more than doubles the
certainty equivalent for non-strategic uncertainty. Furthermore, the difference is
tremendously large for choosing non-strategic in favor of strategic uncertainty. In
contrast, entrepreneurs out of opportunity only respond weakly in every choice,
if not in a negative direction. Both kinds of entrepreneurs are more willing to let
others decide but only opportunity entrepreneurs are significantly more likely, by
23 percentage points. In general, as necessity entrepreneurs respond much more
to the treatment in the directions hypothesized than opportunity entrepreneurs,
we cannot reject hypothesis five.
On average, return migrants only weakly respond to the treatment, especially
for the certainty equivalents and for letting others decide. The effect for non-
strategic uncertainty is even negative, albeit small. It is worth mentioning that, at
baseline, returnees are significantly more willing to let other persons decide than
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entrepreneurs and that the positive treatment effect for opportunity entrepreneurs
just puts them on the same level as returnees. Summarized, we cannot reject
hypothesis six that entrepreneurs respond more strongly to the treatment than
do returnees.
So far, we have not discussed the correlation between the ambiguity attitudes
elicited in part two (Section 4.2.2) and the choice sets in part four (Section 4.2.3)
of our experiment. In general, the correlation between different elicitation meth-
ods for ambiguity attitudes seem to be rather weak. Trautmann et al. (2011), for
example, find substantially more ambiguity aversion and even preference rever-
sals for willingness-to-pay tasks in comparison to choice tasks, which we use. We
have chosen these specific tasks because (i) they have a solid decision-theoretic
foundation; and (ii) because we want to elicit a-insensitivity explicitly. The choice
sets we implement in part four of the experiment are not suited to measure am-
biguity aversion. The idea of these choice sets is to analyze whether a treatment
that is supposed to change competence and familiarity affects the willingness to
take uncertain gambles in general, not in comparison to risk. Our assumption
is that choices in these sets are much more driven by beliefs than by ambiguity
aversion. Furthermore, choices that are made after the treatment intervention
are potentially altered by the treatment. This is also true for our control group,
as they are made aware of the fact that their judgement was not correct. Hence, a
comparison of choices between the two tasks to assess the quality of the elicitation
method might be misleading.
However, it is still interesting if ambiguity aversion parameters affect choices
and interact with the treatment. In Appendix Tables C.1.3 and C.1.4, correla-
tions between the global ambiguity index, a-insensitivity, and the choice sets for
both treatment groups are depicted. For the control group, not only is there no
significant correlation between ambiguity aversion and any of the choices, but
there is only one significant correlation between a-insensitivity and the choice
between strategic and non-strategic uncertainty. In contrast, for the treatment
group, we find a positive correlation between ambiguity aversion and both cer-
tainty equivalents. A-insensitivity has no significant correlation to any choice.
We interpret this as a sign that the competence treatment especially affected
those with a higher level of ambiguity aversion.
Summarized, we confirm three out of the five hypotheses, in particular that neces-
sity entrepreneurs react more to the treatment than opportunity entrepreneurs.
At baseline, necessity entrepreneurs are much less willing than either opportu-
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nity entrepreneurs or return migrants to accept non-strategic uncertainty, which
is subsequently more than off-set by the treatment. However, there is no strong
baseline difference regarding strategic uncertainty, which is an interesting result.
In general, both kinds of entrepreneurs respond strongly to a rather mild treat-
ment as opportunity entrepreneurs’ willingness to let others decide also increases
significantly. Comparing this to another group of risk-takers, returnees, hints at
the fact that this is not driven just by different degrees of ambiguity aversion as
they do not differ substantially in this respect. Still, it should be noted that the
groups experiencing the largest boost in taking uncertain gambles is the one that
is the least a-insensitive.
Generally, our evidence is not directly in favor of the hypothesis that an in-
crease in perceived domain-specific competence drives these results. Although
our treatment intends to manipulate the perceived competence of the partici-
pants to judge other participants, mostly the willingness to tolerate non-strategic
uncertainty increased. Surprisingly, it seems that the treatment affected the gen-
eral level of optimism. In all four choices, participants in the treatment seem to
be more optimistic toward the option that entails larger uncertainty.17 Further
evidence for the conjecture that the treatment effected general optimism is shown
in Appendix Figure C.1.1. Directly after the treatment message, participants are
also asked how well they think they did in the previous parts in comparison to
other participants in the room. They should place themselves between one and
ten, where one stands for the person who earned the fewest points so far and
ten for the person who earned the most. The performance in the previous tasks
is only weakly linked to guessing the number of competitors correctly as most
choices, like the one outlined in 4.2.2, do not entail any strategic uncertainty.
Still, those in the treatment group ranked themselves higher than those in con-
trol (onesided t-test, p-value:0.087); hence expecting to have performed better
so far. We see this as additional evidence that the level of optimism and not
competence is spurred.
4.4 Robustness
Controlling for the Order of Choices. There is reason to believe that the order
in which the three uncertainty choices are played could matter. Fox and Tversky
(1995) are among the first who noticed that ambiguity aversion is much more
17 The choice regarding deciding on one’s own or let others decide in principle bears the same
risk. However, as outlined in Section 4.2.3, participants might perceive letting others persons
decide as more ambiguous.
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pronounced if the ambiguous prospect can be compared to a less ambiguous one
and is not considered in isolation. Their “comparative ignorance hypothesis”
also explains why people prefer to bet on ambiguous prospects in areas they feel
competent about than on ambiguous prospects in areas where they do not have
knowledge or experience. Thus, the order in which the choices are considered
might change the results. In Table C.1.5 in the Appendix, we control for each of
the three choices whether it is elicited first, second, or third. As can be seen, the
effects and the coefficients for the treatment stay almost the same. This also holds
for our groups of interest individually (results upon request). Interestingly, the
order still has a significant effect on the direct choice between strategic and non-
strategic uncertainty. The later it is elicited, the less participants are attracted
to the non-strategic option.
Controlling for Certainty about the Guess. As mentioned in Section 4.2.3, par-
ticipants are not only asked to guess the number of competitors in their group but
also how certain they are about this guess on scale from one to ten. Extreme cer-
tainty or uncertainty could “interfere” with our treatment in various ways. Those
who are extremely certain could not react to the treatment at all or are shattered
if they learn they guessed incorrectly. Those who are extremely uncertain could
experience the biggest boost in competence if they are treated. Thus, it is not
clear ex ante whether certainty and our treatment are complements or substitutes,
especially since our treatment rather affected the perception of non-strategic un-
certainty. Therefore, in Appendix Table C.1.6, the certainty variable is included
as control. As before, our treatment effect is robust to this inclusion (also in the
individual groups of interest). What is striking is the comparative ignorance effect
we apparently find. The certainty equivalent choices where the two ambiguous
prospects are considered in isolation are almost not affected by how certain the
participants are. The direct choice between the strategic and non-strategic un-
certainty, however, largely and significantly depends on certainty. Those who are
more certain about their guessed number of competitors seem to be much more
willing to bet on the strategic gamble. This holds for participants in the treat-
ment and the control groups. Hence, our treatment and the perceived certainty
(which can be a form of perceived competence) are rather substitutes as their
effects go in opposite directions. This again underlines the conjecture that the
treatment affected general optimism and not competence. Interestingly, neces-
sity entrepreneurs are significantly more certain than opportunity entrepreneurs
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(twosided p-value=0.05) and are minimally more tolerant to strategic uncertainty
at baseline.
4.5 Conclusion
The observed prevalence of entrepreneurship is sometimes hard to reconcile with
conventional levels of risk taking measured in standard models. On the other
hand, in weak labor markets, individuals might feel that they have no option
other than becoming self-employed. Motivated by the mixed findings on whether
entrepreneurs are more risk seeking than non-entrepreneurs and by different mo-
tives to become entrepreneurs in the first place for necessity and opportunity
entrepreneurs, we analyze if the latter groups differ with respect to their level of
ambiguity aversion, a-insensitivity, and the willingness to take non-strategic and
strategic, uncertain gambles. Additionally, we isolate return migrants from the
remaining general population to compare entrepreneurs to another group of occu-
pationally high-risk takers, and to make sure the aforementioned mixed findings
are not driven by a varying share of migrants in the comparison group.
Furthermore, as theory predicts that expected returns to entrepreneurship also
depend on (perceived) competence, we randomize a competence treatment. The
treatment exogenously strengthens the perceived ability to judge other persons’
market entry decision for half of our participants before we measure the willing-
ness to take uncertain gambles. Differences in perceived uncertainty and compe-
tence could explain different entry rates and why “necessity businesses” are less
profitable than “opportunity businesses.” We expect necessity entrepreneurs to be
more responsive to treatment than opportunity entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs
in general to be more responsive than return migrants. Our sample consists of
real entrepreneurs, returnees, and other persons living in Albania and Kosovo, as
middle-income countries particularly rely on innovation as a source of growth.
Using the matching probabilities method by Dimmock et al. (2016), we find
that although there are no substantial differences in ambiguity aversion, necessity
entrepreneurs are significantly less a-insensitive than opportunity entrepreneurs
and return migrants. The latter two groups seem to have a different perception of
non-strategic uncertainty, because they tend to consider all unknown probabilities
as 50-50 chances. Our results also show that, in general, necessity entrepreneurs
are the least willing to take non-strategic, uncertain gambles but subsequently,
respond strongest to the competence treatment. They experience a large increase
in the willingness to take non-strategic, not so much to take strategic uncertain
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gambles. This hints at the fact that it is not perceived competence that is altered
but rather general optimism. In contrast, returnees do not respond well to the
treatment, while opportunity entrepreneurs only respond in trusting other people
more. Our results are robust to order effects and participants’ pre-treatment
certainty about their ability to judge the decision of others.
With our study, we contribute to the literature trying to shed light on the
behavioral determinants of entrepreneurship and how motives behind opening
a business potentially shape business outcomes. Behavioral factors can be im-
portant barriers for market entry and firm survival, which policy makers want to
resolve. Boosting confidence or optimism seems to help necessity entrepreneurs in
increasing their willingness to gamble on non-strategic uncertainty, which might
be beneficial for innovation and funding. For example, Cusolito et al. (2020)
argue that entrepreneurs not accepting venture capital might be one of the rea-
sons for start-up failure in the Western Balkans. Additionally, they find that
inexperienced and small firms especially profit from a business readiness pro-
gram that emphasizes entrepreneurial skills. Besides actually improving skills,
another reason for their success could be the increased feeling of competence and
the subsequent increase in willingness to gamble on uncertainty. At least in our
experiment, this increase is still below levels that expected utility theory would
deem optimal and are, in contrast to the assumption in some theoretical studies,
not irrationally high.
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5.1 Introduction
For households, taking out debt is a valuable tool to smooth consumption and
often a necessary precursor of private investments. However, as consumer indebt-
edness is significantly increasing worldwide, there is widespread concern that it
may turn detrimental. Specifically, when households face increasing difficulties to
repay their debts, household well-being and consumption are threatened. More-
over, household over-indebtedness poses a serious threat to the stability of the
financial system as a whole; for example, as experienced during the U.S. financial
crisis in 2007-08.
Emerging market economies are especially at risk of low growth and even fi-
nancial crises when the level of household debt is high, as not only are their institu-
tions and financial regulations weaker, but income inequality is also higher (IMF,
2017). Therefore, understanding the factors and reacting to the consequences
of over-indebtedness are crucial for improving living conditions while also ensur-
ing a stable development of emerging economies. Building on the “permanent
income hypothesis”, where income expectations determine current consumption
and borrowing, this paper studies one potential driver of over-indebtedness: too
high income expectations. Although being positive about the future might have a
net positive effect on lifetime utility (see Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005), being
too positive might lead to serious financial distress and over-indebtedness.
In general, households’ borrowing behavior around the world is still puzzling
in various aspects and often hard to reconcile with standard neoclassical and
behavioral models. Zinman (2015) argues that one reason for many unresolved
puzzles is that household debt is vastly under-researched within household fi-
nance. In the last decade, a vibrant literature on measuring over-indebtedness
has emerged (e.g. D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013; Keese, 2012; Schicks, 2013). In con-
trast, its determinants are still mostly unidentified. Our paper contributes to
closing this gap by focusing on high income expectations as one likely cause. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the relationship between real
income expectations and over-indebtedness.
We investigate the relationship between positive expectations and over-indebt-
edness using extensive survey data on the financial situation and financial behav-
ior of one of the most vulnerable populations in Thailand: rural households in the
north-east. A crucial part of our survey was to collect objective and subjective
data on potential symptoms of over-indebtedness. This allows us to construct
98 Chapter 5
different objective and subjective over-indebtedness indicators.1 Additionally, we
quantify households’ predictions of their future income. Instead of relying on
qualitative Likert scale measures, we elicit individual distributions of expected
household income and set these in relation to actual income. Hence, a major
contribution to the literature is that we relate the over-indebtedness indicators
to a sophisticated measure of subjective income expectations. In our regression
analysis, we control for relevant household characteristics and unexpected shocks
faced by households, thereby reducing reverse causality concerns. In order to
further strengthen the contribution of our paper, we delve deeper into the causal
effect of positively biased expectations on overborrowing by carrying out a lab-
in-the-field experiment with the exact same respondents. In the experiment, we
concentrate on one particular expectation bias: overconfidence. We exogenously
bias income expectations via two treatments that vary the level of self-confidence
of the respondents and, thereby, their expected earnings. Subsequently, we inves-
tigate if participants spend more on goods they can buy in the experiment and,
as a consequence, potentially overborrow.
Thailand is, on the one hand, an exemplary emerging market, but, on the
other, outstanding when it comes to household finances: Financial inclusion is
comparatively high, with four out of five persons participating in the formal finan-
cial system. Simultaneously, household debt has increased to over 78.03% of the
country’s GDP. This makes it the emerging market with the highest household
debt to GDP ratio in the world (IMF (2017), see Appendix Figure D.1.1). Given
these numbers, it is hardly surprising that both local policy makers and interna-
tional institutions agree that over-indebtedness is a growing problem in Thailand
(Tambunlertchai, 2015). Additionally, there are circumstances that make our
sample especially vulnerable to over-indebtedness and to struggle with financial
hardship. This part of the population faces higher uncertainty regarding their
future incomes in two ways: through the generally high level of macroeconomic
volatility in emerging markets and through individual, mostly weather-related
shocks, common to poor, small-scale agricultural households (see Loayza et al.,
2007; Klasen and Waibel, 2015).
Our survey results show that there is a strong and robust relationship be-
tween high expectations and over-indebtedness. Those who have positive expec-
tations are more likely to be over-indebted than those with neutral or negative
expectations, which we interpret as a sign that these expectations are truly too
1 It is still a highly debated topic how to measure over-indebtedness and there is no clear-cut
answer on the right method of elicitation, which is why we construct a variety of over-
indebtedness measures.
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high for some households. The results vary slightly with respect to different
debt indicators. The relationship between high expectations and the objective
over-indebtedness indicator is more pronounced in comparison to the subjective
indicator, but both relationships are significant. Our results indicate that the
subjective indicator is not only driven by actual debt levels but also by per-
sonal characteristics and perceptions, such that it measures a different dimension
of over-indebtedness. In an additional exercise, we can show that the subjective
over-indebtedness indicator is highly correlated to a qualitatively assessed income
forecast (error) measure. Eventually, we find that being more certain about the
future income realization, which can be another form of forecast error, is also
positively related to our objective over-indebtedness indicator. Rural households
are exposed to a highly uncertain environment; hence, being too certain about
ones future income may be harmful. Our results are robust to various sample
specifications and become more precise if we exclude parts of the sample that
may have had difficulties understanding the questions on eliciting future income
expectations.
In the supplemental experiment, we find that overconfidence is related to more
spending and overborrowing. However, our treatments themselves have no im-
pact on overborrowing, which is why we cannot claim a causal relationship of
overconfidence on overborrowing. These results are not driven by presumably
confounding factors that the treatments could have affected and are relatively
robust. Rather, we find evidence for “sticky” overconfident beliefs, which also
points to a high level of perceived certainty in our sample. Furthermore, partici-
pants who overspend in the lab are also those who experience over-indebtedness
in real life. This shows that our experiment is not “too artificial” to capture real
life behavior.
Our study touches on three strands of literature: First, the literature on
eliciting and using subjective expectations data; second, research on potential
behavioral biases in financial decision-making and debt illiteracy; and, third, the
literature on households’ (over-)indebtedness in emerging economies. There are
at least two reasons why the relationship between income expectations and over-
indebtedness should be explicitly studied in an emerging market setting and why
findings from “WEIRD”2 populations might not translate to rural populations.
First, financial literacy is substantially lower. This implies lower debt literacy,
which might hamper expectation formation on financial matters. For example,
Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that debt illiteracy is related to higher debt
2 Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic
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burdens and the inability to evaluate the own debt position. Burke and Manz
(2014) experimentally show that economic illiteracy increases financial forecast
errors. Second, the higher uncertainty that respondents are facing distinguishes
this research from work done in “WEIRD” societies. A more volatile economic
environment requires more individual belief formation, which makes biased expec-
tation formation more likely (see for example Johnson and Fowler, 2011) and at
the same time more dangerous. In any case, the empirical evidence from WEIRD
countries on the relationship between income expectations and over-indebtedness
is sparse as well. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that explicitly
concentrates on real-life income expectations.
Our work is most closely related to Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) and Grohmann
et al. (2019). The former find a correlation between Finnish households’ overbor-
rowing and extreme positive forecast errors about the financial situation of the
household. They do not analyze the effect of income expectations on overbor-
rowing but the effect of financial expectations in general, which gives more rise
to issues of reverse causality. Furthermore, the forecast errors are constructed
using Likert scales and hence, cannot be quantified. They show that households
exhibiting high positive forecast errors are more likely to overborrow than house-
holds exhibiting smaller errors. Grohmann et al. (2019) conduct a lab experiment
among students in Germany that is similar to ours and link the experiment data
with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. They find a causal link be-
tween overconfidence and debt taking in the lab and a correlation between a
simple measure for overconfidence and the level of household debt in the panel
sample. Our study differs from these two studies in that it contributes to the
literature by (i) explicitly eliciting and quantifying real income expectations and
precisely measuring over-indebtedness; and (ii) analyzing the research question in
a setting where expectation formation is generally difficult and over-indebtedness
bears severe consequences.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 presents the survey data, discusses
the setting, and explains how our variables of interest are constructed. In Section
5.3, the estimation strategy is outlined and survey results are presented. Section
5.4 describes the experiment and its results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Data
This section introduces the data collected during the survey and explains how the
main variables of interest are derived. We develop a measure that approximates
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future income expectations, which we call the quantitative income forecast. Fur-
ther, we construct various over-indebtedness indicators to capture the different
dimensions of household debt.
5.2.1 The Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel
The survey was conducted in Thailand in November 2017 and is an add-on project
of the Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel (TVSEP).3 The TVSEP has con-
ducted panel surveys in rural Thailand and Vietnam on a regular basis since 2007,
with recurrent surveys in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2017, and 2019, so far.
The TVSEP survey captures the living conditions of households in rural areas
that are largely engaged in agriculture. It focuses on factors affecting households’
vulnerability to poverty. Among others, the survey includes socio-economic char-
acteristics of every household member, sections on household consumption and
savings, crop farming, livestock rearing, and, in particular, questions on expo-
sure to shocks and anticipated risks. Furthermore, each wave captures topics of
current research interest. About 4000 rural households in 440 villages across six
provinces in Thailand and Vietnam are interviewed for the survey. The sample
is set to represent the rural population in these two countries while urban house-
holds are deliberately excluded. To obtain a representative sample, a three-stage
cluster sampling is used. The procedure is described in Hardeweg et al. (2013).
Our study is conducted in only one of the TVSEP provinces in Thailand,
Ubon Ratchathani, which borders Cambodia and Laos (Figure 5.1). The sample
consists of about 750 households in 97 villages. For the majority of our analysis,
we concentrate on our own survey, adding data from the 2016 and 2017 general
TVSEP survey as necessary. With our study, we want to gain new insights into
the determinants of debt induced financial distress within a vulnerable popula-
tion. Therefore, our survey includes extensive question batteries on objective
and subjective over-indebtedness (see Sub-Section 5.2.4), savings, financial lit-
eracy, borrowing behavior in general, and income expectations (see Sub-Section
5.2.3). In addition, we collect data on health, subjective well-being, personality
traits, and risk preferences. We use established items to assess these data. For
example, personality traits are measured using the short version of the Big Five
Inventory “BFI-S” (John and Srivastava, 1999; Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). We
develop a broad financial literacy score, which not only encompasses numeracy
but also questions on financial behavior and attitude. The score is similar in style
to that developed by the OECD (OECD, 2018).
3 See https://www.tvsep.de/overview-tvsep.html.
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Figure 5.1: Study Site, Ubon Ratchathani and Sampled Subdistricts
Furthermore, we construct a score for risk preference out of two questions:
The first one asks whether the person is generally fully prepared to take risks
and the second question specifically asks for risk-taking behavior in financial
decision-making (i.e. investing and borrowing). Self-control is assessed using the
well-established scale of Tangney et al. (2004). Given the low numeracy within the
sample, we add a phrase to each numerical value on questions involving scales.4
We use a restricted sample for the analysis in Section 5.3 and exclude outliers
by the following means: We exclude (i) the 1 percent highest monthly household
incomes in 2016 and 2017, (ii) households who have a debt service to income
ratio greater than four, and (iii) those whose income is negative in general. For
the latter case, we trim them as we do not know whether a negative income
itself means that the households are in financial distress. Regression results with-
out trimming are very similar to those with trimming. In any case, trimming
(marginally) downward biases our results.
In our trimmed sample, the average respondent is 57 years old, female, the
spouse of the household head, and has 5.7 years of education. Our financial
literacy score indicates a relatively low level of financial literacy. On average,
respondents answered four out of seven knowledge questions correctly, reached
five out of nine possible points concerning financial behavior, and three out of
4 Our main questionnaire can be downloaded here.
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seven possible points with regard to financial attitude. This is in line with find-
ings from the OECD/INFE study for Thailand from 2016 (OECD, 2016). While
57.27% of our respondents are the sole financial decision makers in their house-
holds, 28.05% share this task with someone else. Hence, when sometimes using
respondent- and not household-specific characteristics or perceptions in the anal-
ysis, we are still confident that these individual traits determine the household’s
state of indebtedness because the majority of respondents is in charge of making
financial decisions.5
5.2.2 The Thai Rural Credit Market
In Thailand, over 80% of the population has a bank account and over 60% uses
it for digital payments. The gaps in financial inclusion between women and men
as well as between the rural and urban population have declined and are now
relatively small (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2018). Financial inclusion in our sample is
similar: 78.34% of our sample households have an account with a formal banking
institution.
Simultaneously, the rural credit market has evolved extensively, providing
manifold loan options for consumers. This is mainly due to heavily subsidized
government programs. The market is dominated by government-financed institu-
tions (Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017). The most important ones are the Bank for
Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) and the Village and Urban
Community Fund (VF) program,6 with the former reaching approximately 95%
of all farm households (Terada and Vandenberg, 2014). This massive expansion
can also be observed in our sample, where the majority (73.4%) of households has
a loan that is either still owed or has been paid back within the last 12 months.
Figure 5.2 provides a graphic overview of the loan situation. Conditional on
having a loan, households have on average 2.4 loans. Households borrow from
formal and informal sources alike. In fact, loan sources are diverse, with the two
most important credit sources being the BAAC and the VF. This lending pat-
tern is similar across all districts we consider. Households also borrow from other
sources, for example, from agricultural cooperatives, business partners, money
lenders, relatives, and friends. Loans are taken out for various reasons. Most
loans are primarily used for agricultural related goods like fertilizer or pesticides
(23.96%), for consumption goods (22.39%), and for agricultural investments, e.g.
5 Still, as a robustness check, we re-run the analysis without respondents who are not at all in
charge of financial decision-making within the household.
6 The aim of the VF is to improve financial access in rural areas in Thailand. It is one of the
largest microfinance programs in the world (Menkhoff and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011).
104 Chapter 5
farm land or agricultural machines (16.58%). Loans are also used for paying back
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Figure 5.2: Number of Loans
5.2.3 Income Expectations
Households can form positive or negative income expectations. We are interested
in studying households that exhibit high (positive) income expectations. In order
to obtain a positive income expectation measure, we must elicit income expecta-
tions in the first place. Expectations play a central role in the economic theory of
household decision-making, for example, with respect to determining saving, bor-
rowing, and consumption (Friedman, 1957), or with respect to occupation choices
(Becker, 1964). Manifold research has tried to predict this choice behavior based
on expectations. Yet, expectations are challenging to elicit empirically.
Eliciting Income Expectations
Expectations from Former Income Realizations The traditional way of elic-
itation - referred to as revealed preference analysis - assumes that individuals
have rational expectations (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Manski, 2004) and infers
expectations from data on past income realizations. For this approach, strong
assumptions on the expectation formations process are needed, with both the
researcher and the respondent needing to have the same information set (Guiso
et al., 2002). Given these strong assumptions and our conjecture that mistakes
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in expectation formation are likely to occur in our setting, we decide for two
alternative elicitation methods, which are explained in what follows.
Qualitative Expectations Questions The first way is to elicit expectations via
qualitative questions, e.g. using Likert scales for questions on future expected
events. We use this method in the appendix to replicate the results of Hyytinen
and Putkuri (2018), who use Likert scales to elicit financial expectations. How-
ever, this approach suffers from two main drawbacks: First, answers might not be
comparable across respondents and, second, response options may be too coarse
and leave room for responses different from what is proposed.
Subjective Probabilistic Income Expectations Dominitz and Manski (1997)
suggest to elicit probabilistic expectations. This approach is particularly useful
for calculating individual cumulative distribution functions and moments of the
relevant variable (Attanasio, 2009). By allowing researchers to retrieve different
moments of the expected income distribution, it becomes possible to algebraically
study the internal consistency of elicited expectations (e.g. apply the laws of
probability) and to use these probabilistic expectations as actual probabilities
describing how respondents assess future outcomes. We use this approach in our
main analysis to retrieve positive expectations.
As we elicit expectations within a rural sample in an emerging economy, we
rephrase percent change questions in a way similar to “how sure are you” and use
visual aids to make the concept of probability more comprehensible.7 Thereby,
we address the concerns of Attanasio (2009) and Delavande et al. (2011), who
state that the concept of probability might be hard to convey in contexts where
people have low levels of education.8
To check whether respondents adhere to the basic laws of probability, we
first ask them how sure they are that it will rain tomorrow and how sure they
are that it will rain within the next two weeks. They can indicate their answer
by putting between zero and ten marbles that we gave them beforehand into a
cup, with zero marbles meaning they are absolutely sure it will not rain and ten
marbles meaning they are absolutely sure it will rain. There are 182 out of 748
7 Studies dealing with these kind of expectation elicitation include, among others, Attanasio
and Augsburg (2016), who study income processes in India, McKenzie et al. (2013), who
investigate income expectations of Tongans, and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014), who elicit
income expectations among high school students in Mexico.
8 The average respondent in our sample only attended school for six years.
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respondents (24.33 %) who do not obey the laws of probability: they set a zero
chance that it will rain within the next two weeks but a positive probability that
it will rain tomorrow. This is a substantial share of respondents, most likely
caused by the low educational level in our sample. In the subsequent analysis,
we run our regression both with and without these individuals.
After this “warm-up” exercise, we ask respondents how sure they are that
their monthly household income in the next twelve months will be in a predefined
range. We use income quartiles from the 2013 TVSEP wave to predetermine the
four bins to which respondents allocate their ten marbles. The four bins range
between 0 - 3,300 Thai Baht (THB), 3,300 - 8,100 THB, 8,100 - 16,590 THB, and
16,590 - 921,000 THB.9 Respondents distribute their ten marbles based on how
likely they think it is that their future monthly income will lie in each specific
bin.10 Hence, we are able to calculate the individual cumulative distribution
function (CDF) for the expected monthly income as we interpret the number of
marbles distributed between the cups as points on their individual CDFs.
We then fit a subjective income distribution following Attanasio and Augsburg
(2016) and assume a piecewise (i.e. per cup) uniform probability distribution.
This enables us to calculate a specific expected mean and median income, as well
as the standard deviation, for each household.
Table 5.1: Probabilities Assigned to Sections of the Income Distribution
Observations Minimum Maximum Median Mean S.D.
0-3300 THB 737 0 100 20 32.18 35.1
3301-8100 THB 737 0 100 30 30.71 29.27
8101-16590 737 0 100 20 24.03 28.38
16591-300000 737 0 100 0 13.08 24.08
Respondents allocate the number of marbles to the cups as a function of their
underlying subjective probability to earn income in the specific income range. The
average distribution of marbles per cup, i.e. the average implied probabilities to
earn income in the respective income quartile is shown in Table 5.1. Additionally,
Figure 5.3 presents the probability density function of expected income in our
9 The range of the last bin is very broad. Compared to the maximum monthly income respon-
dents state, we find that only two respondents expect an income as high as 921,000 THB. All
other maximum income guesses range between 0 - 300,000 THB. In order to avoid artificially
high expected median incomes, we restrict the range of the last bin in our calculation of
expected median income to a maximum of 300,000 THB.
10 The enumerator places four cups in front of them, each labelled with a different income range
and makes sure that all marbles are allocated at the end of the exercise.
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sample. The average respondent’s expected income distribution is skewed to
the right; that is, on average, respondents believe it is more probable that their
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Figure 5.3: Probability Density Function of Expected Income
We also ensure that the elicited expected income is not completely at odds
with the actual income process. As measure for the income process, we use the
realized income in 2016 and a measure averaging the self-reported income in a
very bad and a very good month. Correlations between these and our expected
income measure are always statistically significant and range between 0.27 and
0.33, which is encouragingly high given that the correlation between actual in-
come in 2016 and 2017 is 0.48. Furthermore, as Attanasio (2009) proposes, we
check how the subjective expected median income covaries with household char-
acteristics, particularly with the composition, education, and realized income
(results available upon request). Beyond the already stated relationship with in-
come, household total education is significantly, positively related to the expected
median income. A little ambiguous is the correlation to household composition:
While a larger number of elders in the household is associated with lower ex-
pected income (albeit not significantly), more workers in the household also seem
to decrease it.11
11 Reflecting on this last result, we assume that households with more working members are,
in general, poorer and have less stable incomes. There is a tendency in Thailand to abolish
multi-generational households for small family homes, which is, however, only possible if
income is high enough and stable.
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Defining Positive Income Expectations
We develop a new kind of positive income expectation measure that is based on
the expected future monthly income and the current income. To derive a quanti-
tative income forecast (Quant. IF), we first calculate the percentage change be-
tween actual monthly income generated in t and future expected monthly income
in t + 1, which is elicited by the procedure explained in this Section. Specifically,
t refers to the year 2017, for which we have actual income data. Consequently,
t + 1 considers income expectations for 2018.
QuantitativeIncomeForecast(Quant.IF ) = Et(Inci,t+1) − Inci,t
Inci,t
×100 (5.1)
In a second step, we divide the quantitative income forecast into quintiles
such that our outcome measure allows for five categories ranging from a very
negative, negative, mildly negative income forecast, via a neutral income forecast
to a positive quantitative income forecast. Thus, the negative (positive) forecasts
capture households that expect relatively less (more) future monthly income as
compared to their actual earned income in the current year. Each quintile enters
the regression via a dummy variable where households with a mildly negative
quantitative income forecast (i.e. respondents that range in the third quintile)
serve as the omitted group.
In general, respondents are rather pessimistic with regard to their future in-
come. The distribution of changes in expected future income ranges from -98.6%
to 19528.6% whereas the maximum is a clear outlier, which also drives the average
increase of expected future income of about 35%. If we exclude this household
the average shrinks to 6.9%.12 The median household expects a 51% decrease
of future income relative to actual income. Thus, the distribution is skewed to
the right. In total, 75% of the sample expect their future income to be lower
than the one in the year of the survey. This explains why three of the quintiles
clearly range in the negative scope of the distribution and are thus coined “neg-
ative income forecast.” Only the highest quintile is composed of households that
have a clearly positive outlook.13 The negative outlook on future income may
be explained by two developments: First, respondents may fear further political
turmoil following the 2014 military coup. Second, the negative outlook may be
12 The corresponding respondent has a very low income in 2017, but - in the cup game - used
all ten balls for the highest income range. We suspect the respondent had not fully grasped
the elicitation game.
13 Variables that covary with each respective forecast group can be found in the Online Ap-
pendix.
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due to the persistent, regional, economic inequality. People from north eastern
Thailand still earn substantially less than people from other regions and, thus,
might feel disadvantaged throughout (Lao et al., 2019). According to the World
Bank, inequality in Thailand has increased between 2015 and 2017, despite overall
economic growth in the country (World Bank, 2019).
While we cannot formally test accuracy of expectations with our subjective
expected income data,14 we assume that a high and positive relative difference
between expected income in 2018 and realized income in 2017 is partly due to re-
spondents being too optimistic regarding what they will earn in the future. This
assumption is based on studies finding that expectations about various future out-
comes may tend toward being positively biased (see for example Zinman, 2015).
Furthermore, considering the median household’s negative expectation on future
monthly income, we are confident that we capture very optimistic households
with regard to income development in the highest quintile of the distribution.
We also account for perceived income uncertainty in our analysis. In addition
to asking respondents how they think that their income will develop over the
next 12 months, we ask how certain they are that this income development will
truly become reality. Being potentially too certain about future realizations of
stochastic processes can be a form of biased expectation called “overprecision”
(Moore and Healy, 2008).










Very uncertain Uncertain Somewhat certain Very certain
Figure 5.4: Income Certainty
14 For example, because we lack data about realized income in 2018, the year after we asked for
expected income, and we do not know (yet) about shocks households endured during that
time.
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55.56% of respondents are at least somewhat certain about their income de-
velopment and 28.44% are very certain. The survey took place during the harvest
season, so that respondents might have an idea about the harvest outcome and,
therefore, perceive their expected future income as rather certain or they truly
suffer from overprecision.
Last, we derive a measure of expectation accuracy following Souleles (2004)
and Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018). It is based on a coarser assessment of a
household’s future income. We can actually determine its accuracy, which is why
we call this measure the qualitative forecast error. The derivation and estimation
results are found in Appendix D.2.
5.2.4 Over-Indebtedness Indicators
There is no consensus regarding a single set of indicators measuring indebtedness
precisely, even less so for over-indebtedness.15 In general, all measures share eco-
nomic, social, temporal, and psychological dimensions such as that the amount
of debt exceeds income over a medium- to long-term time horizon and the house-
hold is not able to fulfill its debt commitments without increasing its income or
lowering its standard of living, which might lead to stress and worry (D’Alessio
and Iezzi, 2013). Furthermore, so-called objective debt measures relate to the
household’s debt service capacity, subjective measures rather emphasize the psy-
chological consequences of being indebted (Keese, 2012).
Based on the existing literature, we decide to construct two measures of over-
indebtedness. The first index captures different dimensions of being “objectively”
over-indebted (based on best practices from the literature) while the second index
rather refers to “subjectively” felt factors related to financial distress.
Objective Over-Indebtedness Index The objective over-indebtedness mea-
sure is an aggregated and standardized index that combines four indicators. We
include the following components in the index: an indicator variable if the debt
service to income ratio (DSR) is greater than 0.4, an indicator variable if the
overall remaining debt service to income ratio exceeds 0.4, an indicator for if the
household holds more than two loans at the same time, and one indicator for
if the household paid late or defaulted on a loan in the last 12 months. Each
component is well established in the literature (see, for example D’Alessio and
Iezzi, 2013). Among these variables, the DSR is widely recognized as standard
measure to capture indebtedness. The threshold we set for the DSR to indicate
15 Among others, D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) provide a summary on different indebtedness indi-
cators, their usage, and possible drawbacks.
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over-indebtedness is based on considerations from the literature where a range
between 0.3 and 0.5 is used (Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017; D’Alessio and Iezzi,
2013). In constructing the objective over-indebtedness index we follow Kling et
al. (2007). We explain how the index and its components are derived in the On-
line Appendix. When deriving our debt measures, we include all types of loans
that households report. Those can be formal or informal loans, as well as loans
taken from friends and family members. During the interview, respondents were
highly encouraged to report all loans regardless of the source. Hence, we are
confident that we capture a household’s true debt level.
Subjective Over-Indebtedness Index While objective debt indicators pro-
vide numerically accurate debt measures, they are sometimes criticized for failing
to account either for the reasons why households overborrow or for the house-
hold’s undisclosed ability to pay back debt. Therefore, we also include subjective,
“respondent driven” over-indebtedness measures in our analysis. As before, we
derive a standardized index aggregating different indicators of subjective over-
indebtedness. The indicators include an assessment identifying if the household
feels it has too much debt, if it has difficulties paying debt off, and the so-called
“sacrifice index.”16 The index and its components are explained in detail in the
Online Appendix. Schicks (2013) prefers to use subjective over objective debt
measures in her work analyzing over-indebtedness from a customer-protection
point of view in microfinance. D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) also rely heavily on a
subjective measure to study over-indebtedness in Italy. In line with Keese (2012)
and Lusardi and Tufano (2015), we argue that subjective measures describe a
situation of financial distress for the respective households but are, naturally,
highly subjective to the respondent such that these measures should not be used
without considering objective indicators as well. For all indices derived, higher
scores point at a higher value of accumulated debt.
Table 5.2 depicts the summary statistics of the objective and subjective over-
indebtedness indices. The objective index ranges from -1 to 3 with higher values
indicating a more severe level of over-indebtedness. While the average DSR lies
at 0.23, about 18% of the households have a DSR that is higher than 0.4. More
strikingly, about 23% of our sample households have more than two loans. The
range of the subjective index is between -2 and 3, again oriented in a way that
higher numbers point to higher indebtedness. On average, households state that
they have the “right amount of debt” (Mean = -0.02 for the debt position variable)
and that they have no difficulties paying off debt. However, the average household
16 We closely follow Schicks (2013) in constructing the sacrifice index.
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admits to have made at least some sacrifices regarding household needs due to
lack of money as the average value is -0.08 and a household with no sacrifices
would be found at the lowest end of the sacrifice index distribution.
Furthermore, Table D.1.1 presents correlations between all our debt indica-
tors. Naturally, the objective and subjective indices are significantly correlated
with their respective sub-indicators. However, our objective and subjective mea-
sures also correlate significantly with each other. This is encouraging, since it
rebuts criticism with respect to objective over-indebtedness measures neglecting
important dimensions of financial distress.
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics - Over-Indebtedness Variables
Mean S.D. Min Max Observ.
Objective Index 0.00 0.99 -1 3 688
DSR > 0.4 (=1) 0.18 0.39 0 1 688
Holds > 2 Loans (=1) 0.23 0.42 0 1 688
RDSR > 0.4 (=1) 0.40 0.49 0 1 688
Paid Late/Default (=1) 0.15 0.36 0 1 685
Subjective Index -0.02 0.98 -1 4 688
Debt Position -0.02 0.86 -1 1 688
Diff. Paying Debt (=1) 0.06 0.25 0 1 686
Sacrifice Index -0.08 1.19 -2 4 688
Note: The debt index variables are standardized. The components of the indices are given
in non-standardized real terms.
5.3 Survey Results
In the following, we relate the quantitative income forecast to the over-indebtedness
indices by running OLS regressions, estimating correlations between the respec-
tive variables.
5.3.1 Estimation Strategy
The regressions we run take the following form:
Over-Indebtedness Indexi = β0 + β1Quant. IFi + X
′
iβ2 + ϵi (5.2)
The dependent variable Over-Indebtedness Indexi represents the debt mea-
sures we apply to mirror financial distress of the household. It contains either the
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objective over-indebtedness index,17 or the subjective over-indebtedness index.18
The main variables of interests are captured in Quant. IFi. It comprises the in-
come forecast groups (quantitative income forecast) we derived in Section 5.2.3,
where the mildly negative forecast group serves as reference group. We cluster
our standard errors at the district level.19
The vector Xi controls for household and respondent characteristics that
are likely to influence household over-indebtedness: dummies for farming, self-
employment, and wage employment, monthly household income in 2016 and 2017,
the number of children between the age of 0-6, 7-10, and 11-16 years, the number
of elders and working members, total household education (sum of all educational
levels in the hh), age and age squared of the respondent, and respondent’s finan-
cial literacy score. The vector also captures the monetary loss from past shocks.
We use detailed information from 2016 and 2017 about monetary losses directly
related to a shock. We differentiate between losses from farming related shocks,
environmental shocks, economic shocks, crime shocks, and other shocks.
5.3.2 Main Results
To begin with, we relate the quantitative income forecast groups to each over-
indebtedness index (OI-Index). Then, we add the aforementioned control vari-
ables to our regression as the indices depend on other respondent and household
specific characteristics as well. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide results for the objective
and subjective OI-Indices. The tables show results for the four income forecast
groups as well as for the shock loss control variables (tables including results for
all covariates are presented in the Online Appendix). The first column in each
table represents the standardized and averaged index whereas the subsequent
columns depict results for the single non-standardized components of the indices.
Objective Over-Indebtedness We find a strong, statistically significant, rela-
tionship between positive income forecasts and the objective OI-Index. House-
holds with high future income expectations compared to their actual income are
17 Standardized average of a dummy equaling one if the debt service to income ratio is greater
than 0.4, a dummy equaling one if the remaining debt to income ratio is greater than 0.4,
a dummy regarding whether the household paid late or defaulted on a loan, and a dummy
equaling one if the household has more than two loans.
18 Standardized average of the sacrifice index, answers to questions on debt position and whether
the household has difficulties paying off debt.
19 Cameron and Miller (2015) advise to cluster at least at the primary sampling unit, which is
the district level in our case. Since this gives us a small number of clusters, as a robustness
check, we use wild cluster bootstrap. This does not change our main findings.
114 Chapter 5
more likely to be over-indebted. The over-indebtedness index increases by 0.29 -
0.31 points for positive income expectations (columns (1) and (2), Table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative −0.125 −0.017 −0.097* −0.022 −0.073 0.011 0.017 −0.015 0.001 0.010
(0.151) (0.143) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.079) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060)
Negative 0.050 0.058 −0.067 −0.054 0.075 0.100* 0.081** 0.066** −0.029 −0.037
(0.134) (0.132) (0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.058)
Neutral 0.153 0.135 0.025 0.002 0.079 0.067 0.074 0.095* −0.002 −0.010
(0.153) (0.168) (0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.333** 0.098** 0.087* 0.187** 0.210*** 0.109*** 0.133***−0.054 −0.037
(0.134) (0.136) (0.042) (0.047) (0.072) (0.069) (0.038) (0.041) (0.055) (0.060)
Farm. Shocks −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Env. Shocks 0.005*** −0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Econ. Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.016* −0.004* −0.013*** −0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.073 −1.425** 0.189*** 0.119 0.343***−0.617** 0.099***−0.016 0.245***−0.291
(0.144) (0.576) (0.048) (0.296) (0.072) (0.286) (0.019) (0.243) (0.063) (0.280)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squ. 0.014 0.099 0.025 0.046 0.025 0.125 0.007 0.044 -0.003 0.053
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered SE in parentheses.
The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the income forecast groups. Households
with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income
employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of
elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
This relationship is mainly driven by the remaining debt ratio and the dummy
on if the household paid late or defaulted on a loan. The debt service to income
ratio is only marginally significantly related to positive expectations and having
more than two loans shows no relation at all. The RDSR increases by 18.7 - 20.7
percentage points (columns (5) and (6)) and the probability that a household paid
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late or defaulted on a loan increases by 10.9 - 12.4 percentage points for households
whose expected future median income is greater than the current income (columns
(7) and (8)). Furthermore, the coefficient of the dummy indicating a DSR greater
than 0.4 increases by 8.4 - 9.8 percentage points (columns (3) and (4)) for those
households.
With regard to the other forecast groups, we do not find consistent results.
While the probability of a household defaulting or paying late slightly increases
for households with a negative forecast, overall, results for the non-positive groups
are insignificant, if not showing a negative sign. A significant and robust link to
over-indebtedness can only be found for households with positive expectations.
We account for monetary losses from various shock events, because a shock might
influence both the level of over-indebtedness and income expectations at the same
time (i.e. an expectation to return to pre-shock-level income). The results show
that higher losses are associated with higher debt levels. However, while we find
statistically significant effects, these effects are economically rather small. For
example, if an environmental shock loss increases by 1000 Thai Baht (ca. 26e in
2017), the objective OI-Index increases by 0.05 points. Even when accounting for
monetary losses induced by shocks, the relationship between positive forecasts
and over-indebtedness remains significant, confirming a robust relationship.
Concerning additional covariates, household income and the perceived social
status are significantly negatively related to household over-indebtedness. Age
is positively and age squared negatively significant, suggesting a hump-shaped
pattern in line with life-cycle-income-smoothing. Furthermore, over-indebtedness
remains largely unaffected by household composition and education.
Subjective Over-Indebtedness Our analysis of subjective over-indebtedness
reveals that the relationship to the positive income forecast group is less pro-
nounced than for the objective over-indebtedness index but still significant for
the index and all its components. As shown in Appendix D.2, the qualitative
forecast error is more strongly related to the subjective OI-Index. This hints
at two possible explanations: One, the subjective OI-Index is rather a concept
of perceived financial distress and, thus, more related to the “more subjective"
qualitative forecast error. Two, financial distress is not only determined by the
household’s true debt situation but more so by its perception. When analyzing
the control variables, we find that risk seeking and the perceived social status of
the household are highly significantly related to the subjective OI-Index, much
more so than other control variables.
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Table 5.4: Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.182 0.215* 0.040 0.036 0.065** 0.058 0.118 0.245**
(0.112) (0.122) (0.114) (0.110) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.103)
Negative 0.157 0.150 0.096 0.046 0.037 0.033 0.108 0.178
(0.135) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.154)
Neutral −0.007 0.048 −0.021 0.008 0.022 0.031 −0.098 −0.035
(0.104) (0.092) (0.096) (0.094) (0.021) (0.019) (0.128) (0.095)
Positive 0.144 0.258** 0.113 0.181** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.245*
(0.086) (0.101) (0.071) (0.084) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.122)
Farming Shocks −0.001 0.002 −0.000* −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.001 0.003** −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 −0.006 0.003 −0.005
(0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.115 −0.482 −0.064 −1.480***0.035** 0.140 −0.131 0.344
(0.082) (0.593) (0.081) (0.514) (0.016) (0.155) (0.111) (0.591)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.133 -0.002 0.094 0.002 0.073 -0.001 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered SE in
parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the in-
come forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the refer-
ence group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6, 7-10, and 11-16), financial
literacy score, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed,
main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of work-
ing members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Delving deeper into respondent characteristics, we run regressions including
the Big Five measures,20 (tables are presented in the Online Appendix). For
respondents who score high on openness and neuroticism, the subjective OI-
Index and its components are larger than for those who score low. Eventually,
shocks are similarly related to subjective over-indebtedness as they are to objec-
20 The Big Five comprise five personality traits: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism. Details on their construction are in the Online Appendix.
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tive over-indebtedness: Households experiencing an environmental shock have a
significantly higher perceived debt level.
Income Certainty Next, we investigate whether being potentially too certain
about the future income development is related to over-indebtedness. As shown
in Tables 5.5 and 5.6, there is no relation between certainty about future income
and subjective over-indebtedness, although we find that higher income certainty
is related to objective over-indebtedness. If a respondent is very certain about
the development of future household income, this is linked to an augmented over-
indebtedness index. This result is mainly driven by the debt to service ratio and
by having more than two loans (columns (2) and (5), Table 5.5).
Table 5.5: Certainty Measure - Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
Very Negative −0.017 −0.023 0.012 −0.017 0.013
(0.144) (0.050) (0.079) (0.036) (0.061)
Negative 0.047 −0.062 0.104* 0.057* −0.034
(0.129) (0.044) (0.054) (0.030) (0.057)
Neutral 0.122 −0.002 0.062 0.092* −0.013
(0.167) (0.060) (0.064) (0.051) (0.063)
Positive 0.323** 0.084 0.201*** 0.131*** −0.037
(0.140) (0.051) (0.070) (0.043) (0.061)
Certainty 0.129** 0.052** 0.046* −0.008 0.061**
(0.061) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
Constant −1.564** 0.074 −0.705** 0.064 −0.413
(0.552) (0.299) (0.284) (0.268) (0.276)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 664 661 664
Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.054 0.125 0.042 0.060
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered SE
in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the
income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the ref-
erence group. Controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16),
financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from envi-
ronmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed,
main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no.
of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status,
total hh education.
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Table 5.6: Certainty Measure - Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
Very Negative 0.220 0.049 0.057 0.247**
(0.133) (0.117) (0.041) (0.108)
Negative 0.144 0.045 0.032 0.168
(0.109) (0.108) (0.026) (0.150)
Neutral 0.043 0.010 0.030 −0.048
(0.092) (0.095) (0.019) (0.097)
Positive 0.238** 0.177* 0.035 0.227*
(0.110) (0.098) (0.023) (0.125)
Certainty 0.069 0.092 0.006 0.031
(0.086) (0.066) (0.020) (0.104)
Constant −0.673 −1.802*** 0.143 0.273
(0.651) (0.578) (0.165) (0.699)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 662 664
Adj. R-squared 0.133 0.098 0.072 0.115
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered SE
in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the
income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the ref-
erence group. Controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16),
financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from envi-
ronmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed,
main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no.
of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status,
total hh education.
Overall, we conclude, (i) that there is indeed a significant positive and ro-
bust relationship between positive quantitative income forecasts and objective as
well as subjective over-indebtedness; (ii) We are also reassured that, although
correlated to each other, subjective and objective over-indebtedness indicators
measure different dimensions of indebtedness. The “hard” objective OI-Index is
much stronger related to positive income forecasts than the subjective OI-Index;
(iii) Certainty about the household’s income development is also related to over-
indebtedness, primarily to objective over-indebtedness.
5.3.3 Robustness
Excluding Possibly Confounding Observations. Before eliciting the subjective
expected income of respondents, we ask two questions testing the understanding
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of the concept of probability. We re-run the analysis including only those respon-
dents who do not violate the laws of probability and examine whether our main
results hold. Results are presented in Tables D.1.2 and D.1.3 in the Appendix.
The coefficients for this sub-sample stay highly significant and almost all coef-
ficients increase in size emphasizing the link between a positive income forecast
and objective over-indebtedness. In order to verify that respondents have an ac-
tual understanding of their household’s finances, we again re-run the regressions,
including only those individuals who are in charge of the household’s financial
decisions either alone or together with someone else (see Appendix Tables D.1.4
and D.1.5). Overall, the results stay virtually unchanged with regard to the
significance of our coefficients of interest. Point estimates change slightly.
Interacting the Income Forecast with Personality Traits. We do not claim to
show a causal effect because - among other reasons - we acknowledge that the
relation between over-indebtedness and positive income expectations may also
work in the reverse. For example, if people are indebted, they might have a great
bias regarding future expected income as they plan to work harder in the future
to pay down their debt. We expect such people to exhibit a high level of consci-
entiousness, the personality marker describing achievement oriented (McClelland
et al., 1953), hard-working, effective, and dutiful characters (Barrick and Mount,
1991). Hence, we interact our income forecast measure with this character trait,
expecting to find significant effects for conscientious people. Results for the ag-
gregated indices as dependent variables are presented in Appendix Table D.1.6.
The interaction is not significant for the positive income forecast and any of the
OI-Indices. This counteracts the assumption that the achieving respondents with
distorted expectations drive the relationship between our positive income forecast
and debt status.
Exchanging the Forecast Groups with One Single Indicator. We apply a coarser
indicator measuring positive future income expectations to counteract the possi-
ble criticism that our results hinge on the choice of the reference category with
respect to our income forecast groups. In lieu of the five quantitative income
forecast groups, we define an indicator variable to turn one if the relative differ-
ence between expected future and actual income is greater than zero. Results for
the objective and subjective over-indebtedness indices as well as for the certainty
measure are presented in Appendix Tables D.1.7, D.1.8, D.1.9, and D.1.10. Prob-
ably due to the broader category that we use as the main explanatory variable,
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point estimates gain in significance, but are numerically a little smaller when
compared to the positive income forecast group. This actually supports our find-
ing that it is exactly those respondents with high expectations about their future
income who are also relatively more indebted. Generally, this robustness check
confirms that our results remain significant and similar in size with respect to
the objective and subjective over-indebtedness indicators when using a broader
income expectation indicator. Hence, it is not the choice of the reference group
that drives our results.21
5.4 The Experiment
The preceding section shows that high expectations and over-indebtedness are
strongly related to each other in our rural Thai population, even when controlling
for important socio-economic characteristics and shocks. However, methodologi-
cally, the implemented regression analysis only represents correlations. Further-
more, we are specifically interested whether overconfidence, a systematic behav-
ioral bias that might be responsible for having too high expectations in the first
place, can actually cause overspending and overborrowing. In what follows, we
analyze if overconfidence is one potential cause why households in our sample
spend more than they can actually afford.
Theoretically, upward biased expectations can arise for two reasons; either
an individual is overly optimistic or overly confident. We follow Heger and Pa-
pageorge (2018) in defining overoptimism as the tendency to overestimate the
probability of preferred outcomes and overconfidence as the tendency to overes-
timate one’s own performance. We acknowledge that in our rural, agricultural
setting, overoptimism might occur as frequently if not more than overconfidence.
Since agricultural activities and the exposure to weather shocks are rather ho-
mogeneous in our sample and less driven by personal abilities, a more positive
view on the future might originate from an optimistic view on the world in gen-
eral. Still, there is scope for overconfidence as the adoption of new agricultural
technologies and crops, the working pace (that can influence agricultural output)
and the bargaining power in selling crops is strongly dependent on beliefs about
individual performance and might lead to positive income expectations as well.
For our experiment, we concentrate on overconfidence because numerous studies
21 Additionally, we also used different reference groups in the first place and our regression
results remain similar. Results are available upon request.
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show that overconfidence is related to important life and financial decisions, while
overoptimism is less so.22
5.4.1 Experimental Design
As final part of the survey, we play a “market game” in which respondents can
buy different kinds of goods for a discounted price with money they earn in the
experiment. They can buy packs of coffee, chips, dried mango, or detergent for
10 THB (ca. 0.25e) each instead of the 20 THB list price.23 Each participant
receives an endowment of 40 THB. Additional money can be earned by answer-
ing questions in a trivia game. Earnings depend on how many questions the
participant answers correctly in comparison to the other participants. We rank
them from 1-10, where rank ten corresponds to answering the most questions
correctly and rank one to answering the least number of questions correctly.24
People ranked 1-4 do not earn anything on top of their endowment, those ranked
5-6 earn 10 THB, those ranked 7-8 20 THB, and those ranked 9-10 earn 40 THB
additionally. Thus, participants can earn up to 80 THB and can buy at most
eight goods.
We make expectations a crucial factor in the game by requiring participants
to decide how much and what to buy before they take the pay-off relevant quiz,
i.e. before they know their final payoff. We divide participants in two treatment
groups; one group faces a “hard” quiz and the other one an “easy” trivia quiz. To
convey the difficulty of each quiz and to exogenously vary expectations about rel-
ative performance, participants do a test quiz with seven questions upfront where
difficulty again depends on treatment. Based on the test quiz, participants infer
22 For example, Camerer and Lovallo (1999), who experimentally test the effect of overconfi-
dence on entrepreneurial decision-making (this relationship is a well-researched field of study),
conclude that excess entry in a market game is strongly related to overconfidence and not to
overoptimism.
23 At least for the bag of chips, it is common knowledge that they usually cost 20 THB as, for
a long time, they had the price printed on their front. To further convince participants that
the products are truly discounted, we attached “20 THB” price tags to each product.
24 In the field, participants from the first villages were ranked against participants from our
pilot villages and our interviewers who also took the quizzes. For later villages, we replaced
our interviewer data with data from the previous villages and told participants that they are
ranked against ten persons who live in a village similar to theirs. For the final analysis, we
use all the observations to create a ranking. In each treatment, we have two accumulation
points in the number of correctly answered questions that are next to each other and around
the mean. We set these two points as rank five and six. Each one point deviation in correctly
answered question then constitutes a one point deviation in rank (e.g. if rank five means nine
questions answered correctly, rank four means eight questions answered correctly). Since
there are more questions than possible ranks, we have some bunching of correctly answered
questions around rank one and rank ten, the boundaries of the ranking.
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how good they will be in the pay-off relevant main quiz and form expectations
about the performance of the others and, thereby, their relative rank. They are
ranked within each treatment group and they are told that everybody they are
ranked against took the exact the same quiz. With this design, we can exploit
the so-called hard-easy gap analogous to Dargnies et al. (2019) and very similar
to Grohmann et al. (2019). Much research finds that people tend to overplace
themselves in easy tasks and to underplace themselves in hard tasks (for exam-
ple Merkle and Weber, 2011; Hartwig and Dunlosky, 2014; Benoit et al., 2015).
Over-(under-)placing is a form of over-(under-)confidence in which individuals
over-(under-)estimate their relative performance in comparison to others. Thus,
by assigning participants to two different treatments, we exogenously vary their
expectations through varying self-confidence (see Figure 5.5).25 We subsequently
measure confidence as the difference between expected rank and actual rank:













Figure 5.5: Experimental Flow
Except for the difference in difficulty, the procedure is the same for every par-
ticipant: If participants agree to play the game, the interviewer prepares the set-
up and starts reading the instructions. The instructions include comprehension
questions to test whether participants understand how their rank is determined
and how much they can earn. If participants do not answer these questions cor-
rectly, the interviewer does not continue with the instructions.26 After they have
finished the instructions, the participants start answering the test quiz, which
has seven trivia questions. They have five minutes to answer all the questions.
25 The exogenous variation is one reason why we do not include this measure for self-confidence
in our survey regressions as a measure for expectation bias. Another reason is that self-
confidence is domain dependent.
26 Still, there are participants who had serious difficulties in understanding the game such that
we exclude them from the main analysis
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For each question, four possible answers are given. When the time is up or par-
ticipants have finished answering, they receive a decision sheet. On the decision
sheet, they first have to write down the rank and the earnings they expect to
reach in the following main quiz. Then, they must indicate their buying decision
based on their expected earnings. Afterwards, participants continue with the
main quiz where they have to answer 15 questions in ten minutes. Following the
quiz, there are three debriefing questions including a question on the expected
rank after the second quiz has actually taken place (such that we can check for
belief updating). Finally, the interviewer calculates the rank and earnings, then
hands over the products and money, if applicable.
In most cases, participants could read, write, and answer the quizzes on their
own. Sometimes, people, in particular the elderly, needed assistance in reading
and writing, which was provided by the interviewer. The supplemental material
for the experiment is found in the Online Appendix in English (for the experiment
everything was translated to Thai).
Rational Decisions
If participants want to buy more than they can afford, including their endowment,
their consumption has to be restricted. They receive at most as many goods as
they can buy with their earnings and nothing beyond that amount. Participants
are aware of this fact.
We implicitly assume that expectations influence buying decisions. If this
does not hold, the aforementioned design feature seriously distorts our results
as follows. If it was the case that “rational” participants strictly prefer goods
over money because, for example, they are cheaper than list price and can be
stockpiled, expectations would become meaningless for the consumption decision.
Indicating to buy eight goods is weakly dominating any other number of goods for
this kind of participants, since they clearly prefer goods over money independent
of the budget.27
Eventually about 4% of our participants decided to buy eight goods even
though they expect to earn less. An additional 3% wanted to buy more than
they expected to earn but less than eight goods. In our main analysis, these
observations are excluded because i) we already know that expectations do not
impact consumption in this setting for them and ii) they could artificially inflate
27 If the participant expects less than 80 THB, there is a potential loss in indicating to buy
less than eight goods because the prediction might be underconfident. However, given our
setting, there is no loss if she indicates buying eight goods but actual earnings are less than
80 THB.
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our results. We present additional analyses on this sub-sample in the Appendix
Section “The Rationals” (5.5) and discuss whether they truly acted in a rational
way or rather had difficulties understanding the game.
For the other 93%, we still assume that respondents generally prefer a bundle
of products and cash. The exact composition depends on individual preferences
but also expected earnings. Thus, being overconfident (or underconfident) cre-
ates a distortion in utility. Following these reflections, we derive the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: On average, individuals in the easy treatment will buy more
than individuals in the hard treatment.
Hypothesis 2: A great level of overconfidence will lead to excessive spending.
Hypothesis 1 is implied by the finding on the hard-easy gap. Hypothesis
2 follows from the fact that we define respondents to be overconfident if their
expected rank is higher than their actual rank, which implies that they earn less
than expected. Since we cannot allow respondents to pay from personal money
if experimental money is insufficient, restricting consumption in some cases is
necessary. Therefore, people cannot accumulate debt. Still, we try to mimic real
life financial decision making with this design, especially the fact that sometimes
(and optimally) consumption decisions must be made before income is realized.
In that sense, participants still have to take a loan, although only for a short
time and without serious consequences, if they want to consume. Further, if
they have biased beliefs, they might end up with a consumption bundle that
is sub-optimal, thus overborrowing. The process can also be seen as a form of
household budgeting; however, we prefer the term overborrowing as participants
have to plan with money they do not have in the moment of planning. In real life
those who overborrow accumulate more debt than optimal, perhaps more than
they are able to repay.
5.4.2 Experimental Results
Overall, 604 respondents participated in the game. Since participation is self-
selected, participants and non-participants are compared in Table D.3.1 in the
Appendix. As can be seen, participants and non-participants differ significantly in
some variables.28 In all these variables, the difference is in the expected direction:
female, older, less occupied, less educated, financial illiterate and less numerate,
28 A complete list of all variables and their explanation is provided in the Online Appendix.
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and more financial risk averse respondents are less likely to participate in the
game. Several of these variables are significantly correlated with each other.
Running a simple regression on the likelihood to participate, we find that some of
these variables are insignificant and that the time of day is one of the strongest
predictors of game participation (see D.3.2). Since the time of day at which we
visited households for the interviews is mostly exogenous,29 self-selection into the
game is less pronounced than initially expected.
Out of the 604, seven observations are excluded because either treatments for
them are mixed up, personal information is missing, or a third person helped
them answer the questions. We exclude 44 observations that are also excluded
from the survey regression analysis because they are outliers in income or the
debt service to income ratio (see Section 5.2.1).30 Additionally, 84 observations
are excluded because it can be inferred from the data that comprehension was
insufficient31 or because they want to buy more than they expect to earn in total
(see previous Sub-Section on these special cases). Those 84 cases differ only in
their number of children between 7-10 years.
In Table 5.7 characteristics of the remaining 471 participants are compared
across treatments. The significantly unequal number of participants per treat-
ment is due to fact that we slightly over-sampled the easy treatment. Results
from previous studies suggest that the effect of easy tasks on self-confidence is
generally stronger than the effect of hard tasks (see for example Dargnies et al.,
2019). The characteristics depicted here might be important for the general level
of self-confidence and the willingness to buy products. Given the sample size and
the number of variables analyzed, randomizing participants into the treatments
worked well; the two groups only significantly differ with regard to their health
status, their monthly household income, and their (objective) over-indebtedness
index. Controlling for these variables leaves our results virtually unchanged and
a f-test on joint orthogonality finds that controls do not jointly determine the
treatment group.
29 We interviewed households according to a schedule we designed together with our interview
team manager, which tried to minimize travel distances for each interview team. Hence, this
schedule was exogenous to individual household characteristics, except for the village that
the household resides in. However, a few houses were empty the first time we visited them
and we had to reschedule another date with the household itself.
30 The results are robust to this exclusion.
31 For example, one participant writes that he expects to earn 30 Baht from the game, which
is, however, not an possible option. Another one wants to buy 35 products although the
maximum affordable number is eight.
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Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Full Sample Hard Treatment Easy Treatment Difference
Sex 1.64 1.60 1.67 −0.07
Age 56.16 55.23 56.93 −1.70
Relation to HH Head 1.70 1.69 1.71 −0.02
Marital Status 2.13 2.09 2.16 −0.07
Main Occupation 4.79 4.29 5.20 −0.90
Years of Schooling 5.92 6.08 5.79 0.28
Children (0-6 years) 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.01
Numeracy 2.14 2.09 2.19 −0.10
Health Status 1.38 1.32 1.43 −0.11∗∗
BMI 23.58 23.25 23.86 −0.61
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.55 1.59 −0.03
Self Control 20.94 21.19 20.75 0.44
Risk Taking 4.02 3.96 4.07 −0.12
Fin. Risk Taking 4.06 3.99 4.12 −0.13
FL-Score 5.66 5.55 5.75 −0.20
Monthly Inc. 2017 18653.06 20802.79 16893.44 3909.35∗∗
Obj. OI-Index 0.01 −0.09 0.09 −0.18∗∗
Subj. OI-Index −0.04 −0.03 −0.06 0.03
Morning 0.53 0.51 0.54 −0.03
Midday 0.27 0.26 0.28 −0.02
Read Alone 1.44 1.44 1.44 −0.00
Difficulties in Game 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.01
Observations 471 212 259 471
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Shift in Beliefs
On average, participants answered 9.07 out of 15 trivia questions correctly in
the easy treatment and 5.09 out of 15 in the hard treatment. Thus, it can be
assumed that, for our sample, the easy treatment is truly “easier” than the hard
treatment. The average expected rank in the hard treatment is 6.89 whereas the
average expected rank in the easy treatment is 7.22. In Figure 5.6 the cumulative
distribution functions of the expected ranks for both treatments are plotted. It
seems that there is only a small shift in beliefs, since the distributions are still
almost overlapping.32 Indeed, if we compare the distributions of the “second”
expectations that are elicited after respondents actually took the main quiz, we
32 We focus on the expected rank in our analysis but everything holds analogously for expected
earnings.
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find a much larger shift (see Appendix Figure D.3.1). Thus, either our test quizzes
are not as hard or easy as the main quizzes and, therefore, the shift in first beliefs
is smaller or participants have such strong beliefs that they only gradually update
their beliefs. Still, the distributions of first beliefs are significantly different from
each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sided p=0.056; Wilcoxon rank-sum two-
sided p=0.041). The t-test for mean expectations is significant at the 5% level
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Figure 5.6: Cumulative Density Distribution of Expected Rank by Treatment
The difference in self-confidence is larger than the difference in expected rank
(see Figure 5.7). This might be driven by our ranking procedure or by the fact
that the easy quiz is not a perfect shift of the hard quiz with respect to the number
of questions answered correctly. In any case, this suggests that our manipulation


















−10 −5 0 5 10
Predicted Rank
Hard Easy













−9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Expected Rank − Actual Rank
Figure 5.8: Histogram Self-Confidence
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As seen in Figure 5.8, across both treatments, the mean and median respon-
dents are slightly overconfident (even in the hard treatment). The whole distri-
bution is a little bit skewed to the left but still resembles a normal distribution.
Over 14% of the sample have perfectly accurate beliefs and have a self-confidence
of “0.” Small deviations from 0 could be considered accurate as well because
they could present a form of Bayesian updating.33 Still, a substantial fraction of
participants seems to be tremendously overconfident.
Buying Decision
We find a significant positive correlation between expected rank (earnings) and
the number of goods participants want to buy. However, there is no significant












































Figure 5.9: Mean Expected Rank (left) and Consumption (right) by Treatment
If we run regressions where we can control for the variables that are unbalanced
across treatments, the picture stays the same: the treatment is positively related
to the expected rank, the expected rank is positively related to the desired amount
of goods, but the treatment is not related to the amount of goods (see Table 5.8).
A similar pattern emerges if we look explicitly at spending behavior (see Table
5.9). We distinguish overborrowing, meaning buying more than actual earnings
including endowment can pay for, from overspending, meaning buying more than
actual game earnings can pay for, but the spending can still be paid with the
endowment. The expected rank as well as confidence have a significant effect on
both variables, but treatment does not.34
33 On this discussion, see Merkle and Weber (2011).
34 The level of significance is higher not lower when we exclude possibly “rational” participants
who want to buy more than they expect to earn in total.
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Table 5.8: Consumption Decision
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.377** −0.133 −0.189
(0.175) (0.173) (0.171)
Exp. Rank 0.144*** 0.149***
(0.046) (0.046)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank cor-
responds to a higher expected performance. Controls: Health Status, Monthly HH income
and Objective OI-Index.
Table 5.9: Overborrowing and Overspending
Overconfidence Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.217*** 0.010 −0.007 −0.034
(0.284) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045)
Overconfidence 0.014*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; Controls: Health Status,
Monthly HH income and Objective OI-Index.
Summarized, our treatments shifted expectations in hypothesized directions;
expectations are positively related to spending behavior, but the treatment has
no impact on the latter. Therefore, we cannot claim that there is a causal link
between expectations and overborrowing in our experiment.
5.4.3 Confounding Factors
The previous findings are robust to various restrictions. For example, they are not
driven by participants who are very old or have mild comprehension difficulties
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(we already excluded those with large difficulties in the main analysis). It is
also not the case that the treatments only affect expected ranks but not expected
earnings.35 This suggests that there are confounding factors or “noise” interfering
with our treatments. We run further analyses to rule out that the treatments
affected factors other than expectations:
Frustration and Gratification. One of the most likely confounds could be that
participants in the hard treatment feel frustrated because of the difficult questions
and want to treat themselves with “shopping.” In contrast, some others might be
proud of mastering such a hard quiz and also want to reward themselves. Both
motives should lead to the result that, specifically, participants with extreme ex-
pectations behave differently across treatments. Participants who are frustrated
should rank themselves rather low whereas participants that are proud should
rank themselves rather high. Subsequently, the buying behavior of participants
with the same expected rank across treatments should be significantly different
for the lowest and highest ranks. However, the only (marginally) significant dif-
ference we can detect is for the five participants who expected to reach rank two:
here, participants in the hard treatment want to buy more than participants in
the easy treatment. Excluding these observations does not change our results.
For all other ranks, participants in both treatments exhibit the same spending
pattern. This finding does not favor frustration and gratification as being possible
confounding factors.
Temptation. Another possibility is that participants in the hard treatment
are more susceptible to temptation goods. They have to exercise more cognitive
effort, which decreases their self-control, so-called “ego depletion” (see, for exam-
ple, Hagger et al., 2010). Running separate regressions on each product, we find
a significantly different treatment effect only for dried mango. Still, self-control
(measured with the scale from Tangney et al., 2004) and BMI do not have sig-
nificant effects on buying mango, which opposes the ego depletion interpretation.
We also do not find evidence that frustrated (more depleted) participants are
more likely to buy mango. Furthermore, detergent is the most popular product
and the share of detergent in all goods desired is not different across treatments,
whereas mango is the least popular. Detergent is the one product we would
expect to be least related to self-control issues. Summarized, we do not find con-
35 This could happen if there is a piecewise treatment effect (shifting expectations only within
the same earnings category) because earnings are only piecewise increasing in ranks and not
equidistant.
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vincing evidence that persons in the hard treatment are more likely to give in to
temptation.
Based on these tests, we argue that we can rule out the most probable factors
interfering with our treatment. We believe that the reason we do not find a
treatment effect on spending and borrowing is that the shift in beliefs was not
strong enough to eventually be reflected in spending. We find additional evidence
for this proposition when employing IV estimation, where we instrument expected
rank with treatment. Several tests indicate that treatment is a weak instrument
for expected rank.
5.4.4 Behavior in the Lab and in Real Life
A supplementary result we find worth mentioning is that being over-indebted in
“real life” is actually related to spending behavior in our experiment (see Table
5.10). Those respondents who have problems controlling their spending in real
life are also those who spend less carefully in the game. Eventually, we see this
as evidence that our experiment, although highly artificial, still captures aspects
of real life behavior.
Table 5.10: Overborrowing in the Game and in Real Life
No. Goods Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obj. OI-Index −0.000 −0.001 0.050**
(0.077) (0.008) (0.021)
Subj. OI-Index 0.105 −0.005 0.043*
(0.078) (0.008) (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Controlled for confidence as defined in Equation 5.3.
We can only speculate why the well-established hard-easy gap is so small in
our setting. Consulting our interviewers, we have no reason to believe that par-
ticipants did not perceive the test quizzes as hard or easy when they should.
Several other studies find larger shifts in beliefs, although participants had less
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exposure to manipulation.36 The rural Thai population may have more persis-
tent beliefs than WEIRD populations. This makes changing these beliefs more
difficult. Given the tremendous level of overconfidence we find in the lab, this cir-
cumstance might not be beneficial for our participants. It relates to our regression
result that being too certain about future income is related to over-indebtedness.
“Sticky,” biased expectations, bear implications for policy making and must be
taken into account when measures to reduce over-indebtedness are designed.
5.5 Conclusion
Over-indebtedness can pose a serious threat to households’ welfare and the finan-
cial stability of a country, especially in emerging markets. However, the deter-
minants underlying over-indebtedness globally are, so far, not well understood.
Theoretically, as modelled in various permanent income hypotheses, higher in-
come expectations should lead to a higher level of borrowing.
In this study, we analyze the relationship between high income expectations
and over-indebtedness using data from an extensive household survey and a lab-
in-the-field experiment. Low levels of financial knowledge and high income un-
certainty demand for explicit research in emerging countries because relying on
results for Western populations is insufficient. Our sample belongs to a panel
survey of relatively poor and rural households in Thailand. Indeed, we can con-
firm a low level of financial literacy in several dimensions and find substantial
uncertainty in income expectations for our sample. While over-indebtedness is
increasingly recognized as a growing problem in Thailand, our study sheds light
on one potential driver.
In our regression analysis, we find a strong and robust positive relationship
between high expectations concerning future income and over-indebtedness con-
trolling for various household characteristics and shocks. We think this is a sign
that these expectations are actually too high for some households. This find-
ing holds for various measures of over-indebtedness. They are stronger for ob-
jective measures, if we use a quantitative elicitation method for positive income
expectations based on probabilistic expectations and stronger for subjective over-
indebtedness, if we use a qualitative, more subjective forecast error. In any case,
they are always significant. The results reflect that subjective over-indebtedness
indicators are likely to be influenced more heavily by personal perceptions on
36 For example, Grohmann et al. (2019) only use four questions they frame as “example ques-
tions” and find larger treatment effects on expectations.
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the household’s financial situation as well as by respondents’ personality traits
and that objective and subjective measures capture different dimensions of over-
indebtedness. Eventually, higher certainty about the future household income
development is also related to more household over-indebtedness, which might be
the case because being too certain is not optimal given the highly uncertain envi-
ronment. The results are robust to a diverse set of different sample specifications
and we do not find evidence of reverse causality issues.
We attempt to establish a causal relationship between overconfidence as a
form of biased expectation and overborrowing in our experiment by exogenously
biasing self-confidence via the so-called hard-easy gap. Thereby, we change ex-
pectations about the future payout in the game. Our results show that, in the
experiment, overconfidence is related to more spending and overborrowing, but
we cannot claim causality. The most probable reason why our treatments do not
affect spending behavior are too “sticky” beliefs. This also suggests that rural
households are indeed too certain about their income expectations. Interestingly,
we find that overspending in the experiment is related to overspending in real
life, which confirms that the artificial experiment still captures real life behavior.
As we will never know the true income generating process, we cannot know
whether the expectations of our respondents are systematically biased or posi-
tive for other reasons. A systematic overestimation of future income would have
much more devastating effects than a random, one-shot, inaccurate guess. Nev-
ertheless, we find reassuring evidence that even one-time high expectations are
positively related to household over-indebtedness, thus pushing households into
severe poverty. One of the potential channels through which high expectations
are related to over-indebtedness is being too certain about own expectations in
the highly uncertain environment that rural households in emerging markets are
living in. Given the supplemental evidence for sticky beliefs from our experiment,
to change beliefs or their certainty seems to be challenging. More appropriate
policy measures might reduce vulnerability and uncertainty with the expansion
of assistance and insurance schemes, especially for households engaged in agri-
culture.
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Material A.2.1: Introductory Statement for the Games Section of the Survey
Material A.2.2: Instructions for Coupled Lotteries in the Survey
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Material A.2.3: Decision Sheets for Respondent and Neighbor
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Material A.2.4: Instructions for Dictator Game in the Lab
[Translation:] Decision 1
The computer will match you to a random person in this room and randomly assign you to the
roles of person A or B. The matching and assignment of roles will be kept anonymous.
The setup: Person A will be asked to distribute 10e between herself/himself and person B.
Each amount between 0 and 10e is possible.
You have to decide now as person A how much of these 10e you want to keep. The re-
maining amount is paid to person B.
Please note that even though you make the decision as person A now, it might happen that the
computer assigns you the role of person B:
If you were assigned the role of person A, you will receive the amount that you assigned to
person A and the other person in the room who is matched to you receives the amount you
assigned to person B.
If you were assigned the role of person B, you will receive the amount that the other per-
son in the room who is matched to you assigned to person B.
How much do you want to keep as person A?
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Material A.2.5: Instructions for Coupled Lotteries in the Lab
[Translation:] Coupling of Payoffs
Again, the computer will match you to a random person in this room and randomly assign you
to the roles of person A or B. Please note that this matching is a completely new (and random)
matching. Matching and assignment are again anonymous.
The setup: A virtual coin flip will decide whether you will gain 10e or nothing. This means, you
have a 50:50 chance to win 10e. Person B is in the same situation. Both of you have to decide
now whether you take the chance to win together or alone. “Together” means a single coin flip
will decide for both of you if EACH of you will win 10e or nothing respectively. “Alone” means
that two independent coin flips will decide for each of you separately whether you will win 10e
or nothing.
Please note that the roles of person A and B are exactly the same here.
If you decide unanimously, this decision will be implemented.
If you decide differently, there will be a third coin flip deciding whether it will be played
alone or together.
Do you want to play alone or together with person B?
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Material A.2.6: Multiple Price List for Gains - Lab Experiment
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Material A.2.7: Questionnaire - Lab Experiment
What is your sex? 
 Male 
 Female 
What is your age?  
       ___ years 
What is your body-height? 
       ___ cm 
What is your body-weight? 
       ___ kg 
 
Are you a person who rather avoids risks or are you rather willing to take risks? 
 Mostly avoid risks 
 Rather avoid risks 
 Rather willing to take risks 
 Mostly willing to take risks 
 
Do you frequently take advice from other students, if you have to make decisions regarding your studies? 
 Yes 
 No 
How many persons are so close to you that you can count on them if you are in serious trouble (e.g. illness, 
lovesickness, stress)? 
 No one 
 1 or 2 
 3 - 5 
 6 or more 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful when dealing 
with people? 
 Most people can be trusted 
 You can’t be too careful when dealing with people 
 






How happy are you with your life in general? 
 Very unhappy 
 Rather unhappy 
 Rather happy 
 Very happy 
How much money do you have available each month in comparison to other students? 
 Much less 
 A little bit less 
 About the same 
 A little bit more 
 Much more 
 
And now a question about your donations. We understand donations here as giving money for social, church, 
cultural, community, and charitable aims, without receiving any direct compensation in return. These donations 
can be large sums of money but also smaller sums, for example, the change one puts into a collection box. We also 
count church offerings. Did you donate money last year, in 2017 – not counting membership fees? 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes: How high was the total sum of money that you donated last year? 
       ___ Euro 
 
Suppose you put 100€ into your savings account. The interest rate is 2% per year and you leave this money on your 
account for 5 years. What do you think: how much money would be in the account after 5 years? 
 More than 102€ 
 Exactly 102€ 
 Less than 102€ 
 Don’t know 
Suppose the interest rate on your savings account is 1% per year, and the inflation rate per year is 2%. What do 
you think: after 1 year, can you buy the same, more or less than today? 
 More 
 Exactly the same 
 Less 
 Don’t know 
Is the following statement true or false?  
“Buying a company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund. “ 
 True 
 False 
 Don’t know 
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A.3 Description of Independent Variables
Male Sex of respondent, 0=Female, 1=Male
Age Age of respondent in years
Years of Schooling Years respondent went to school
Ann. Consumption
per Cap. (log)
Log annual consumption per capita in THB
Ann. Income per
Capita
Annual household income in 2013 USD
Assets Value Total value of all durable goods in the household in THB
Risk Taking, MPL Risk preference measured via Multiple price list method, variable
indicates the switching row from the lottery to the safe amount,
rows from “1”-“21(Never)”. The lottery gives 300 THB with 50%
chance and 0 THB with 50% chance, the safe amount increases
gradually from 0 to 190 THB.
General Risk Taking Answer to “Are you generally a person who is willing to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risk?”, from 0-“Fully unwilling to
take risks” to 10-“Fully willing to take risks”
Hypothetical
Investment
Amount of money respondents would invest if they would win
100,000 THB and the chance is 50% that the investment is doubled
and 50% that it is halved
Comparing with
Neighbors
Dummy for neighbors being the main reference group respondents
compare their standard of living with




Dummy whether respondents take agricultural advice from neigh-
bors/relatives
Trust in Village Believe in trustworthiness of other persons in the own village from
1-“Trust them not at all”to 4-“Trust them a lot”
158 Appendix A
Numeracy Counts the number of right answers to following questions:
1 What is 45 + 72?
2 You have 4 friends and you want to give each friend 4 sweets. How
many sweets do you need?
3 What is 5% of 200?
4 You want to buy a bag of rice that costs 270 Baht, but you only
have one 1000 Baht note. How much change will you get back?
5 In a sale, a shop is selling all items at half price. Before the sale,
a mattress costs 3000 Baht. How much will the mattress cost in
the sale?
6 A second-hand motorbike dealer is selling a motorbike for 12000
Baht. His is two thirds of what a new motorbike costs new. How
much did the new motorbike cost?
Financial Literacy Counts the number of right answers to following questions:
Interest Rates If today you borrow 10,000 THB, at an interest rate of 2% per
month, after 3 months how much do you owe totally (principle +
interest)?
Less than 10,200 THB
More than 10,200 THB
Exactly 10,200 THB
Inflation If you have 10,000 THB in an account, the interest rate on the
account is 10% per year, and during this time, the price of goods
and services rises by 12% per year, after one year you can buy:
Less than you can buy today
More than you can buy today
Exactly the same as today
Expected Utility For the same amount of money, a person can enter either one
these two lotteries. Lottery A pays a prize of 2,000 THB, and
the chance of winning is 5%. Lottery B pays a prize of 100 THB,




Two lotteries pay the same expected amount
Loan Conditions Suppose you need to borrow 50,000 THB. Two people offer you
two different loans, the first loan you have to pay back 60,000 THB
in one month, with the second loan you have to pay back 50,000




Number of persons living in the household for most time of the
year
Self-Employed Dummy whether the household head is self-employed including
being engaged in agriculture
HH better off
in 5 years
Answer to “Do you think your household will be better off in 5
years?”, from 1-“Much better off” to 5-“Much worse off”
Number
Anticipated Risks
Number of household risks a household head thinks will occur in




Number of household risks a household head thinks will occur in
the next 5 years that are related to weather
Land Size Size of the area used for cultivating crops in Rai (1600 sq m)
Number of
Tractors
Number of tractors in the household
Number of
Waterpumps
Number of waterpumps in the household
Advice from
Classmate
Dummy whether participants take study advice from classmates
Dictator Keeping Amount of that participant wants to keep in the dictator game.
Can take values between 0 and 10(e).
Relative Income How much disposable money per month participants think they
have in comparison to other students on a scale from 1-“Much
less” to 5-“Much more”
Compare
Performance
Dummy whether participants often compare their attributes and
performance with other persons
Happiness How happy participants are in their lives from 1-“Very unhappy”
to 4-“Very happy”
Appendix B to accompany Chapter 3
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B.1 Susceptibility to Social Comparison
In the following subsections, we present all the hypotheses as stated in our pre-analysis plan,
including those on which personality characteristics are more or less susceptible to social com-
parison effects. Subsequently, we discuss the results on the personality types.
B.1.1 Hypotheses
To answer our main research question, we look at the difference in the amount and the
probability of loans taken between those in the private treatment and those in the other two
treatments. Thus, these variables focus on the differences between the amount that someone
should have spent according to standard economic predictions and the amount that someone
actually spends. Furthermore, we look at within subject differences in what participants re-
ported to be their quality preference for the pen in our online survey and what they actually
buy during the experiment. To assess which personalities are more susceptible to social com-
parison effects, we interact the personality traits with our treatments. Finally, we also analyze
the amount of effort exerted in the slider task to investigate who is willing to work more in the
future to actually avoid financial distress because of socially contingent consumption.
Question 1: “Are people willing to pay out of their future income because of social im-
age/status concerns?”
We expect that at least some people are willing to do so. As previously explained, buying
a low quality pen is a credible signal for being a “lower” cognitive ability type, as it can be
directly linked to worse performance in the test of intelligence. Since we assume that cognitive
ability is a desirable trait for our student sample, for some persons the additional benefit of
being perceived as having higher cognitive ability is large enough to offset the potential costs of
borrowing or of “working more” (see hypothesis 1a). In our experiment, participants can borrow
money without interest, reducing potential costs of borrowing to general opportunity costs of
spending more instead of keeping money. Some participants in the public treatment are, thus,
willing to use their future income to buy a higher quality pen than they can afford in order
to hide their true performance. Since social image concerns can only arise when individual
decisions are made publicly, these concerns neither arise in the private nor the information
treatment.
Hypothesis 1: “Participants in the public treatment are more likely to take out a loan and
take out a higher loan amount to buy a higher quality pen than participants in the private
treatment.”
Participants in the public treatment who take out a loan, because they want to convey a
certain type, end up with less money after the shopping round than their control treatment
counterparts who cannot engage in socially contingent consumption. Assuming only weak
fatigue, the marginal rate of substitution of not exerting effort in the slider task for money
should be larger for those subjects, as they have a debt on their accounts. Differently speaking,
persons who take out a loan might be willing to work more because they want to settle their
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debts.1 Determining if individuals with a loan exert more effort is interesting because, in real
life, higher consumption could be financed by debt or by working more (e.g. Neumark and
Postlewaite, 1998; Bowles and Park, 2005). Hence, some of our participants could already have
internalized working more in the slider task to take out a higher loan.
Hypothesis 1a: “Participants in the public treatment will exert more effort in the slider task
than participants in the private treatment, because they took out a higher loan before.”
Question 2: “Can the peer effect on visible consumption mostly linked to social image/status
concerns partly be explained by peer information?”
A different explanation why people adjust their consumption to peers is that they are intrin-
sically motivated or because they receive information about the usefulness/quality of a product.
Intrinsic motivation could be a form of self-image concern, a desire to imitate or a desire to
conform to others. Pure information about the quality is especially important if the individual
is not familiar with the product. To analyze whether the effect of peer information is compa-
rable to that of social image concerns, we designed the information treatment in such a way
that only new information but no social image concerns can arise.2 Our prediction is that peer
information only has a small effect on the decisions in our setting. The pens we use are trivial
goods and quality differences are comparatively small, which is why we expect the intrinsic and
informational gain to be small. However, we acknowledge that this is not necessarily true for
goods that are usually considered in field studies on conspicuous consumption, e.g. cars, travel
destinations, restaurant visits, and so forth. In this sense, our treatment for information effects
lies at the lower bound. Finding significant results would possibly imply that a substantial
share of visible consumption is actually not driven by conspicuous consumption.
Hypothesis 2: “Participants in the information treatment will take out a higher loan than
participants in the private treatment, but a smaller loan than participants in the public treat-
ment.”
Hypothesis 2a: “Participants in the information treatment will exert more effort in the slider
task than participants in the private treatment, but less than participants in the public treat-
ment.”
Question 3: “Are there certain types of personality that correlate with larger socially contin-
gent consumption?”
Since cognitive reflection is related to standard IQ measures, we expect small effects in our set-
ting. Participants with high cognitive reflection are expected to perform well in our intelligence
task and, therefore, can buy high quality pens without needing to take out a loan. This reduces
1 An alternative explanation would be that these persons do not want to lose money they
already have in their mental accounts. They do not like the feeling of creating a debt that
eventually will be deducted from their participation fee, which is already part of their en-
dowment.
2 Given our experimental design, observations in the information treatment within a session
are path dependent. We try to control for this issue in our analysis.
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the difference between the control and the other treatments. Nevertheless, we hypothesize to
find a negative relation between CR and susceptibility to social image concerns after controlling
for performance. Royzman et al. (2014) find that moral values of reflective persons are more
independent of existing social norms. We see this as indication of putting less value on what
other people think about oneself.
Hypothesis 3a: “Participants with higher cognitive reflection are less susceptible to social
image concerns.”
We expect higher internal locus of control to decrease the reliance on social networks and
perceived peer pressure, because it relates to the belief that individuals are responsible for their
lives themselves.
Hypothesis 3b: “Participants with rather internal locus of control are less susceptible to social
image concerns.”
Self-esteem and power, the capability to control other people, are related concepts and power
affects self-esteem (Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz, 2007). Since research shows that
feeling powerful decreases conspicuous consumption, we expect an analogous effect for self-
esteem.
Hypothesis 3c: “Participants with higher self-esteem are less susceptible to social image
concerns.”
High self-monitors adjust their self-presentation more than low self-monitors to signal a desired
type. High self-monitors have a more precise estimate of the social desirability of an action and
care more about being perceived as a higher type.
Hypothesis 3d: “Participants with higher self-monitoring are more susceptible to social image
concerns.”
Looking at the Big Five personality traits, we concentrate on the traits of extraversion, openness,
and agreeableness. For the remaining two traits, we do not have a clear prediction. Extraversion
is shown to be positively correlated to status consumption of low status individuals (Landis and
Gladstone, 2017). Therefore, we expect it to be related to social image concerns. For openness
and agreeableness, we only formulate hypotheses regarding their effect on responding to peer
information. A high level of openness means to be open to new experiences, ideas, and variety
seeking. Therefore, openness drives participants away from the mean decision of others, which
is considered as not innovative and unexciting. Agreeableness is closely related to the desire
for conformity and cooperation, which is why we predict it to be related to anchoring the own
decision on others’ decisions.
Hypothesis 3e: “Participants with a higher level of extraversion are more susceptible to social
image concerns.”
164 Appendix B
Hypothesis 3f: “Participants with a higher level of openness will anchor their decision less to
the average decision in the information treatment than those with a lower level.”
Hypothesis 3g: “Participants with a higher level of agreeableness will anchor their decision
closer to the average decision in the information treatment than those with a lower level.”
B.1.2 Results on Personality Types
For all characteristics listed in Table B.1.1, we only derived hypotheses for the interaction with
the public treatment and, therefore, do not report coefficients for the information treatment. We
first look at cognitive reflection (CR). Since we find a highly significant correlation between CR
and actual performance in the IQ-quiz, we additionally control for performance. As expected,
a better performance is significantly negatively correlated with taking a loan. Interestingly, for
the control treatment, a higher CR is significantly positively related to loan take-up. However,
we find a negative effect of cognitive reflection on loan take-up in the public treatment. The
effect is rather small and only marginally significant on the extensive margin. However, if we do
not control for possibly endogenous self-esteem, the effects are stronger and highly significant.
In general, the interaction effect is robust to various specifications and more than offsets the
positive effect of CR in the control. Because this study is slightly under-powered to estimate
effects of this size, we are still cautious in interpreting the results. Still, it seems that individuals
with higher cognitive reflection do adjust their decision because of social image concerns, but
in opposite direction to the others. In this sense, we have to reject hypothesis 3a.
The results for the interaction between public treatment and locus of control (LOC) are
shown in the second panel of Table B.1.1. Internal LOC is also correlated with performance
but to a smaller extent. We do not find a significant interaction effect for the probability to
take up a loan at all, although the coefficient points in the right direction.3 Given the rather
large standard errors and the imbalance of LOC between control and public, we view our results
as inconclusive. Thus, we also cannot confirm hypothesis 3b. For global self-esteem (GSE),
we find an insignificant interaction term and a rather small effect size. As participants with
higher GSE are overly represented in the public treatment or higher GSE might be induced by
the treatment, we would expect larger effects in negative direction: The treatment could give
those persons who performed well in the quiz a confidence boost, who can now announce this
publicly (and vice versa). Actually, there is a mild correlation between quiz performance and
GSE. However, this should increase the effect size in favor of our hypothesis, which is not the
case. Thus, we reject hypothesis 3c.
Similar as for GSE, we do not find any effect for self-monitoring (SM). The effect size is
fairly small and effects are not significant at all. Interestingly, SM is negatively correlated to
quiz performance, which even should increase the potential effect. Based on these results, we
also reject hypothesis 3d. The last panel in the table presents the results on extraversion (EV).
The effects go in hypothesized direction, but are never significant. Effect sizes, though, are of
moderate size (Cohen’s d ∼ 0.24 ) and p-values are “flirting with significance.” As previously
noted, our study is under-powered for this effect size and, hence, we are hesitant to reject
hypothesis 3e but also cannot confirm it, which means results are inconclusive.
3 If we apply wild cluster bootstrap, we additionally find an overall significant positive effect
of LOC at the 10% level.
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Table B.1.1: Personality and Loan Take-Up




Interaction CR*Public −0.128 −0.116*
(0.084) (0.065)





Interaction LOC*Public −0.094 −0.101
(0.104) (0.064)





Interaction GSE*Public −0.047 −0.027
(0.131) (0.092)





Interaction SM*Public 0.017 0.020
(0.072) (0.069)





Interaction EV*Public 0.148 0.093
(0.098) (0.066)
Public Treatment −0.010 0.013
(0.134) (0.098)
Observations 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on info treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences and performance in IQ-quiz. SE in parentheses,
bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Hypotheses 3f and 3g address the anchoring of decisions to others in the information treatment.
To measure anchoring, we again look at the difference between pre-experiment choice and actual
choice, interacting the information treatment with the two personality traits. In Table B.1.2,
we first investigate whether persons with a higher level of openness deviate less from their
individual preference as they receive information about others.
Table B.1.2: Personality and Adjustment
Pen Before Pen After Difference
Openness
OP 0.288** 0.018 −0.316**
(0.127) (0.063) (0.127)
Interaction OP*Info −0.372* 0.168 0.580**
(0.215) (0.107) (0.263)
Info Treatment −0.187 −0.010 0.162
(0.245) (0.149) (0.258)
Agreeableness
AG 0.118 0.083 0.009
(0.158) (0.124) (0.159)
Interaction AG*Info −0.162 −0.154 −0.057
(0.252) (0.185) (0.327)
Info Treatment −0.235 0.017 0.255
(0.257) (0.195) (0.300)
Observations 201 248 201
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences and performance in IQ-quiz. SE in parentheses,
bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
First, we notice a strange differential effect for the pre-experimental choice. In general, a
higher level of openness is related to choosing a more expensive pen in the online survey but the
interaction has a large significantly negative effect. Eventually, persons with a higher level of
openness who were assigned to the information treatment choose a cheaper pen in the survey.
However, as treatment assignment is random, this is most likely an artifact of the small sample
size. Nevertheless, we find a considerably large positive effect for the actual choice and the
difference between the choice before and during the experiment. This means that we have to
reject hypothesis 3f, as apparently it is exactly the opposite: persons with a higher level of
openness deviate more from their pre-experiment preference.
Panel 2 in Table B.1.2, shows the effect of agreeableness on anchoring. Here, we do not
find significant effects and the difference between pre-experimental and actual choice is small
in size. Therefore, we also reject hypothesis 3g.
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B.2 Additional Results
Figure B.2.1: Pre-Experimental Choices - Pens, Lip-Balms, and Folders
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Table B.2.1: Descriptive Statistics across Survey Participation
Full Sample Online Survey No Survey Difference
Male 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.05
Age 22.86 22.87 22.80 −0.06
Education 3.36 3.36 3.35 −0.00
Students 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.02
Semester 3.68 3.51 4.39 0.88
Student Job 0.28 0.26 0.33 0.07
Mthl. Income 688.36 692.70 669.86 −22.84
Risk Preference 5.34 5.39 5.15 −0.24
Lab Experience 1.89 1.87 1.96 0.09
Know Someone 0.31 0.34 0.20 −0.14∗
Persons in Session 11.33 11.26 11.61 0.35∗∗∗
Correct Control Questions 4.74 4.76 4.67 −0.09
Correct Quiz Questions 4.43 4.43 4.43 0.00
Financial Literacy 4.59 4.60 4.53 −0.07
Cognitive Reflection 1.91 1.91 1.90 −0.01
Conscientiousness −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00
Neuroticism 0.03 −0.01 0.20 0.21
Extraversion −0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.04
Openess −0.02 −0.00 −0.11 −0.11
Agreeableness −0.01 0.02 −0.16 −0.18
Self-Esteem −0.01 0.03 −0.18 −0.21
Locus of Control 0.00 0.05 −0.21 −0.26
Self-Monitoring −0.02 −0.04 0.09 0.14
Observations 270 219 51 270
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.2.2: Effects on Loan Take-Up - Pre-Experiment Choice
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment −0.068 −0.006 −0.083 −0.021
(0.125) (0.088) (0.146) (0.094)
Info Treatment 0.078 0.030 0.036 −0.017
(0.135) (0.076) (0.133) (0.079)
Pen Before 0.084** 0.056*** 0.064* 0.039
(0.036) (0.021) (0.038) (0.025)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 219 219 201 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.2.3: Effects on Loan Take-Up, Info Treatment Correction -
Pre-Experiment Choice
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Loan Amount Loan Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment −0.151 −0.165 0.031 0.180
(0.249) (0.109) (0.586) (0.476)
Order −0.016 −0.002
(0.022) (0.010)
Interaction Order*Info 0.030 0.024*
(0.027) (0.013)
Pen Before 0.067* 0.040 0.014 0.019
(0.038) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027)
Mean Prev. Pens 0.086 0.124
(0.137) (0.141)
Interaction Mean*Info −0.005 −0.067
(0.211) (0.175)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.220 0.172
Correction Order Order Mean Pen Mean Pen
Observations 201 201 183 183
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered
on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.2.4: Deviation from Pre-Experiment Choice - Dummy
Pre-Experiment = Experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment −0.012 −0.051 0.198 0.216
(0.066) (0.075) (0.165) (0.195)
Info Treatment −0.020 −0.027 0.103 0.135
(0.080) (0.100) (0.170) (0.201)
Order 0.012 0.015
(0.015) (0.014)
Interaction Order*Info −0.020 −0.025
(0.023) (0.025)
Mean Control Group 0.312 0.312 0.312 0.312
Controls No Yes No Yes
Correction No No Order Order
Observations 219 201 219 201
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.2.5: Using a Different Ordering
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Info Treatment 0.016 −0.161 0.094 0.138
(0.193) (0.113) (0.085) (0.103)
Order 2 0.004 −0.007 −0.004 −0.002
(0.021) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Interaction Order*Info 0.007 0.025* −0.003 −0.011
(0.029) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.038 0.043
Correction Order 2 Order 2 Order 2 Order 2
Observations 248 248 248 248
Control treatment is reference category. Coefficients on public treatment not reported. Con-
trolled for variables with significant differences. SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered
on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.2.6: Decisions by Sex
Loan Amount Loan Dummy Lost Amount Lost Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public Treatment −0.009 0.034 0.097* 0.071
(0.165) (0.133) (0.052) (0.047)
Info Treatment −0.009 −0.057 −0.002 0.010
(0.161) (0.121) (0.047) (0.051)
Male 0.066 −0.034 −0.060 −0.045
(0.108) (0.084) (0.039) (0.044)
Interaction Sex*Public −0.035 −0.055 0.039 0.010
(0.190) (0.141) (0.111) (0.078)
Mean Control Group 0.220 0.172 0.038 0.043
Observations 247 247 247 247
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table B.2.7: Number of Modes for Pens Bought
Number of Modes Number of Modes
Public Treatment −0.207 −0.191
(0.573) (0.580)
Info Treatment −0.415 −0.641
(0.431) (0.451)
Mean Control Group 1.903 1.903
Controls No Yes
Observations 270 248
Control treatment is reference category. Controlled for variables with significant differences.
SE in parentheses, bootstrapped and clustered on session level.





The experiment in which you are going to participate serves to analyze decision behavior. 
For your presence, you will receive an amount of 5 Euro, independent of your decisions and of 
other events in the experiment. The participation fee is 3.50 Euro. In addition, you can earn 
money in the experiment that depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the other 
participants. For that reason, it is very important that you read these instructions thoroughly. 
During the experiment it is not permitted to use electronic devices or to communicate with 
the other participants as long as you are not requested to do so. Please only use the 
programs and functions provided for this experiment. Please do not talk to the other 
participants. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to answer your 
question in private. Please do not ask your question out loud in any circumstance. In case 
the question is relevant for all participants, we will repeat it and answer it for everyone. 
If you violate the rules, you will be excluded from the experiment and the payment. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will find short comprehension questions on the screen. 
Please answer these. If you answer one or more of these questions incorrectly, one of the 
experimenters will come to discuss open questions with you if necessary. 
Structure of the experiment: 
1. First option to obtain income - IQ test questions 
2. Information about your performance in the first revenue round 
3. Shopping round 
4. Second option to obtain income – Slider 
5. Questionnaire 
What happens during the first revenue round? 
You have to answer 12 questions during the first revenue round. These are questions that are 
also used to measure intelligence. The income in this round depends on your performance in 
relation to  the other participants. The three participants with the best results get 3 Euro, the 
second three get 2 Euro, the third three get 1 Euro and the last three get 0.50 Euro. This means, 
you are in a direct comparison with the other participants. In case of a tie, the speed with which 
the questions were answered decides over the ranking.   
You will learn see how you performed in comparison to the other participants directly after the 
IQ test questions. You alone will see your personal rank. 
What happens during the shopping round? 
After the IQ test questions, you will have the possibility to buy a pen. You can decide between 
five different pens. All pens are of different quality and have different prices. If your earned 
income is not sufficient, you will have the opportunity to take out a loan to buy a pen of better 
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quality. All pens are clearly labelled and the quality of the pens is obvious. Income not spend 
will expire. The taken credit will be subtracted from your participation fee of 3.50 Euro. You 
will receive the pen at the end of the experiment together with your payment. 
You will later see on the screen how you inform the experimenters about your decision. 
What happens during the second revenue round? 
In this round, you can earn additional income. Your income will depend solely on your own 
performance. You have to move sliders to a certain point. You will be paid for each slider that 
is moved to the right point. The income you will earn per slider will decrease with the amount 
of sliders you already set correctly: for the first set of eight correctly set sliders you earn more 
than for the second set of eight correctly set sliders, for the second set of eight correctly set 
sliders you earn more than for the third set of eight correctly set sliders etc.. You can keep the 
whole income you earned during this round. 
This round follows a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, you will receive your payment 
and the pen you bought in the next room one after another. Please wait outside the room until 
we call your name as only one person at the same time should be inside the room to receive the 
payment.  
Schematic: 
Total remuneration =     Show-Up fee 5 Euro 
   + Participation fee 3.50 Euro 
   + Variable income 1 (IQ test: must be spent to purchase a pen or expires) 
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Material B.3.2: Comprehension Questions
Comprehension questions: 
1. On what does your income depend in the first revenue round? 
a. Only on my own performance 
b. On my own performance in relation to other participants 
c. Only on the performance of the others 
 
2. What happens to the income of the first round that you do not spend? 
a. I can keep it 
b. It expires 
c. The other participants get it 
 
3. On what does your income depend in the second revenue round? 
a. Only on my own performance 
b. On my own performance in relation to other participants 
c. Only on the performance of the others 
 
4. What are the options in case you want to buy a better pen than your income can actually 
pay for? 
a. Take out a loan 
b. Nothing 
c. Take money from other participants 
 
5. What happens if you cannot pay back the credit with the earned money? 
a. I can give back the pen 
b. I have to pay the money to the experimenters 











Material B.3.4: Printed Paper with Pens
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Material B.3.5: Slider Task
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Material B.3.6: Shopping Information Treatment
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Material B.3.7: Example Products Online Survey
182 Appendix B
Appendix C to accompany Chapter 4
184 Appendix C
C.1 Additional Results
Table C.1.1: Correlation Ambiguity Parameters
Simple A. m(0.1) m(0.5) m(0.9) AA0.1 AA0.5 AA0.9 b a
Simple A. 1
m(0.1) 0.531*** 1
m(0.5) 0.823*** 0.584*** 1
m(0.9) 0.408*** 0.454*** 0.486*** 1
AA0.1 −0.531*** −1 −0.584***−0.454*** 1
AA0.5 −0.823*** −0.584***−1 −0.486*** 0.584*** 1
AA0.9 −0.408*** −0.454***−0.486***−1 0.454*** 0.486*** 1
Index b −0.710*** −0.825***−0.835***−0.800*** 0.825*** 0.835*** 0.800*** 1
Index a 0.0905 0.479*** 0.0621 −0.565***−0.479***−0.0621 0.565*** 0.0245 1
Simple A. is derived from the original Ellsberg urns, where 0 means ambiguity averse, 1 means ambiguity
neutral, and 2 means ambiguity seeking. m(0.1), m(0.5), and m(0.9) are the matching probabilities de-
rived from the three ambiguity choice sets. AA0.1, AA0.5, and AA0.9 are the differences between objective
and matching probabilities-the local ambiguity attitudes. Index b and a are global indices for ambiguity
aversion and a-insensitivity derived via linear approximation.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01











CE Ambiguity 31.48 −27.63 3.85 −46.46* −14.99
CE Competition −4.26 6.21 1.95 0.45 −3.81
Competition vs. Ambiguity 1576.99 −1051.65* 525.33 −569.15 1007.84
Others Decide −0.02 −0.09 −0.11 −0.19* −0.21**
Observations 35 58 65 45 52
Groups: Diff. Nec.-Opp., Diff. Rem.-Nec., Diff. Rem.-Opp., Diff. Ret.-Nec. and Diff.
Ret.-Opp. are various differences between necessity entrepreneurs, opportunity entrepreneurs,
returnees, and the remaining sample. Variables: CE Ambiguity is the outcome for the certainty
equivalent of non-strategic uncertainty, CE Competition is the outcome for the certainty equiv-
alent of strategic uncertainty, Competition vs. Ambiguity is the outcome for the total profit
in the strategic uncertainty option against non-strategic uncertainty, and Others Decide is the
outcome for the probability of letting other decide the winning numbers instead of oneself. Pos-
itive differences indicate that value of the parameter is larger for the second group in each pair
of groups.
Onesided t-tests.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.1.3: Correlation Ambi. Parameters and Choices in Part 4 - Control










Index a 0.00930 1
CE Ambiguity 0.158 0.144 1
CE Competition 0.0217 0.0286 0.603*** 1
Comp. vs. Amb. −0.00690 0.237** 0.433*** 0.301*** 1
Others Decide −0.0392 −0.0151 0.149 0.0641 0.0162 1
Index b and a are global indices for ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity derived via linear
approximation.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.1.4: Correlation Ambi. Parameters and Choices in Part 4 - Treatment










Index a 0.0378 1
CE Ambiguity 0.218** 0.0273 1
CE Competition 0.325*** 0.0994 0.713*** 1
Comp. vs. Amb. 0.108 0.0986 0.477*** 0.463*** 1
Others Decide −0.0292 0.0499 0.0538 0.220** 0.137 1
Index b and a are global indices for ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity derived via linear
approximation.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01













Table C.1.5: Controlling for the Order of Choices
CE Ambiguity CE Strategic MP Strat.-Ambi.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 17.297* 18.138* 6.166 6.344 794.907* 852.412*







Constant 90.368*** 81.782*** 101.218*** 104.852*** 1130.227*** 2120.717***
(7.745) (16.480) (8.131) (17.193) (309.767) (804.165)
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222
Robust S.E. in parentheses. Onesided t-tests.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table C.1.6: Controlling for Certainty about the Guess
CE Ambiguity CE Strategic MP Strat.-Ambi.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 17.297* 16.583* 6.166 5.716 794.907* 771.620*
(11.532) (11.440) (11.370) (11.345) (518.701) (518.037)
Certainty −4.435** −2.792 −144.602*
(2.344) (2.236) (99.027)
Constant 90.368*** 119.276*** 101.218*** 119.418*** 1130.227*** 2072.769***
(7.745) (18.072) (8.131) (17.593) (309.767) (791.019)
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222
Robust S.E. in parentheses. Onesided t-tests.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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C.2 Covariates of Ambiguity Parameters
To analyze if socio-economic or individual characteristics drive the few differences found
across our groups of interest and to assess which variables are important covariates of ambiguity
attitudes, we run regressions with our ambiguity aversion parameters as dependent variables.
Table C.2.1 presents results for ambiguity aversion derived from the Ellsberg paradox, local
ambiguity aversion, as well as index b and index a. We include the following potential covariates:
sex, age, age squared, education, the Big Five personality traits, and two parameters measuring
risk attitudes. The parameters for risk attitudes, derived by employing the method by Tanaka
et al. (2010), measure the degree of risk aversion (Sigma) and probability weighting (Alpha),
respectively.1 The descriptions of all independent variables are in Appendix 5.5. We include
occupational groups, using necessity entrepreneurs as the base group. As can be seen, results
regarding the differences to other groups stay robust even when controlling for other covariates,
especially those with respect to a-insensitivity. Thus, the differences between the groups cannot
be explained by differences in other characteristics.
Looking at the other variables, our sample does not seem to differ much from other samples
considered in the existing literature. At a first glance, it seems that we find an inconclusive
effect for being male, as it is significantly positively related to ambiguity aversion, as measured
by Ellsberg, but it has no effect on the matching probability of 90% and a negative effect on
those for 50%. We find a similar pattern for a-insensitivity and being male. However, this
finding resembles the pattern found by Borghans et al. (2009). For Dutch high-school students,
they find that boys are more ambiguity averse for moderate levels of ambiguity but there is
no difference between boys and girls for high levels of ambiguity. Dimmock et al. (2015) also
find men to be more ambiguity averse than women. Age is significantly positively related to
being more ambiguity averse, especially for moderate and high probabilities. Furthermore, the
relation between age and ambiguity aversion is hump-shaped, which implies that the middle-
aged are the most ambiguity averse. Surprisingly, there is only a marginal relation between risk
aversion and ambiguity aversion. A-insensitivity is not at all related to risk aversion. However,
as in the study of Abdellaoui et al. (2011), a-insensitivity is significantly related to inverted
S-shaped probability weighting, which, intuitively, makes sense. Out of the Big Five, openness
seems to be significantly negatively related to ambiguity aversion for moderate probabilities.
Persons who score high on openness are described as willing to engage in new experiences and
are, therefore, potentially more likely to engage in risky behaviors. Conscientiousness seems
to be related to more ambiguity aversion for 50-50 probabilities and agreeableness to more
ambiguity aversion for higher probabilities.
Similar to Dimmock et al. (2016), we conclude that, in general, the explanatory power of
socio-economic variables for ambiguity attitudes is low. Remarkably, we find similar correlations
to those of Dimmock et al. (2015) for the US-American population. Besides the difference in
gender, they estimate that older persons are less ambiguity averse and that the correlation
between risk and ambiguity aversion is rather low. We also cannot confirm that risk aversion
and ambiguity aversion have a strong link to each other, as is shown in other studies (e.g.
1 In the first part of the experiment, participants answered the required multiple price list
choices to calculate these parameters.
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Butler et al., 2014; Charness and Gneezy, 2010; Dimmock et al., 2016). Trautmann and van de
Kuilen (2015) conclude that the evidence is suggestive for a positive link and that probability
weighting (which is not collected in most of the studies) might serve as an mediator but that
more research is necessary to clarify the empirical relationship between the two attitudes.
Table C.2.1: Socio-economic Predictors
Ambiguity Averse AA0.1 AA0.5 AA0.9 Index b Index a
Male 20.217*** −0.065 0.067 −0.000 0.002 0.080
(6.875) (0.046) (0.043) (0.049) (0.078) (0.059)
Age 4.237*** 0.011 0.029*** 0.025** 0.043*** 0.017
(1.388) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013)
Age2 −0.054*** −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.001*** −0.000
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 1.333 −0.007 0.017 0.003 0.009 0.013
(2.053) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.018)
Sigma −14.502* −0.024 −0.058 −0.016 −0.065 0.011
(7.826) (0.041) (0.041) (0.047) (0.067) (0.067)
Alpha −5.600 0.126 −0.044 −0.079 0.002 −0.256*
(13.633) (0.092) (0.080) (0.089) (0.141) (0.131)
Agreeableness 1.488 0.016 0.010 0.019* 0.030* 0.004
(1.673) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013)
Extraversion 1.191 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.002
(1.663) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011)
Conscientiousness 3.036** 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.011 −0.001
(1.531) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011)
Neuroticism −0.812 −0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.012
(1.352) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012)
Openness −3.956*** −0.009 −0.014* −0.008 −0.021 0.001
(1.448) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
Remain 14.128 −0.075 0.063 −0.016 −0.019 0.074
(9.731) (0.062) (0.056) (0.066) (0.100) (0.080)
Opp. 15.103 −0.057 0.102∧ 0.052 0.064 0.136∧
(11.524) (0.072) (0.063) (0.076) (0.115) (0.094)
Return 3.142 −0.094∧ −0.008 0.005 −0.064 0.123∧
(10.577) (0.068) (0.062) (0.072) (0.112) (0.076)
Constant −49.133 −0.406* −0.608*** −0.094 −0.739** 0.389
(31.848) (0.208) (0.189) (0.221) (0.328) (0.294)
Observations 222 222 222 222 222 222
Adj. R-squared 0.050 -0.007 0.031 -0.014 0.000 -0.007
Variables: Male is an indicator for being male or female; Age(2) is the age of the participant in years (squared);
Education is a categorical variable from 1-9, where 1 is “no degree/no education” and 9 is “doctoral degree or
equivalent;” Sigma and Alpha are risk attitudes; Agreeableness, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
and Openness are the Big Five personality traits; Opp. only includes entrepreneurs out of opportunity; Return
represents the group of returnees; and Remain includes all persons who are neither entrepreneurs nor returnees.
Robust S.E. in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, ∧ p < 0.10 (onesided)
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Participants who successfully established a business at least once in-




Those entrepreneurs who set up a business and felt the most impor-
tant reason was out of necessity, i.e. no other job possibilities, fear




Those entrepreneurs who set up a business and felt the most impor-
tant reason was because they had the opportunity, i.e. ideal form of
work to be self-employed, opportunity to be in charge, opportunity
to earn more money, or other reasons.
Returnees
(Return)
Participants who spent at least three consecutive months abroad in




Participants who are neither entrepreneurs nor returnees.
Independent
Variables
Kosovo Dummy that takes the value 1 if the person participated in a session
in Kosovo and 0 if the person participated in a session in Albania.
Male Dummy that takes the value 1 if the participant is male and 0 if the
participant is female.
Age(2) Age (squared) of the participant in years.
Education Variable with the following options: 1-“No degree/no education,”
2-“Primary education,” 3-“Lower secondary education’,’ 4-“Upper
secondary education,” 5-“Post-secondary non-tertiary education,” 6-
“Short-cycle tertiary education (no university diploma),” 7-“Bachelor
or equivalent”, 8-“Master or equivalent,” 9-‘´Doctoral or equivalent”.
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Dummy Working Dummy that takes the value 1 if the participant worked in the last
seven days and 0 if not.
Work Status Employment status for participants who work. Categorical vari-
able with the following options: 1-“Paid full-time employee,” 2-“Paid
part-time employee,” 3-“Paid intern/Paid apprentice,” 4-“Employer,”
5-“Self-employed,” 6-“Unpaid intern/Unpaid apprentice,” and 7-
“Unpaid worker in household business”.
Sigma A measure for risk aversion that estimates the concavity of the value
function. Estimated with the method from Tanaka et al. (2010).
Alpha A measure for probability weighting that equals 1 if the weighting
function is linear, < 1 if it is inverted S-shaped, and > 1 if the function
is S-shaped. Estimated with the method from Tanaka et al. (2010).
Agreeableness One of the Big Five personality traits that is measured with two
different items. Participants answer on a scale from 1-“Strongly dis-
agree” to 7-“Strongly Agree” if the following traits apply to them: 1.
“Critical, quarrelsome” and 2. “Sympathetic, warm”.
Extraversion One of the Big Five personality traits that is measured with two
different items. Participants answer on a scale from 1-“Strongly dis-
agree” to 7-“Strongly Agree” if the following traits apply to them: 1.
“Extraverted, enthusiastic” and 2. “Reserved, quiet”.
Conscientiousness One of the Big Five personality traits that is measured with two
different items. Participants answer on a scale from 1-“Strongly dis-
agree” to 7-“Strongly Agree” if the following traits apply to them: 1.
“Dependable, self-disciplined” and 2. “Disorganized, careless”.
Neuroticism One of the Big Five personality traits that is measured with two
different items. Participants answer on a scale from 1-“Strongly dis-
agree” to 7-“Strongly Agree” if the following traits apply to them: 1.
“Anxious, easily upset” and 2. “Calm, emotionally stable”.
Openness One of the Big Five personality traits that is measured with two differ-
ent items. Participants answer on a scale from 1-“Strongly disagree”
to 7-“Strongly Agree” if the following traits apply to them: 1. “Open
to new experiences, complex” and 2. “Conventional, uncreative”.
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C.4 Instructions
Material C.4.1: Welcome Script  
 
Choosing Risk Interactive Classroom Sessions 
Instructions to be given to participants as a hard copy and to be read aloud together 
 
********************[BEGINNING OF WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS]******************** 
General Instructions  
Welcome and thank you for participating in this interactive session today. You have been invited 
because you completed a survey last year for a project titled “Exploring recent trends in economic 
migration”. You agreed to be contacted for further participation in our research. This interactive 
session is for the purpose of research on economic decision making and risk. For this session, it does 
not matter whether you have any migration in your past or future. We want to know preferences from 
a wide variety of different people here in [INSERT ALBANIA OR KOSOVO]. 
******* 
[Alternative wording, in case we need to recruit people who did not take the survey.] 
You have been invited to participate in this interactive session for the purpose of research on 
economic decision making and risk. It is one element of a wider research project titled “Exploring 
recent trends in economic migration”. There has also been a household survey for this project, that 
some of you have answered already. For this session, it does not matter whether you have any 
migration in your past or future. We want to know preferences from a wide variety of different people 
here in [INSERT ALBANIA OR KOSOVO]. 
******* 
We will give each person a lump sum of [INSERT EUR OR ALBANIAN LEK AMOUNT] for coming 
today. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can also earn a good amount of additional money. 
You will be paid in cash in private at the end of the session. It is important that you do not talk, or try 
to communicate, with other participants during the session. Please also put your mobile phones on 
silent and refrain from using them during the session. If you have any questions once the session has 
started, please raise your hand and a moderator will come over to where you are seated to answer your 
question in private.  
This interactive session consists of two parts. During the first part you will be asked to make a number 
of decisions that involve risk. “Risk” means that the effects of a decision cannot be known for certain 
at the time the decision is made, and the effects may be better or worse due to chance.  
To give you an idea of the types of risky scenarios you will see, consider this bucket with 10 balls, 
numbered ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ and ⑩.  




It is like the one pictured below.  
⑧①②⑨⑥ 
⑤⑦③⑩④ 
We will now do a hypothetical example. We will talk about points but the points will not translate to 
money in this example. 
Here is the example. I will give you the opportunity to draw a ball form the bucket. If you draw a ① 
② or ③, I will give you 300 points. If you draw any other number you get 0 points.  
But suppose you don’t like this scenario. I will give you a second option. Instead of trying to get 300 
points by drawing a ball from the bucket, which could also result in 0 points, you can choose to get a 
flat pay-out of 80 points. If you want that option, you would get the 80 points for sure and there would 
be no draw from the bucket. 
Do you prefer: 
- Get 80 points for sure    OR 
- Draw a ball from the bucket for the chance to get 300 points. Get 300 points if a ① ② or ③ 
is drawn. Get 0 points if any other ball is drawn. 
[The moderator allows one participant to draw a ball from the physical bucket and announces the 
result.] 
During the session we will let the computer perform the draws, so that each person can get draws that 
only apply to them. This bucket is for illustration only, so that you understand how the computer will 
make a fair draw based on your choices. You will not actually see the bucket illustration – the 
computer will do this in the background. 
You will not know which ball the computer will draw – it is random. You only know how many balls 
in the bucket indicate the high and low pay-outs. 
Please raise your hand now if you have any question. 
In summary, you will be asked to make choices about your earnings when you do not know for sure 
what the outcome of the choice will be.  
For some of your decisions, the chances of earning a good amount will also depend on the decisions 
that others make. How you can earn money from your decisions will be described in detail each time 





By following instructions carefully and completing tasks to the best of your ability you can earn a 
good amount of money.  
How earnings are determined 
In addition to the [INSERT EUR OR ALBANIAN LEK AMOUNT] you will receive for coming today, 
you can earn money by the decisions you make. For each decision, you will earn points. The points 
will be converted to cash. For every [INSERT NUMBER OF POINTS] points you earn you will 
receive [INSERT EUR OR ALBANIAN LEK AMOUNT] in cash at the end of the session.  
To earn points, you will be asked to choose between different earning options, each of which involves 
different amounts of possible earnings and different amounts of risk. Options with more risk have 
higher potential earnings, but there is also a chance that you get a very low amount. Options with low 
risk have lower potential earnings, but higher chance of getting the money. Once you make your 
choices, the computer will determine the outcome.  
All earnings will be paid out in cash in private at the end of the session today. You will be asked to 
sign a receipt of payment, acknowledging that you have received the earnings for participation in this 
interactive session only.  
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand.  
Informed consent 
Before the session begins, we must obtain permission from each of you to use your replies today for 
this research. This is called “obtaining informed consent”. We have prepared a form for you to read 
and sign for this purpose. It is on the desk in front of you, with the heading “Consent Form”.  
This form describes the research, how the information we collect will be used and how we will protect 
your anonymity. I will give you a few minutes to read the form. Please raise your hand if you have a 
question and I will come to you. Once we have collected all the signed consent forms, we will 
proceed. 
[Spoken only.]  
We will now hand you a tablet which you will use to complete the tasks during this interactive 
session. Please wake up your tablet and a welcome screen will appear. Please raise your hand if the 
tablet does not display a welcome message. 
[Spoken only.]  
You will also receive an ID card. The ID card is to preserve your anonymity. Please do not share your 
ID with any other participant. 
 
********************[END OF WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS]******************** 
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Material C.4.2: Instructions Ambiguity Aversion Parameters 
 
********************[BEGINNING OF PART II]******************** 
 
[SCREEN 2.1 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part II, introduction 
This is Part II. Tasks in Part II will also entail deciding between different earnings opportunities, but 
the options are different from those in Part I.  
Like before, there will be two possible earnings opportunities, and both opportunities will be risky.  
Unlike before, you will not always know the exact chances for getting points.  
Please pay careful attention to the example of the task, which is on the next few pages.  
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 2.2 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part II, example  
Please imagine the following two earnings opportunities, where you can get points by drawing a ball 
from a bucket: 
There are two buckets. Each bucket has 100 balls. Each ball is either blue or orange. The two buckets 
have different combinations of orange and blue balls.  
Earnings are determined by first choosing a bucket, then drawing a ball from the chosen bucket. Blue 
and orange balls have different values. If the drawn ball is orange you will receive 0 points and if the 
drawn ball is blue you will receive 100 points.  
The two buckets are: 
Bucket A: you don't know how many balls are orange and how many balls are blue. Put differently, if 
you have to draw a ball from the bucket, you do not know the probability of drawing an orange or a 
blue ball.  
Bucket B: you know the exact number of orange and blue balls in this bucket. In other words, if you 
have to draw a ball from the bucket, you know the exact probability of drawing an orange or a blue ball.  
The two buckets are pictured on the next screen.  








[SCREEN 2.3 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part II, example  
The images below show the two buckets. Each bucket contains some orange and some blue balls. 
To illustrate that Bucket A could have any number of blue or orange balls, these balls are coloured in 
grey here. But each ball is either orange or blue for sure.  
The picture of B has exactly 50 orange and 50 blue balls. This illustrates that you know the content of 
Bucket B.  
Although the balls are ordered by colour in the picture, you can imagine that the buckets will be shaken 
such that all balls are mingled. The picture is designed in this specific way to help you recognize how 
many balls of each colour are in the bucket. 
 
 
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 2.4 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part II, example continued 
Your task is to choose which bucket is used for the draw.  Only one ball will be drawn. 
No matter which bucket you choose, if the drawn ball is orange you will receive 0 points and if the 
drawn ball is blue you will receive 100 points.  
 If you indicate a preference for Bucket A: a ball is drawn from Bucket A and you will 
receive 100 points if the ball is blue and 0 points if the ball is orange. 
 If you indicate a preference for Bucket B: a ball is drawn from Bucket B and you will 
receive 100 points if the ball is blue and 0 points if the ball is orange. 
 





[SCREEN 2.5 - to be read out loud.]  
Try selecting an option. The two small circles below the buckets are for you to indicate your preference, 
the left circle corresponds to bucket A, while the right circle corresponds to bucket B.   
Make sure you understand how to enter the choice or change the choice.  
Do you prefer:  
- draw the ball from Bucket A (where you do not know your chances for getting a blue ball)  
- draw the ball from Bucket B (where you know the chance of a blue ball is 50%).  
 
 
Once you are sure of your choice, please click “Next”.  
 
[SCREEN 2.6 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part II, instructions 
You will be asked to complete tasks like this example a number of times. We will present the choices 
in sets. There are 3 sets in Part II. Each set entails 4 tasks. 
There will always be two options to choose from. In one option you will not know the chances of getting 
the points. For the other option you will know the exact chances of getting the points.  
We will provide you with further instructions before each set, if required. 
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
 





[SCREEN 2.7 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part II, how earnings are determined 
In each set of tasks you complete, one of the tasks will be randomly selected by the computer to 
determine payment for that set. The ball will be drawn from the bucket you chose in that task, and you 
will get the points corresponding to the colour ball that was drawn. 
You will not learn your earnings from individual tasks, but will see them reflected in the point totals at 
the end of the session today. 
Consider each task carefully as all tasks are equally likely to be selected for payment. 
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 2.8 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part II, comprehension questions 
Before we start with the first set we just want to make sure that our instructions on the tasks were clear. 
Therefore, we ask you to answer the following comprehension questions: 
Consider the two buckets, Bucket A and B. Bucket A contains orange and blue balls, but the exact 
composition is unknown. Bucket B contains exactly 50 orange balls and 50 blue balls. 
 
 
Please indicate if the following statement is true or false:  "There are more blue balls in Bucket A than 
in Bucket B." 
1. True 
2. False 




Please indicate if the following statement is true or false:  "It is more likely to draw a blue ball from 
Bucket A than it is from Bucket B." 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Cannot be known 
Click "Next" to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 2.9 - TO BE SEEN if at least one answer was incorrect] 
Header: Part II, answers 
Answer to the first question:  
In fact, it cannot be known which bucket contains more blue balls, because the composition of orange 
and blue balls in Bucket A is unknown.  
Answer to the second question:  
In fact, it cannot be known whether it is more likely to draw a blue ball from Bucket A than from Bucket 
B, because the composition of orange and blue balls in Bucket A is unknown.  
If you have a question regarding these answer, please raise your hand now. 
Otherwise, click “Next” to proceed. 
[INSERT WAITING SCREEN] 
 
[SCREEN 2.10 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part II, any questions? 
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. We will answer questions for everyone 
to hear before you begin the tasks.  
Please remember, once you begin the tasks, if you have any questions quietly raise your hand and a 
moderator will come and answer your questions in private. It is important you do not talk to any other 
participants from this point onwards. 






Material C.4.3: Instructions Competence Treatment 
 
[SCREEN 3.11 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, Set 2, instructions 
For the next several tasks, you will make decisions between two options. One option in each pair will 
involve entering competition. The differences between the options will change from one task to the 
next, so please consider each choice carefully. By offering you many different tasks, we hope to learn 
more about how you make decisions that involve risk and competition. 
 
[SCREEN 3.12 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
In this activity, competing can be thought of as obtaining a share of a limited amount of profits. You do 
not have to win a contest. Just by entering the competition you get a share.  
However, the size of your share depends on the number of competitors you face. 
Click “Next”. 
 
[SCREEN 3.13 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
How will competitors impact the points I can earn?  
If you chose to enter the competition, your earnings will be determined by splitting the total available 
among you and all the other competitors in your group. The amount is shared equally.  
For example, suppose there are 300 points available for competition and three people are in the 
competition. Each person would get 100 points.  
If there are few competitors, the prize per person is high. If there are many competitors, the prize per 
person is low.  The charts below provide an example. 

















[SCREEN 3.14 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
If you choose the Competition option and there are no other competitors, you would earn the entirety 
of the total points available.  
If you choose the Competition option and everyone else in the group is also a competitor, you get one 
fifth of the available points. 
If you do not choose to compete, your earnings are not dependent on the number of competitors in your 
group. 
Please raise your hand if you have a question. 
 
[SCREEN 3.15 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
How many competitors could I face? 
You will be randomly assigned to a group. If you chose to compete, your competitors will come from 
this group. If you do not choose to compete, you will not face competitors, and the group will not matter.  
Your group will always has the same people in it. It will consist of you, and 4 other people who did a 
session already. So they are not in the room today. 
Each other person in your group will either be a “competitor” or “not a competitor”. The others already 
did their session. They are “Competitors” if they chose competition more than they chose other options.   
You will not know how many people in your group are competitors. So you will not know your 
exact prize amount if you chose the competition option. In all tasks, the number of competitors 














[SCREEN 3.16 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
To indicate the competition option in each task, we will use the following diagram. The diagram shows 









The image  ??? indicates your competitors. There can be 1,2,3 or 4 competitors, but this image 
will always be the same. There are ??? because you do not know how many competitors you face.  
Click “next” 
 
[SCREEN 3.17 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part III, competition instructions 
Before we start with the next set we want to make sure that our instructions about the group were clear. 
Therefore, please answer the following questions: 
How many people will be in your group, besides you?  
_________ 
True or False: I will not know how many competitors I will face in the competition options. 
Please indicate how many competitors you think will be in your group. Exclude yourself from 
your estimations. 
 Competitors: ________ 
How certain are you about your estimation? Please choose a number on a scale from 1 to 10. 1 
means you are not certain at all about your guess, that you picked the number more or less 
randomly. 10 means you are very certain about your guess, that you think you understand well 
people’s preference for competition. 
Please click “Next” to proceed. 
300                         ??? 
 
A share of 300 points. The size of your share 
depends on competitors  
 
the highest possible points for you are 300, the 
lowest possible points for you are 60 
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Material C.4.4: Instructions Choices under Uncertainty 
 
********************[BEGINNING OF PART IV]******************** 
 
[SCREEN 4.1 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part IV, introduction 
This is Part IV. Tasks in Part IV will again entail deciding between different earnings opportunities. 
Your task will be to decide whether you prefer the option on the left side of the screen or if you prefer 
the option on the right of the screen. 
The opportunities differ in whether you know the risk, whether others’ choices affect what you can earn 
and what the possible earnings are. These tasks will look similar to the tasks you considered in Part III. 
But they are not the same. 
There are 4 sets in Part IV. Each set compares different scenarios. We will provide instructions at the 
beginning of each set. Set 1-3 have four tasks each. The fourth set has 3 tasks. 
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 4.2 - to be read out loud.] 
Header: Part IV, instructions 
For all tasks in Part IV you are again grouped with other persons. These are not the same persons as 
before. The group consists of yourself and 4 new and randomly selected people who are your potential 
competitors if you chose to compete. These are people like you, who completed their session already. 
They are not in the room today.  
Click “Next” to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 4.3 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part IV, competitors 
As in Part III, the competition preferences of your group members may matter for some tasks and not 
other tasks. Since your group members completed their own session already, we know whether they 
prefer to compete or prefer not to compete. These potential competitors will impact your earnings only 
if you chose to compete yourself. You do not know the number of competitors. You do know that this 
number does not change from one decision to the next. You will always face the same number of 
competitors at any point you chose to compete. 
We will always tell you when the choices of your group members might matter for your payment. 
Choices that persons outside your group make can never influence your earnings. 






[SCREEN 4.4 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part IV, how earnings are determined 
In each set you complete, one of tasks in that set will be randomly selected by the computer to determine 
payment for that set.  
As with Parts I-III, once the computer selects which task is used to determine payment, the computer 
will calculate how many points you earn depending on the choice you made.  
You will not learn your earnings from individual tasks, but will see them reflected in the point totals at 
the end of the session today. 
Consider each task carefully as all tasks are equally likely to be selected for payment. 
Click "Next" to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 4.5 - to be read out loud.]  
Header: Part IV, any questions? 
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. We will answer questions for everyone 
to hear before you begin the tasks.  
Please remember, once you begin the tasks, if you have any questions quietly raise your hand and a 
moderator will come and answer your questions in private. It is important you do not talk to any other 
participants from this point onwards. 
Click "Next" to proceed. 
 















Material C.4.5: Instructions Fourth Choice 
 
[SCREEN 4.27] 
Header: Part IV, fourth set, instructions 
This is the last set of tasks that you will complete for earning points. At most you will do three tasks in 
this set. This set is similar to Part I. 
Consider again the bucket with 10 balls, numbered ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ and ⑩. The two 
scenarios below assign different balls to indicate a “high” and a “low” earning: 
 Scenario A Scenario B 
  
 150 points if ①②③④⑤ 150 points if ⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩ 
 0 points if ⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩ 0 points if ①②③④⑤ 
 
In words: 
 If you indicate a preference for Scenario A you will receive 150 points if ball ① ② ③ 
④ or ⑤ is drawn from the bucket and 0 points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn from the 
bucket.  
 If you indicate a preference for Scenario B you will receive 0 points if ball ① ② ③ ④ 
or ⑤ is drawn from the bucket and 150 points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn from the 
bucket.  
This means, you can decide which balls are the “winning” balls. You cannot change the risk, there are 
always 5 balls that give you 150 points and 5 balls that give you 0 points. You just decide which balls 
are the winning balls for you. Each person has their own choice and their own draw from the bucket. 
 
[NEXT SCREEN] 
In addition, for this set you are no longer in the group with 4 other people. Instead you are randomly 
matched to one single person in this room which will be your partner for this set.  
You will have the option to ask your partner to choose the winning balls for your draw.  
Your partner faces the same decision as you and can decide that you have to choose the winning balls 
for her/him. 
At the end of this set, you and your partner will both be informed whether you or your partner chose 
the winning balls for you, and which balls end up being the winning ones for you. You will also both 
learn the same information about the winning balls for your partner.   
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand. We will answer questions for everyone 
to hear before you begin the tasks.  
Please remember, once you begin the tasks, if you have any questions quietly raise your hand and a 
moderator will come and answer your questions in private. It is important you do not talk to any other 
participants from this point onwards. 






Header: Part IV, fourth set, first task 
 
 Who should decide which balls are the winning balls? 
Myself          Another Participant 
 
[SCREEN 4.29] 
Header: Part IV, fourth set, second task 
[FORMAT 1 – TO BE SEEN if participant clicked “Myself”] 
You decided that you will decide on your own which balls are “winning balls”..  
The two small circles situated between the scenarios are for you to indicate your preference, the left 
circle corresponds to Scenario A, while the right circle corresponds to Scenario B.   
 Scenario A Scenario B 
  
 150 points if ①②③④⑤ 150 points if ⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩ 
 0 points if ⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩ 0 points if ①②③④⑤ 
 
[FORMAT 2 – TO BE SEEN if participant clicked “Another Participant”] 
You decided that another participant will decide for you which balls are “winning balls”.  
Click "Next" to proceed. 
 
[SCREEN 4.30 – only if participant has to decide for another one] 
Header: Part IV, fourth set, third task 
Your partner wants you to decide for him/her which balls are “winning balls”. Which scenario do you 
choose? Notice that your partner will be informed what your decision was. 
The two small circles situated between the scenarios are for you to indicate your preference, the left 
circle corresponds to Scenario A, while the right circle corresponds to Scenario B.  
 Scenario A Scenario B 
  
 150 points if ①②③④⑤ 150 points if ⑥⑦⑧⑨⑩ 







Header: Part IV, fourth set, summary 
[FORMAT 1 – TO BE SEEN if both clicked “Myself”] 
You decided on your own that you receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ is drawn 
and 0 points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
 
[FORMAT 2 – TO BE SEEN if participant clicked “Myself” and partner “Another participant”] 
You decided on your own that you receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ is drawn 
and 0 points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
Furthermore, you decided for your partner to receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ 
is drawn and 0 points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
 
[FORMAT 3 – TO BE SEEN if participant clicked “Another participant” and partner “Myself”] 
Your partner decided that you receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ is drawn and 0 
points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
 
[FORMAT 4 – TO BE SEEN if both clicked “Another participant”] 
Your partner decided that you receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ is drawn and 0 
points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
Furthermore, you decided for your partner to receive 150 points (0 points) if ball ① ② ③ ④ or ⑤ 
is drawn and 0 points (150) points if ball ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ is drawn. 
 
Click "Next" to proceed. 
********************[END OF PART IV]******************** 
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D.1 Survey Appendix
Figure D.1.1: Household Debt to GDP Ratio, Selected Emerging Markets


















DSR > 0.4 0.733*** 1
RDSR > 0.4 0.771*** 0.481*** 1
> 2 Loans 0.725*** 0.426*** 0.430*** 1
Paid Late/Def. 0.529*** 0.111*** 0.212*** 0.141*** 1
Subj. OI-Index 0.458*** 0.193*** 0.347*** 0.310*** 0.417*** 1
Debt Position 0.485*** 0.250*** 0.439*** 0.348*** 0.302*** 0.763*** 1
Diff. Pay Debt 0.298*** 0.0922** 0.164*** 0.169*** 0.398*** 0.749*** 0.371*** 1
Sacrifice Index 0.240*** 0.0881** 0.169*** 0.174*** 0.233*** 0.728*** 0.330*** 0.305***
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The objective and subjective
over-indebtedness indices are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation of one.
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Table D.1.2: Subsample Probability Question: Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative −0.088 −0.067 −0.024 −0.003 −0.008
(0.166) (0.052) (0.093) (0.043) (0.061)
Negative 0.061 −0.071 0.075 0.079** −0.009
(0.178) (0.064) (0.075) (0.038) (0.066)
Neutral 0.109 0.010 0.033 0.090 −0.014
(0.196) (0.076) (0.066) (0.060) (0.068)
Positive 0.373** 0.105** 0.218*** 0.141*** −0.025
(0.137) (0.047) (0.063) (0.043) (0.058)
Constant −1.978** −0.103 −0.914*** −0.008 −0.448
(0.845) (0.315) (0.316) (0.303) (0.383)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 525 522 525
Adj. R-squared 0.092 0.054 0.124 0.044 0.039
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent
the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the
reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), chil-
dren (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss
from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income
2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social
status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.3: Subsample Probability Question: Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.210 −0.003 0.059 0.282**
(0.131) (0.115) (0.047) (0.106)
Negative 0.124 0.044 0.012 0.207
(0.118) (0.135) (0.027) (0.154)
Neutral 0.019 0.026 0.017 −0.073
(0.115) (0.127) (0.024) (0.094)
Positive 0.343*** 0.213** 0.057** 0.351***
(0.092) (0.083) (0.025) (0.120)
Constant −0.872 −1.816** 0.059 0.154
(0.829) (0.726) (0.181) (0.688)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 523 525
Adj. R-squared 0.109 0.076 0.055 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent
the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the
reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), chil-
dren (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss
from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income
2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social
status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.4: Subsample Financial Decision Makers: Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative −0.098 −0.024 −0.032 −0.027 −0.031
(0.154) (0.055) (0.085) (0.040) (0.067)
Negative −0.016 −0.064 0.076 0.045 −0.069
(0.141) (0.051) (0.064) (0.035) (0.072)
Neutral 0.094 0.002 0.041 0.083 −0.023
(0.197) (0.070) (0.067) (0.060) (0.078)
Positive 0.352** 0.093 0.212*** 0.132*** −0.023
(0.153) (0.055) (0.073) (0.042) (0.064)
Constant −1.394* 0.082 −0.634** 0.076 −0.299
(0.676) (0.340) (0.292) (0.236) (0.308)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 572 575
Adj. R-squared 0.094 0.040 0.141 0.046 0.046
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent
the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the
reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), chil-
dren (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss
from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income
2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social
status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.5: Subsample Financial Decision Makers: Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.141 −0.041 0.047 0.204*
(0.122) (0.134) (0.040) (0.116)
Negative 0.108 −0.042 0.021 0.245
(0.120) (0.116) (0.027) (0.208)
Neutral −0.030 −0.053 0.013 −0.074
(0.115) (0.114) (0.018) (0.135)
Positive 0.252** 0.148** 0.040 0.278*
(0.100) (0.069) (0.026) (0.156)
Constant −0.181 −1.442** 0.194 0.848
(0.710) (0.563) (0.179) (0.787)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 573 575
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.108 0.065 0.132
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent
the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the
reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), chil-
dren (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss
from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income
2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social
status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.6: Interaction of Over-Indebtedness Indices with Conscientiousness
Obj. Index Subj. Debt Index
(1) (2)










Very neg. x Conscient. 0.068 −0.155
(0.127) (0.140)
Negative x Conscient. 0.144* −0.119
(0.076) (0.107)
Neutral x Conscient. 0.056 −0.021
(0.127) (0.103)






Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.130
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent
the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the
reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), chil-
dren (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss
from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income
2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social
status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.7: Objective Over-Indebtedness, Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dummy 0.269** 0.245** 0.131*** 0.095** 0.163*** 0.137** 0.058* 0.077** −0.033 −0.022
(0.097) (0.101) (0.036) (0.038) (0.049) (0.049) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040)
Farm. Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Env. Shocks 0.005*** −0.000 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Econ. Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.014 −0.003 −0.012*** −0.001 −0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000* −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.061 −1.274** 0.150*** 0.133 0.358***−0.518* 0.141*** 0.074 0.237***−0.314
(0.091) (0.546) (0.031) (0.285) (0.042) (0.294) (0.015) (0.226) (0.044) (0.265)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 676 686 676 686 676 683 673 686 676
Adj. R-squ. 0.012 0.099 0.020 0.048 0.019 0.121 0.003 0.037 -0.000 0.055
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the income forecast groups.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age
squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss
from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main
income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no.
of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.8: Subjective Over-Indebtedness, Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Forecast Dummy 0.063 0.172* 0.105 0.165* −0.005 0.019 0.054 0.146
(0.097) (0.093) (0.094) (0.086) (0.020) (0.024) (0.079) (0.087)
Farming Shocks −0.001 0.001 −0.000** −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.000 0.003** −0.001 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 −0.006 0.003 −0.006
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.037 −0.430 −0.044 −1.447*** 0.066*** 0.152 −0.100* 0.377
(0.040) (0.566) (0.045) (0.504) (0.011) (0.147) (0.050) (0.584)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 676 686 676 684 674 686 676
Adj. R-squared -0.001 0.133 0.001 0.099 -0.001 0.073 -0.001 0.117
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the income forecast
groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional
controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss
from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks,
main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances,
monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference,
self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.9: Certainty Measure - Objective Over-Indebtedness -
Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Forecast Dummy 0.242** 0.096** 0.130** 0.079** −0.023
(0.103) (0.040) (0.050) (0.035) (0.041)
Certainty 0.127* 0.053** 0.043 −0.008 0.062**
(0.061) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
Constant −1.406** 0.080 −0.587* 0.160 −0.443
(0.526) (0.286) (0.299) (0.247) (0.262)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 664 661 664
Adj. R-squared 0.102 0.056 0.121 0.035 0.063
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and pos-
itive represent the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income
forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children
(0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks,
loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks,
main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main in-
come remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working
members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table D.1.10: Certainty Measure - Subjective Over-Indebtedness -
Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Forecast Dummy 0.156 0.160* 0.014 0.133
(0.094) (0.091) (0.022) (0.091)
Certainty 0.064 0.090 0.005 0.023
(0.089) (0.066) (0.021) (0.107)
Constant −0.609 −1.761*** 0.154 0.331
(0.630) (0.571) (0.153) (0.726)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 662 664
Adj. R-squared 0.133 0.103 0.072 0.112
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered
standard errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and pos-
itive represent the income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income
forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children
(0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks,
loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main
income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income re-
mittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members
in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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D.2 The Qualitative Forecast Error
Deriving the Qualitative Forecast Error
We develop a measure of expectation accuracy closely following Souleles (2004) and Hyytinen
and Putkuri (2018), which enables us to replicate the latter authors’ results. We make use of the
available panel data and combine categorical answers to the question, “How do you think your
average monthly income will develop in the next twelve months?” (Et−1(Inci,t)) asked in 2016
(one year prior to our survey) with responses to the question “Do you think your household is
better off than last year” asked in 2017 (A(Inci,t)).1 We call the difference between these two
questions qualitative forecast error:
Qualitative Forecast Error = A(Inci,t) − Et−1(Inci,t) (D.2.1)
A positive qualitative forecast error occurs if the expected household situation is better than
the realized one and a negative if the opposite is true. We form five categories ranging from a
very negative to a very positive qualitative forecast error, which enter the regression analysis
as dummy variables. The category with households making no forecast error serves as omitted
group.
As the qualitative forecast error is derived at the household level, the respondent may not
be the same for all three data points. Therefore, we re-run the analysis for a sub-sample with
only identical respondents, which does not change the results. We assume that the household’s
qualitative assessment regarding its own development stays similar for a time period of two
years and, thus, is able to explain indebtedness in 2017. There are two reasons encouraging this
view: We are able to control for a rich set of socio-economic variables that capture household
formation and, as incomes are rather stationary, expectations may also change slowly.
Results for the Qualitative Forecast Error
The regressions we run for the qualitative forecast error take the same form as the ones for the
quantitative income forecast (standard errors are clustered at the district level):
Over − Indebtedness Indexi = β0 + β1Qual.FEi + X
′
iβ2 + ϵi (D.2.2)
Results for the objective and subjective OI-Indices are presented in Tables D.2.1 and D.2.2.
With regards to the relationship between the objective OI-Index and the qualitative forecast
error, we find that over-indebtedness increases by 0.42 points if respondents exhibit a very
positive forecast error. The results are driven by two components: the remaining debt to
1 Answer options range on a scale from 1-5. For the question asked in 2016, one means “increase
a lot” and five “decrease a lot.” The question asked in 2017 ranges from one being “much
better off” to five “much worse off.”
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service ratio (columns (5) and (6), Table D.2.1) and the probability of whether people paid
late or defaulted (columns (7) and (8)). The results are similar to those of the quantitative
income forecast. We again find that very positive forecasts are related to a higher probability
of being objectively over-indebted. Point estimates are slightly higher for results from the
qualitative forecast error. Regarding the impact of losses from shocks as well as additional
control variables, results are similar to those of the quantitative income forecast. Overall, results
from the qualitative forecast error confirm the findings from the quantitative income forecast:
positive future income expectations are related to increasing objective over-indebtedness.
Table D.2.1: Qualitative Forecast Error - Main Results Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative 0.130 0.179 −0.089 −0.073 0.118 0.148 0.106 0.109 0.024 0.034
(0.222) (0.236) (0.061) (0.067) (0.129) (0.142) (0.106) (0.101) (0.067) (0.065)
Negative −0.158**−0.055 −0.046 −0.030 −0.033 0.006 −0.026 −0.003 −0.076 −0.033
(0.063) (0.069) (0.032) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029) (0.047) (0.048)
Positive 0.165** 0.069 0.007 −0.009 0.087* 0.044 0.035 0.014 0.069 0.034
(0.064) (0.070) (0.031) (0.034) (0.045) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039)
Very Positive 0.443** 0.410** 0.070 0.052 0.194*** 0.182*** 0.151* 0.149** 0.100 0.093
(0.170) (0.144) (0.073) (0.068) (0.058) (0.050) (0.073) (0.067) (0.063) (0.057)
Farm.Shocks 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Env. Shocks 0.003** −0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Econ. Shocks 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crime Shocks −0.012*** −0.003*** −0.006** −0.002 −0.003
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other Shocks −0.000 −0.000** −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.059 −1.264** 0.184*** 0.190 0.359***−0.508* 0.132*** 0.059 0.214***−0.355
(0.082) (0.584) (0.032) (0.320) (0.032) (0.290) (0.020) (0.229) (0.038) (0.275)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squ. 0.022 0.120 0.002 0.044 0.014 0.124 0.013 0.050 0.011 0.063
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, positive, and very positive represent the forecast groups.
Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, chil-
dren (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income em-
ployed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders
in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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We also find a strongly significant relationship between positive qualitative forecast errors
and subjective over-indebtedness. This relationship is much stronger than for the quantitative
income forecast. Again, we only find a robust relationship for households in the group with the
largest positive forecasts. The subjective OI-Index increases by 0.42 points for respondents who
exhibit very positive forecast errors (columns (1) and (2), Table D.2.2). Mainly, this is due to
the positive relationship between the forecast error and the “debt position” component of the
index and the sacrifice index component.
Table D.2.2: Qualitative Forecast Error - Main Results Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.218 0.140 0.064 0.055 0.052 0.027 0.243 0.167
(0.258) (0.245) (0.230) (0.261) (0.068) (0.060) (0.214) (0.198)
Negative −0.025 0.030 −0.091 −0.011 0.030 0.028 −0.096 −0.046
(0.127) (0.103) (0.072) (0.061) (0.035) (0.031) (0.153) (0.134)
Positive 0.208** 0.105 0.139* 0.065 0.021 0.011 0.265* 0.134
(0.077) (0.083) (0.072) (0.069) (0.016) (0.019) (0.150) (0.133)
Very Positive 0.476** 0.455** 0.351* 0.361** 0.091 0.086 0.352* 0.308*
(0.208) (0.186) (0.177) (0.155) (0.053) (0.053) (0.187) (0.160)
Farming Shocks 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.000 0.002** −0.000* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.003 −0.000 −0.000 −0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
Other Shocks 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant −0.122**−0.499 −0.074 −1.459** 0.043*** 0.122 −0.176** 0.357
(0.057) (0.664) (0.050) (0.530) (0.014) (0.175) (0.072) (0.626)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.102 0.006 0.073 0.012 0.115
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered stan-
dard errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, positive, and very posi-
tive represent the forecast groups. Households with no forecast error serve as the reference
group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-
16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh,
no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Households with a very positive error tend to state more frequently that they “have too
much debt right now” (columns (3) and (4)) and that they make an increasing number of
everyday sacrifices to repay their loans (column (7) and (8)). We conclude that the nature of
the qualitative forecast error being more “subjectively” elicited than the calculated quantitative
income forecast per se, might be reflected in more pronounced results regarding subjectively
“felt” debt. This is also in line with our analysis from the quantitative income forecast that
subjective over-indebtedness may rather be a concept of perceived financial distress affected by
not only the household’s true debt situation but also by respondent characteristics.
Furthermore, we again add income certainty to the regression. Results are presented in
Tables D.2.3 and D.2.4. There is no relationship between future income certainty on objective
and subjective over-indebtedness. For the subjective OI-Indicators, results are in line with those
from the quantitative income forecast. However, they differ for objective over-indebtedness.
Table D.2.3: Objective Over-Indebtedness - Income Certainty
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative 0.180 −0.075 0.151 0.110 0.034
(0.242) (0.067) (0.145) (0.102) (0.066)
Negative −0.056 −0.030 0.007 −0.004 −0.034
(0.068) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029) (0.048)
Positive 0.070 −0.010 0.045 0.015 0.034
(0.069) (0.034) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039)
Very Positive 0.465** 0.093 0.187*** 0.153* 0.104*
(0.164) (0.078) (0.059) (0.074) (0.058)
Certainty 0.046 0.030 0.008 0.004 0.011
(0.049) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024)
Constant −1.481** −0.001 −0.640** 0.066 −0.297
(0.551) (0.295) (0.280) (0.262) (0.261)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 663 663 663 660 663
Adj. R-squared 0.118 0.050 0.122 0.046 0.058
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered S.E. in
parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, positive, and very positive represent the
forecast groups. Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional
controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy
score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks,
loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh,
no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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While we find that higher certainty is related to higher objective over-indebtedness with
respect to the quantitative income forecast, we do not find that relationship with the qualitative
error. This may be due to the more subjective nature of the qualitative forecast error.
Table D.2.4: Subjective Over-Indebtedness - Income Certainty
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.150 0.063 0.026 0.186
(0.242) (0.258) (0.060) (0.192)
Negative 0.028 −0.012 0.028 −0.048
(0.104) (0.061) (0.031) (0.136)
Positive 0.109 0.068 0.011 0.141
(0.085) (0.071) (0.019) (0.135)
Very Positive 0.578** 0.429** 0.116* 0.400**
(0.211) (0.191) (0.064) (0.169)
Certainty −0.035 −0.033 0.010 −0.103
(0.058) (0.048) (0.012) (0.072)
Constant −0.356 −1.374** 0.128 0.605
(0.667) (0.563) (0.181) (0.629)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 663 663 661 663
Adj. R-squared 0.143 0.104 0.076 0.121
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered S.E. in
parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, positive, and very positive represent the
forecast groups. Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional
controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy
score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks,
loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh,
no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Overall, results from the qualitative forecast error confirm the main findings from the quan-
titative income forecast: very positive forecasts are related to a higher level of over-indebtedness.
There is no such relationship for negative forecasts and over-indebtedness. The results also
support the analysis from the quantitative income forecast that subjective and objective over-
indebtedness indicators measure different dimensions of indebtedness. Finally, our results from
the qualitative forecast error are in line with those of Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018). They report
that households with a very positive forecast error are more likely to be over-indebted and that




Table D.3.1: Descriptive Statistics by Participation in Game
Full Sample Participating Non-Participating Difference
Sex 1.66 1.63 1.76 0.12∗∗∗
Age 57.01 56.35 59.78 3.43∗∗∗
Relation to HH Head 1.67 1.66 1.71 0.05
Marital Status 2.15 2.14 2.22 0.09
Main Occupation 4.97 4.66 6.29 1.64∗
Years of Schooling 5.74 5.83 5.33 −0.51∗
Children (0-6 years) 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.01
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.02
Numeracy 2.05 2.13 1.69 −0.45∗∗∗
Health Status 1.40 1.38 1.46 0.08
BMI 23.64 23.70 23.41 −0.28
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.56 1.60 0.03
Self Control 21.26 21.02 22.26 1.24
Risk Taking 3.95 3.99 3.78 −0.21
Fin. Risk Taking 3.94 4.04 3.57 −0.47∗∗
FL-Score 5.50 5.63 4.95 −0.68∗∗∗
Monthly Inc. 2017 19197.02 19313.71 18704.57 −609.14
Obj. OI-Index 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
Subj. OI-Index −0.00 −0.01 0.03 0.04
Morning 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00
Midday 0.24 0.26 0.17 −0.09∗∗∗
Observations 748 604 144 748
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Only significant
variables reported, remaining variables are the same as in Table D.3.1.
Table D.3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Excluded Sample
Full Sample In Out Difference
Sex 1.65 1.64 1.67 −0.03
Age 56.40 56.16 57.75 −1.59
Relation to HH Head 1.68 1.70 1.56 0.14
Marital Status 2.14 2.13 2.24 −0.11
Main Occupation 4.68 4.79 4.08 0.71
Years of Schooling 5.87 5.92 5.60 0.32
Children (0-6 years) 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.13∗∗∗
Numeracy 2.13 2.14 2.04 0.11
Health Status 1.38 1.38 1.38 0.00
BMI 23.69 23.58 24.27 −0.68
Fin. Decision Maker 1.56 1.57 1.52 0.05
Self Control 21.05 20.94 21.62 −0.67
Risk Taking 3.98 4.02 3.74 0.28
Fin. Risk Taking 4.03 4.06 3.90 0.15
FL-Score 5.62 5.66 5.40 0.26
Monthly Inc. 2017 18523.65 18653.06 17798.04 855.02
Obj. OI-Index 0.01 0.01 −0.02 0.03
Subj. OI-Index −0.03 −0.04 0.05 −0.09
Read Alone 1.45 1.44 1.49 −0.04
Difficulties 1.15 1.14 1.21 −0.08
Observations 555 471 84 555
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Figure D.3.1: CDF for the Expected Rank by Treatment, After the Main Quiz
The Rationals
As mentioned above, so far we have excluded experiment participants who want to buy more
than they expect to earn. We refer to these persons as “rationals.” In this section, we discuss
whether these participants are actually rational or had difficulties in understanding the exper-
iment and how including these observations change our results. Comparing our main sample
against all rationals does not yield results that differ substantially from those presented in Ta-
ble D.3.3. However, if we divide the rationals into those participants who want to buy more
than expected earnings could pay for but less than eight goods and those who want to buy ex-
actly eight goods (which would be the “truly” rational decision), we find interesting differences.
The former group has significantly lower education, numeracy, and financial literacy than the
main sample (see Table D.3.4). We see this as evidence that they may have had difficulties
understanding the game (from here on, we refer to these individuals as non-rationals). It does
not seem to be the case, however, that these are persons who generally have problems control-
ling their own spending behavior (also outside the lab) because their debt to service ratio is
significantly smaller compared to the main sample.
The remaining rationals, however, not only have significantly higher numeracy and financial
literacy, but also have a better understanding of the game as perceived by the interviewers (see
Table D.3.5) (for non-rationals the difference is in the opposite direction, but not significant).
Thus, these participants might have taken advantage of the set-up and reasoned that it is
optimal for them to buy as many goods as possible because of the large discount.
Including these two groups into the analysis, the results change as anticipated: the effect
of expected rank on goods turns insignificant and negligible (see Table D.3.6). All other effects
are almost unchanged.
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Table D.3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Non-Rationals (only significant effects
reported)
Full Sample Others Non-Rationals Difference
Years of Schooling 5.84 5.91 5.00 0.91∗∗∗
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.14∗∗
Numeracy 2.10 2.13 1.76 0.36∗
FL-Score 5.60 5.64 5.10 0.54∗
Observations 532 490 42 532
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Table D.3.5: Descriptive Statistics for Rationals (only significant effects
reported)
Full Sample Others Rationals Difference
Main Occupation 4.70 4.76 3.48 1.28∗
Numeracy 2.16 2.13 2.78 −0.66∗
FL-Score 5.66 5.64 6.22 −0.58∗
Difficulties in Game 1.15 1.16 1.00 0.16∗∗∗
Observations 513 490 23 513
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Table D.3.6: Consumption Decision including Rationals
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.373** −0.234 −0.254
(0.168) (0.199) (0.199)
Exp. Rank 0.048 0.054
(0.052) (0.052)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 511 511 511 511
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors
in parentheses. Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank corre-





Table D.4.1: Additional Regression on Big 5 Measures - Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative −0.125 −0.032 −0.097* −0.026 −0.073 0.006 0.017 −0.021 0.001 0.008
(0.151) (0.137) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.076) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.059)
Negative 0.050 0.056 −0.067 −0.052 0.075 0.097* 0.081** 0.062** −0.029 −0.035
(0.134) (0.133) (0.045) (0.050) (0.058) (0.056) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.061)
Neutral 0.153 0.111 0.025 −0.001 0.079 0.059 0.074 0.087* −0.002 −0.019
(0.153) (0.160) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.045) (0.050) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.311** 0.098** 0.084* 0.187** 0.206*** 0.109*** 0.128***−0.054 −0.050
(0.134) (0.135) (0.042) (0.046) (0.072) (0.072) (0.038) (0.040) (0.055) (0.060)
Openness 0.100*** 0.028*** 0.040** 0.027** 0.022
(0.030) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Conscient. −0.083** −0.016 −0.036** −0.025 −0.020
(0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Extraversion −0.003 0.013 −0.013 −0.018 0.014
(0.038) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Agreeabl. 0.039 0.007 −0.008 0.009 0.034*
(0.049) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Neuroticism 0.033 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.029*
(0.034) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant −0.073 −1.493* 0.189*** 0.053 0.343***−0.464 0.099*** 0.073 0.245***−0.539*
(0.144) (0.783) (0.048) (0.367) (0.072) (0.360) (0.019) (0.264) (0.063) (0.305)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squ. 0.014 0.108 0.025 0.047 0.025 0.129 0.007 0.046 -0.003 0.061
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in paren-
theses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the income forecast groups.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age
squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss
from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main
income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no.
of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
228 Appendix D
Table D.4.2: Additional Regression on Big 5 Measures - Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.182 0.213* 0.040 0.035 0.065** 0.056 0.118 0.252**
(0.112) (0.115) (0.114) (0.103) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.102)
Negative 0.157 0.136 0.096 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.108 0.155
(0.135) (0.113) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.157)
Neutral −0.007 0.030 −0.021 −0.003 0.022 0.030 −0.098 −0.061
(0.104) (0.089) (0.096) (0.090) (0.021) (0.020) (0.128) (0.100)
Positive 0.144 0.239** 0.113 0.170** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.206*
(0.086) (0.091) (0.071) (0.077) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.113)
Openness 0.094** 0.058* 0.012 0.113**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.009) (0.049)
Conscientiousness −0.007 0.005 −0.017 0.054
(0.054) (0.042) (0.014) (0.056)
Extraversion −0.042 −0.055 0.007 −0.072
(0.042) (0.037) (0.012) (0.042)
Agreeableness −0.021 −0.026 −0.001 −0.019
(0.042) (0.037) (0.011) (0.050)
Neuroticism 0.058* 0.031 −0.002 0.123**
(0.031) (0.029) (0.009) (0.044)
Constant −0.115 −0.577 −0.064 −1.401** 0.035** 0.183 −0.131 −0.209
(0.082) (0.706) (0.081) (0.646) (0.016) (0.154) (0.111) (0.812)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.143 -0.002 0.098 0.002 0.072 -0.001 0.141
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard
errors in parentheses. The variables very negative, negative, neutral, and positive represent the
income forecast groups. Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference
group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), fi-
nancial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental
shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of
working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table D.4.3: Full Regression Output for Main Regression - Objective OI
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
Very Negative −0.125 −0.017 −0.097* −0.022 −0.073 0.011 0.017 −0.015 0.001 0.010
(0.151) (0.143) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.079) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060)
Negative 0.050 0.058 −0.067 −0.054 0.075 0.100* 0.081** 0.066** −0.029 −0.037
(0.134) (0.132) (0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.058)
Neutral 0.153 0.135 0.025 0.002 0.079 0.067 0.074 0.095* −0.002 −0.010
(0.153) (0.168) (0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.333** 0.098** 0.087* 0.187** 0.210*** 0.109*** 0.133*** −0.054 −0.037
(0.134) (0.136) (0.042) (0.047) (0.072) (0.069) (0.038) (0.041) (0.055) (0.060)
Monthly Inc. 2017 −0.000 −0.000* −0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.061*** 0.007 0.031*** 0.015* 0.019***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Age Squared −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score 0.021 0.008 0.018*** −0.010 0.012
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk Preference 0.054*** 0.013* 0.026*** 0.012 0.013
(0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-Control 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Main Inc. Farming −0.122 −0.066 −0.006 −0.090 0.032
(0.155) (0.059) (0.091) (0.057) (0.044)
Main Inc. Employed −0.194 −0.106* −0.032 −0.022 −0.063
(0.166) (0.059) (0.076) (0.057) (0.055)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. −0.163 −0.087 −0.025 −0.025 −0.053
(0.212) (0.089) (0.099) (0.068) (0.061)
Main Inc. Remitt. −0.151 −0.068 −0.016 −0.070 −0.015
(0.144) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) (0.037)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.085* −0.012 −0.057** 0.007 −0.045**
(0.047) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.092 0.012 0.079** 0.008 0.019
(0.082) (0.048) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.030 −0.017 0.017 0.025 0.009
(0.040) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
No. of Elders 0.036 0.003 0.036* 0.034* −0.032
(0.040) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
No. of Working Mem. 0.072* 0.022 0.008 0.002 0.051**
(0.042) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Total HH Education −0.001 −0.000 0.002 −0.000 −0.003
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Farming Shocks −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.005*** −0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.016* −0.004* −0.013*** −0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Social Status −0.140* −0.021 −0.028 −0.056*** −0.051
(0.071) (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.032)
Constant −0.073 −1.425** 0.189*** 0.119 0.343*** −0.617** 0.099*** −0.016 0.245*** −0.291
(0.144) (0.576) (0.048) (0.296) (0.072) (0.286) (0.019) (0.243) (0.063) (0.280)
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.099 0.025 0.046 0.025 0.125 0.007 0.044 -0.003 0.053
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table D.4.4: Full Regression Output for Main Regression - Subjective OI
Subj. Index Debt Position Diff. Pay off Debt Sacrifice Index
Very Negative 0.182 0.215* 0.040 0.036 0.065** 0.058 0.118 0.245**
(0.112) (0.122) (0.114) (0.110) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.103)
Negative 0.157 0.150 0.096 0.046 0.037 0.033 0.108 0.178
(0.135) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.154)
Neutral −0.007 0.048 −0.021 0.008 0.022 0.031 −0.098 −0.035
(0.104) (0.092) (0.096) (0.094) (0.021) (0.019) (0.128) (0.095)
Positive 0.144 0.258** 0.113 0.181** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.245*
(0.086) (0.101) (0.071) (0.084) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.122)
Monthly Inc. 2017 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.007* 0.042**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.018)
Age Squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score −0.026** 0.007 −0.007** −0.047**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018)
Risk Preference 0.044** 0.057*** 0.003 0.023
(0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.019)
Self-Control 0.009** 0.005 0.001 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Main Inc. Farming −0.192** −0.159 0.007 −0.323**
(0.078) (0.100) (0.032) (0.140)
Main Inc. Employed 0.042 0.017 0.047 −0.138
(0.121) (0.114) (0.037) (0.176)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. −0.019 −0.019 0.031 −0.178
(0.139) (0.108) (0.046) (0.164)
Main Inc. Remitt. −0.159 −0.251** 0.020 −0.176
(0.102) (0.090) (0.036) (0.165)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.091 −0.101** −0.012 −0.046
(0.062) (0.048) (0.016) (0.063)
Children (7-10 yrs) −0.084 0.039 −0.026 −0.162
(0.075) (0.071) (0.019) (0.094)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.007 −0.002 −0.022 0.123*
(0.063) (0.037) (0.022) (0.066)
No. of Elders 0.026 0.043 0.012 −0.045
(0.036) (0.042) (0.011) (0.056)
No. of Working Mem. 0.121*** 0.123*** −0.005 0.182***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.014) (0.045)
Total HH Education −0.009** −0.008** 0.001 −0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Farming Shocks −0.001 0.002 −0.000* −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.001 0.003** −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 −0.006 0.003 −0.005
(0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Social Status −0.353*** −0.184*** −0.069*** −0.371***
(0.079) (0.045) (0.023) (0.092)
Constant −0.115 −0.482 −0.064 −1.480*** 0.035** 0.140 −0.131 0.344
(0.082) (0.593) (0.081) (0.514) (0.016) (0.155) (0.111) (0.591)
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.133 -0.002 0.094 0.002 0.073 -0.001 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table D.4.5: Additional Regression on Predictors for Income Forecast Groups
Very Negative Negative Mildly Negative Neutral Positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Monthly Inc. 2017 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 −0.000** −0.000** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.016** 0.018*** 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.006 −0.008 −0.006 −0.015* −0.019**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age Squared −0.000** −0.000** −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score −0.022*** −0.020*** −0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.003 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk Preference 0.006 0.007 −0.015* −0.015 0.018** 0.015* −0.008 −0.007 −0.001 −0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-Control −0.002 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Main Inc. Farming 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.032 0.035 0.008 0.011 0.058 0.053 −0.230*** −0.236***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.044) (0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.062) (0.069) (0.070)
Main Inc. Employed 0.184*** 0.197*** 0.086* 0.089* 0.046 0.034 −0.021 −0.021 −0.295*** −0.298***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.064) (0.054) (0.057) (0.078) (0.080)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. 0.144*** 0.155*** 0.116 0.107 −0.146** −0.145** 0.070 0.073 −0.184* −0.190**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) (0.071) (0.091) (0.087)
Main Inc. Remitt. 0.075* 0.089** 0.001 0.007 0.103 0.094 0.062 0.060 −0.241*** −0.251***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.067) (0.083) (0.083)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.006 −0.002 0.045 0.044 −0.011 −0.020 −0.022 −0.019 −0.006 −0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
Children (7-10 yrs) −0.038 −0.038 0.004 −0.009 0.094** 0.095** −0.039* −0.035 −0.021 −0.014
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.018 −0.028 −0.028 −0.000 0.004 −0.023 −0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)
No. of Elders 0.047** 0.045** 0.026 0.024 0.008 0.008 −0.023 −0.017 −0.058** −0.060**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
No. of Working Mem. 0.021 0.019 0.037* 0.035* −0.003 0.000 −0.004 −0.004 −0.050** −0.050**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Total HH Education −0.003* −0.003* −0.000 −0.000 −0.003 −0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Social Status −0.021 −0.028 −0.015 −0.015 −0.031 −0.034 0.010 0.006 0.057** 0.070**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
Farming Shocks 0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Environ. Shocks 0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Economic Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.006** −0.001 −0.003** 0.000 0.009**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Other Shocks 0.000* −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Certainty −0.001 −0.012 0.020 0.033 −0.040*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.022) (0.019)
Constant −0.286 −0.363* 0.035 0.151 0.209 0.089 0.207 0.075 0.835*** 1.047***
(0.219) (0.209) (0.259) (0.267) (0.264) (0.280) (0.220) (0.247) (0.261) (0.269)
Observations 676 664 676 664 676 664 676 664 676 664
Adj. R-squared 0.221 0.224 0.025 0.017 0.041 0.037 0.063 0.055 0.072 0.087







It contains the equally weighted average of z-scores of four debt in-
dicators. The procedure of aggregating these specific outcomes is
adapted from Kling et al. (2007). It “improves statistical power”
and helps “to detect effects that go in the same direction” among
indicators (Kling et al., 2007, p.89). The objective over-indebtedness
index captures households with a debt service to income ratio greater
than 40%, a remaining debt service to income ratio greater than 40%,
households, who defaulted on a loan or paid late in the last 12 months
and households with more than two loans. The literature has defined
(kind of arbitrary) thresholds for the DSR indicator beyond which
a household is over-indebted. A household is deemed over-indebted,
for example, if its DSR exceeds - depending on the study - 0.3 to 0.5
(Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017). Hence, we set the over-indebtedness
threshold at a DSR of 0.4 following what we deem is best practice




It contains the equally weighted average of z-scores of three debt
indicators: the standardized sacrifice index and two assessments on
whether the household has too much debt and whether it has diffi-




It is the ratio of all annual interest and principal payments on loans
divided by all annual income generating activities of the household.
Debt Position The question if the household has too much debt right now is asked
twice in almost identical fashion. For this reason, we combine both
questions by deriving two dummy variables, standardize them and
calculate their mean. The exact formulation of both questions is the
following: “I have too much debt right now” (Disagree fully, disagree
strongly, disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little,
agree strongly, agree fully) and “Which of the following best describes
your current debt position?” (I have too little debt; I have about the
right amount of debt; I have too much debt right now.). The first
dummy equals 1 if the respondent at least agrees a little and the
second equals 1 if they feel they have too much debt right now.
Difficulties to Pay
Off Debt
Dummy variable derived from the categorical question with answer
options 1-“I have no difficulties paying off my debt”, 2-“I have some
difficulties [...]”, and 3-“I have a lot of difficulties [...]”, where 1 and




The ratio relates a household’s actual, yearly debt burden to the
average income of 2016 and 2017.
Sacrifice Index This index is adapted by , which asks for several sacrifices house-
holds may make because they lack money. Like them, we combine
these indicators into one “sacrifice index” applying polichoric princi-
pal component analysis such that a continuous index is created giving
more weight to more serious sacrifices people have to make and trans-
forming the categorical responses into a continuous measure In total,
we ask respondents about ten possible sacrifices both for a shorter
term (i.e. twelve months) and for a longer term (five years). Un-
like , we do not pose questions about the acceptability of sacrifices
made but ask only for the frequency of distress events that occurred
in the household. We added two questions introduced by and two
new questions that are more context-specific to the rural setting in
North-East Thailand. Depending on the question asked, respondents
could answer on a scale from 1-3 (e.g. had to work much more, more,
not more) or from 1-5 (e.g. had to buy less food: never, sometimes,




Relative change between expected median income from the proba-
bilistic expectations elicitation and the actual income in 2017.
Qualitative
Forecast Error
Difference between expected income in 2016 and actual welfare of the





Answer to “Do you think your household is better off than last year?”,
from 1-“much worse off” to 5-“much better off”.
Certainty Answer to “How certain are you that this income development will
truly become reality?”. The scale ranges from 1-“Very uncertain” to
4 “Very certain”.
Expected income Answer to “How do you think your average monthly income will de-








Treatment 1=Hard Quiz, 2=Easy Quiz.
Expected Rank Rank that participant expects to reach after taking the test quiz
from 1-“Least questions answered correctly” to 10-“Most questions
answered correctly”.
Number of Goods Amount of goods participant wants to buy.
Overconfidence Difference between expected and actual rank of participant.
Overborrowing Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings including endowment can pay for.
Overspending Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings excluding endowment can pay for.
Controls
Age Age of respondent in years.
Age Squared Squared term of age.
Financial Literacy
Score
Our index is based on seven questions eliciting financial knowledge,
on nine assessments concerning financial behavior, and on three ques-
tions regarding financial attitude. The overall index is composed of
the sum of the sub indices and ranges between 0 and 22 with higher
numbers indicating a higher level of financial literacy.
Financial Risk
Taking
Answer to “Attitudes towards risk change in different situations.
When thinking about investing and borrowing are you a person who
is fully prepared to take risk or do you try and avoid taking risk?”,
from 1-“Fully unwilling to take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”.
Part of our risk preference measure.
Main Income
Dummies
We include four income dummies that tell us whether the main in-




Monthly household income in 2017
Number of
children
This variable is split in three age categories for the analysis. Num-
ber of children aged 0-6 years; Number of children aged 7-10 years;
Number of children aged 11-16 years.
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We include information on monetary losses from various shock events
for 2016 and 2017. We hereby separate by five shock categories:





Number of working household members.
Risk Preference Equally weighted average of risk taking and financial risk taking.
Risk Taking Answer to “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risk?”, from 1-“Fully unwilling
to take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”. Part of our risk
preference measure.
Self-Control We use the questions introduced by and add up the Likert-Scale
answers to one score. The scale ranges from 1-“Disagree fully” to
7-“Agree fully”. The final score ranges from 0 to 49 where lower
numbers indicate a higher level of self-control.
Total HH
Education
Sum of years all working household members went to school.
Big Five -
Personality Traits
Agreeableness A person, who scores high on Agreeableness (Item scale ranges from
1 to 7 for all items) has a forgiving nature, is considerate and kind
and not rude to others.
Conscientiousness A person, who scores high on Conscientiousness does a thorough job,
works efficiently and is not lazy.
Extraversion A person, who scores high on Extraversion is communicative,
talkative, outgoing and not reserved.
Neuroticism A person, who scores high on Neuroticism worries a lot, gets nervous
easily and is not relaxed.
Openness A person, who scores high on Openness values artistic experiences, is





BMI Respondent’s Body Mass Index as of 2017.
Difficulties in
Game
Answer to “Did the respondent have difficulties answering questions?”
with 1-“Not at all”, 2-“Yes, a little bit”, 3-“Yes, very much”. Filled
in by the enumerator.
Financial
Decision Maker
Answer to question “Who is responsible for making day-to-day de-
cisions about money in your household?” where means 1-“Myself”,
2-“Myself and someone else” and 3-“Someone else”.
Health Status Health status of the respondent in 2017: 1-“Good”, 2-“Can manage”,
3-“Sick”
Marital Status Respondent’s marital status: 1-“Unmarried”, 2-“Married”, 3-
“Widow”, 4-“Divorced/separated”.
Morning Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place in
the morning, i.e. before 11am.
Midday Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place
around noon, i.e. between 12am and 2pm.
Numeracy The numeracy index is based on six questions about simple arithmetic
problems. It ranges between zero and six. Zero, if the respondent
does not give any correct answer and six if the respondent gives only
correct answers.
Read Alone Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant could read




Respondent’s relation to the household head: 1-“Head”, 2-
“Wife/Husband”, 3-“Son/Daughter”, 4-“Son/Daughter in law”, 5-
“Father/Mother”, 8-“Grandchild”, 9-“Nephew/Niece”, 11-“Other rel-
atives”.
Sex Sex of respondent: 1-“Male”, 2-“Female”.
Years of
Schooling
Years respondent went to school.
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Experimental Material
Material D.4.1: Instructions Experiment
Read out:
I want you to ask some test question to check whether the procedure of the ranking is clear to 
you. If not, I will explain it again.
After you answered this first set of questions, you have to decide how many goods you want 
to buy. The 40 THB that are already in your account are given you as a credit that you can use 
to buy the goods. With the money you earn in the second round in the quiz you will pay back 
your credit. If you spend more money than you earned we will keep the money from your 
account and give you the goods you have bought. If you earned more than you bought, you 
pay back your credit and can keep the rest of the money and goods.
[Hand respondent the first quiz (green paper). If respondent cannot read, assist in all tasks]
If you don’t have any further questions we start with the first round. [FAQ]
In the first round, you will get 7 test questions, which are very similar to the questions you will 
get in the second round. But again, you can ONLY earn money in the second round. 
[Show picture of ranks, payoffs and people]
Test Question 1: What does it mean to be ranked 6? [Open answer; enumerator please 
continue if you think the respondent gave a correct answer]
Test Question 2: How much money do you earn if you are ranked 6? [Answer: 10 THB]
Test Question 3: How many goods you can buy for 10 THB? [Answer: 1]
The money you earn, will be put on your game account which already has 40 THB in it. As you 
can see from the picture, you can earn up to additional 40 THB. The quiz for which you will 
receive money will be played in the second round.
Experiment Script
We want to play a market game with you. In this game you can earn money and buy goods. 
The kind of goods you can buy are placed right next to you. Each piece has a value of 20 THB, 
but we offer them to you for a discounted price of 10 THB. You don’t have to buy one kind of 
product, but can buy different kinds (for example 2 chocolate bars and 1 bag of chips). If you 
don’t like to buy anything you can keep the money you earn. 
To earn money, you have to play a quiz which consists of 15 questions. 10 persons from 
another village, which is similar to your village, took the same quiz before. The amount of 
money you earn is dependent on how many questions you answered right in comparison to 
these villagers. In this picture, the person who has given the most correct answers is ranked 
10, the person who has given the second most correct answers is ranked 9, the person who 
has given the third most correct answers is ranked 8, and so on. In the picture you can also see 
how much money you will earn dependent on your ranking. For example, if you are ranked 7 
you will earn 20 THB. Please take your time to understand how you can earn money in this 
game.
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[Please note which goods were finally kept]
Thank you very much for your participation, we hope you enjoyed the game. I will now 
calculate your earnings and inform my STL which will bring you your payment and goods.
Question 3 [Only ask if expected earning of respondent was more than 0 THB]: Would you 
have buy less goods, if you thought your earnings would be lower?
[Calculate rank, earnings and cash/goods payoff. Wait for STL to hand the money/goods]
{In the very unlikely case, that more goods were wanted than earnings are generated:}
I calculated your earnings and you cannot afford all the goods you want to buy. You want to 
buy […] goods but can only afford […] goods. Please, choose which goods you want to keep.
[Hand the second quiz, set your alarm clock to 10 minutes and tell respondent to start]
The time is up. Please, hand me the second quiz. Before we conclude, I have some final 
questions for you.
Question 1: After taking the quiz, when 1 is the villager who gave the least correct answers 
and 10 is the villager who gave the most correct answers, where do you see yourself in this 
picture?
Question 2 [Only ask if expected earning of respondent was smaller than 40 THB]: Would you 
have buy more goods, if you thought your earnings would be higher?
[Set your alarm clock to 5 minutes and tell the respondent to start]
The 5 minutes are over. Please, stop answering the test quiz and make your decisions on the 
white sheet of paper. Give me a sign when you have made your decisions, then I will collect 
the white paper.
[During the time the respondent takes the second quiz, evaluate the white sheet of paper 
and enter the numbers on the tablet]
Now, in the second round, you play the quiz that decides how much money you earn. You 
have 10 minutes to answer the questions. Afterwards, I will collect the quiz, calculate your 
earnings and hand you the goods and money.
Please read through the questions on the green sheet of paper and try to answer as many 
questions as you can. You have 5 minutes to answer the questions. I will tell you when the 5 
minutes are over. After you have finished the quiz, please have a look on the white piece of 
paper and answer these questions and make your buying decision. When you have finished 
the first round, I will collect the white piece of paper. You can keep the green paper with the 
test quiz. It is only for you, so that you know what kind of questions to expect in the quiz of 
the second round.
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Material D.4.2: Guideline for Interviewers to Answer Questions from
Participants
Frequently Asked Questions
Respondent: “What if I don’t want to buy anything?”
You: “You don’t have to buy anything, you can also keep the money.”
Respondent: “Can I spend all my money on buying products?”
You: “Yes you can, but if you do not earn enough money to pay all the products you wanted to
buy, you will only get the part of the products you can afford.”
Respondent: “Can I change my buying decision after I took the second quiz?”
You: “No, your decision is fixed. Only in the case where you wanted to buy more products than
you have money available, you can decide on which products to keep”
Respondent: “What happens if I spend more money on products than I earn?”
You: “Then we will take the money from the 40 THB that are already on your virtual bank
account for the game. If even this is not enough, you only get as many products as you have
money. We will NOT take any out of your pocket and we will NOT take money from the 50 THB
you get for the questionnaire. We only count the money you get in the game.”
Respondent: “Does being on rank 7 means that I need to get 7 questions correct?”
You: “No! It means that three persons have answered more questions correctly than you and six
persons have answered less questions correctly than you. The rank is always dependent on how
many questions you have correct in comparison to the other 10 villagers. In this case you are as
good as the villager who was ranked 7.”
Respondent: “Does it make a difference which questions I answer correctly?”
You: “No, all questions count the same.”
Respondent: “Do the products really cost 20 THB per piece?”
You: “Yes, if you buy them as presented here, they cost 20 THB.”
[Respondent: “What if I don’t know the answer to a question at all?”
You: “Just take a guess. You don’t receive some sort of minus points for wrong answers.”]
Respondent: “What if I cannot finish the quiz in time?”
You: “That is no problem. Please, try to answer as many questions as you can in the given time
frame. There will be no minus points for unanswered questions.”
Respondent: “Who are the other 10 persons who have answered the quiz before?”
You: “They are just some randomly selected persons from another village, that is similar to your
village.”
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2. What is the most common blood 
type in the world?
7. Which are the Japanese cities that were hit by atomic 
bombs of the U.S. army during WWII?
5. How many days does Mercury need 
to orbit the sun?
3. Which animal cannot fly? 4. Which fruit contains the most 
amount of Vitamin C per 100g?
6. Which animal is not part of the 
Zodiac?




















5. Which of these countries does 
NOT border Germany?
6. Which is the most drank 
beverage in the world?
Coffee
1. What is the national animal of 
China?
7. Which country is the origin of 
pizza?
8. Which of these four is the 
biggest organ of the human body?
Quiz
2. If Thai currency is THB, what is 
the currency of Germany?
3. How many provinces does Japan 
have currently?
4. Which is the heaviest insect in 
the world?
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Black, Blue and Gold Blueberry
Black, Red and White Pear
Black, Red and Gold Apple









3 seasons including rainy, 
winter and spring  
2 seasons including summer 
and winter15. Who is the God of Islam?
10. What color is traditionally not 
associated with Christmas Day?
13. What color will you get if you 
mix blue, red and yellow?
14. How many seasons are there in 
Germany? And which ones?
11. Of which colors is the flag of 
Germany composed of?
12. Which fruit is blue?
4 seasons including spring, 
summer, autumn and winter.
9. Who is the president of 
Indonesia?
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3. Which animal cannot jump? 4. Which fruit is prohibited in public 
transport around South-East Asia?
6. Which animal is not part of the 
Chinese Zodiac?
Test Quiz
5. Which of these countries does NOT 
border Thailand?
2. What color will you get if you mix 
blue and yellow?
7. What is the most common eye color 
in the world?





Naga (Thai Dragon) Franc
76 provinces Blue Shark
77 provinces Killer Whale
78 provinces Blue Whale
79 provinces Elephant
6 3 seasons including summer, rainy and winter
5 2 seasons including summer and rainy 






5. How many months have 31 
days?
6. How many seasons are there in 
Thailand? And which ones?
4 seasons including summer, 
rainy, autumn and winter
1. What is the national animal of 
Thailand?
7. Which of these do you need to 
make traditional Som Tam Thai?
8. Which is the biggest sense organ 
of the human body?
Quiz
2. If Thai currency is THB, what is 
the currency of USA?
3. How many provinces does 
Thailand have currently?






Bill Clinton Light blue
Green, White and Red Durian
Green, White and Blue Jackfruit
Blue, White and Red Rambutan










15. Who is the son of god of 
Christianity?
10. What is the color of the day on 
Wednesday?
13. Which reign of Thailand 
abolished slavery?
Germany
14. Which country has the highest 
total rice consumption?
11. Of which colors is the flag of 
Thailand composed of?
12. Which fruit does not have 
thorns?
9. Who is currently the president 
of the United States of America?
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Material D.4.5: Decision Sheet
Question 2: We told you that the money you will earn in the second
quiz depends on how you actually are ranked in this picture above. For
example if you are ranked 7, which means that 3 villagers gave more
correct answers than you and 6 villagers gave less correct answers




Before you take the second quiz where you can earn money, we have
some questions for you and you have to decide which goods and how
many you want to buy.
8 9 10
0 ฿ 10 ฿ 20 ฿ 40 ฿
1 2 3 4 5 6
Question 1: As mentioned before, 10 persons from another village
took the same quiz as you will have to take now. After taking the test
quiz and knowing the second quiz will be similar: When the villager on
the left side of this picture is the one who gave the least correct
answers and the villager on the right side of this picture is the one
who gave the most correct answers, where do you see yourself in this






If you have earned 10 THB for example, we will give you the
goods you wanted to buy and we will deduct 10 THB from the
40 THB credit we gave you. All in all, you have two goods then
and 30 THB.
Please indicate here how many of each good you want. If you do not
want to buy some kind of good put 0 there:
Example: You think you are ranked 7, so you earn 40 THB, and you
want to buy one pack of coffee and one bag of chips. That will cost you
20 THB. After you have answered the second quiz, we will calculate
your earnings.
If you have earned 40 THB for example, we will give you the
goods you wanted to buy and additionally 20 THB.
All in all, you have two goods then and 60 THB.
Question 3: Now, you have to decide how many and which kind of
goods you want. You have to think about how much you will possibly
earn including your credit and how much you can spend on the goods.
You don’t have to buy anything at all. But if you want to, remember
each piece has a discounted price of 10 THB and you can buy as many
different kinds as you want.
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